0i  tfW  muobgicm  s    . 


PRINCETON,     N.     J. 


Shelf. 


Division... \&>.^..\..0..0  6 

Section    ...i.LA..ij.  .1 

Number L».  .(s..!&... 


Digitized  by  the  Internet  Archive 

in  2010  with  funding  from 

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MO  HAL   SCIENCE 


'   OUTLINES 


OF 


MORAL   SCIENCE 


ARCHIBALD  ALEXANDER,  D.D., 

LATE  PROFESSOR  IN  TIIE  THEOLOGICAL  SEMINARY  AT  PRINCETON,  N.  3. 


NEW  YORK: 

CHARLES   SCRIBNER  &   CO.,  654  BROADWAY. 

1868. 


Entered  according  to  Act  of  Congress,  in  the  year  1852,  by 

JAMES  W.  ALEXANDER, 

n  the  Cleik's  Oltice  of  the  District  Court  for  tae  BoUluern  District  of 

New  Vork. 


John  F.  TsoW, 
Printer,  S'.creotyper,  and  Ele:trotJp«r 


CONTENTS. 


— •  •  •- 


MOB 

CHAPTER  L 
CONSCIENCE,  OR   THE    MOEAL   FACULTY,     .  -      19 

CHAPTER  ii. 
THE  MOEAL  JBACULTY,  ORIGINAL  AND  UNIVERSAL,       .      2T 

CHAPTER  IIL 

A.  MOEAL  FACULTY  BEING  SUPPOSED,  WHETHEE  ITS 

DICTATES  ARE  UNIFORM, 80 

CHAPTER  IV. 

HOW  FAR  ALL  MEN  ARE  AGEEED    IN  THEIR  MORAL 

JUDGMENTS, 85 

CHAPTER  V. 

WHETHER  CONSCIENCE  IS  THE  SAME  AS  THE  UNDER- 
STANDING, OR  A  FACULTY  DIFFERENT  FROM  AND 
INDEPENDENT  OF  IT, 40 

CHAPTER  VI. 
THE  MORAL  SENSE  COMPARED  WITH  TASTE,  .  .      44 


VI  CONTENTS. 

rAoi 

CHAPTER  VII. 

MORAL  OBLIGATION,  .  .  43 

CHAPTER  VIII 
THE  SUPREMACY    OF  CONSCIENCE,  .  .      60 

CHAPTER  IX. 

WHETHER  WE  ALWAYS  DO  RIGHT  BY   OBEYING   TIIE 

DICTATES  OF  CONSCIENCE? W 

CHAPTER  X. 

WHETHER  THERE  IS  IN  THE  MIND  A  LAW  OR  RULE, 
BY  WHICH  MAN  JUDGES  OF  THE  MORALITY  OF  PAR- 
TICULAR ACTIONS  ? 73 

CHAPTER  XL 

THE   MORAL   FEELING    WHICH   ACCOMPANIES   EVERY 

MORAL  JUDGMENT, 73 

CHAPTER  XII. 

BELIEF  IN  GOD,  AS  CONNECTED  WITH  THE  OPERA- 
TION OF  CONSCIENCE, $1 

CHAPTER  XIII. 
MORAL  AGENCY,  AND  WHAT  IS  NECESSARY  TO  IT,       .       89 

CHAPTER  XIV. 
MAN  A  MORAL  AGENT 97 


CHAPTER  XV. 
MAN  NOT  UNDER  A  FATAL  NECESSITY,         .  .  .101 


CONTENTS.  VU 

CHAPTER  XVL 

MAX'S  DIRECTION  AND  GOVERNMENT  OF  HIS  ACTIONS, 

AND  HIS  CONSEQUENT  RESPONSIBILITY,  .  .    107 

CHAPTER  XVIL 
OBJECTIONS  TO  THE  UNIFORM  INFLUENCE  OF  MOTIVES,    117 

CHAPTER  XVIIL 
SUMMARY  VIEW  OF  LIBERTY, 125 

CHAPTER  XIX. 

THE  KIND  OF  INDIFFERENCE  WHICH  HAS  BEEN  CON- 
SIDERED ESSENTIAL  TO  FREE  AGENCY,  .  .    132 

CHAPTER  XX. 

WHETHER  MEN  ARE  ACCOUNTABLE  FOE  THEIR  MO- 
TIVES; OR  WHETHER  DESIRES  AND  AFFECTIONS 
WHICH  PRECEDE  VOLITION,  HAVE  A  MORAL  CHAR- 
ACTER?   180 

CHAPTER  XXL 

THE  DIVISION  OF  MOTIVES,  INTO  RATIONAL  AND  ANI- 
MAL, .  in 

CHAPTER  XXII. 

WHETHER  MORALITY  BELONGS  TO  PRINCIPLES  A3 
WELL  AS  ACTS,  OR  IS  CONFINED  TO  ACTS  ALONE  i      147 

CHAPTER  XXIIL 
MORAL  HABITS, 155 


VIU  CONTENTS. 


Maa 

CHAPTER  XXIV. 

THE  NATURE  OF  VIRTUE,  .  .  .  .169 


CHAPTER  XXV. 

THE   NATURE   OF    VIRTUE,   CONTINUED.     DIFFERENT 
HYPOTHESES, 17J 

CHAPTER  XXVL 
THE  NATURE  OF  VIRTUE,  CONTINUED,  .  .  .184 

CHAPTER  XXVIL 

WHETHER  VIRTUE  AND  VICE  BELONG   ONLY  TO  AC- 
TIONS?    ...    199 

CHAPTER  XXVIIL 

THE   AUTHOR  OF  OUR  BEING  CONSIDERED   IN  RELA- 
TION TO  MORAL  SCIENCE, 209 

CHAPTER  XXLX. 
THE  PHENOMENA  OF  THE  UNIYEESE,  .  .  .383 

CHAPTER  XXX. 

DUTIES  OF  MAN  TO  THE  CREATOR  AS  THUS  MANI- 
FESTED ,266 


PREFACE. 


The  work  now  offered  to  the  public  is  the 
last  which  proceeded  from  the  lamented 
author's  hand.  In  the  days  which  imme- 
diately preceded  his  peaceful  departure  oat 
of  the  present  life,  and  while  his  powers 
were  free  from  all  clouds  and  weakness,  he 
spoke  of  these,  papers  as  nearly  prepared  for 
the  press,  and  consigned  them  with  that  in- 
tention to  two  of  his  sons.  With  a  trifling 
exception,  the  whole  had  been  carefully 
transcribed  by  the  hand  of  filial  duty  from 
his  own  character,  which,  more  from  de- 
clining eyesight  than  any  manual  debility, 
had  lost  its  former  boldness  and  clearness, 


1-0  PREFACE. 

and  had  become  difficult.  In  giving  his 
commands  respecting  the  printing,  he  em- 
powered his  representatives  to  use  a  discre- 
tion as  to  lesser  points  in  the  form,  which 
has  been  found  to  be  almost  entirely 
needless. 

The  ministers  of  Christ  who  in  this  and 
other  countries  remember  the  instructions 
of  Dr.  Alexander,  will  be  best  able  to  judge 
of  this  production.  They  will  recognise  in 
it  the  doctrines  and  arguments  which  char- 
acterized the  author's  theological  method, 
and  will  doubtless  prize  it  as  a  comprehen- 
sive syllabus,  even  while  they  miss  that 
copiousness,  vivacity,  and  warmth,  which 
added  efficacy  to  his  oral  teachings. 

The  subject  of  Ethical  Philosophy  may 
be  said  to  have  engaged  the  mind  of  the 
author  for  at  least  threescore  years.  The 
earliest  vestiges  of  his  boyish  studies  show 
proofs'  of  this,  in  connection  with  the  met- 
aphysical inquiries  which  afterwards  be- 


PREFACE.  11 

came  his  favourite  employment  of  mind. 
Though  in  after  years  he  was  almost  daily 
adding  to  his  knowledge  of  ethical  litera- 
ture, with  an  avidity  which  was  unabated 
to  the  last,  and  which  sought  to  be  satisfied 
with  the  most  recondite  disquisitions  in  the 
ancient  tongues  no  less  than  our  own,  he 
nevertheless   appears   to   have   arrived  at 
definite  conclusions  very  early,  and  to  have 
maintained   them   with   little  change.     It 
was  not  the  habit  of  his  mind,  as  is  well 
known,  to  accumulate  authorities,  to  load 
his   discourses   with   learned   citation,   or 
even  to  break  the  continuity  of  his  analyti- 
cal discourse  by  unnecessary  sallies  against 
opponents.     Amidst   a  life   of  perpetual 
reading,  of  which  he  held  the  spoils  in  his 
memory  with  singular  exactness  and  tena- 
city, he  persevered  in  seeking  and  present- 
in^  truth  with  the  minimum  of  quoted  aid. 
This  quality  of  his  thinking  will  be  all  the 
rather  obvious  in  a  treatise  like  the  present, 


PREFACE. 


vrhich,  as  an  epitome  of  extended  results. 
necessarily  leaves  out  a  thousand  particu- 
lars of  the  process  and  all  the  lighter  play 
of  illustration. 

During  the  period  of  nearly  forty  years, 
in  which  he  was  theological  professor,  the 
author  had  an  exercise,  for  the  most  part 
weekly,  in  Mental  and  Moral  Science ;  as  a 
transition  from  college  work  and  a  reca- 
pitulation  of  juvenile  studies.  The  lectures 
thus  delivered  were  the  basis  of  the  suc- 
cinct manual  now  made  public.  All  its 
parts  were  thrown  into  a  shape  suitable  for 
the  printing,  except  the  closing  chapters  on 
the  Beino;  and  Attributes  of  God,  and  the 
duties  resulting  from  the  relation  of  the 
Creator  and  creature. 

These  portions  not  having  been  copied 
remain  in  autograph,  and  may  be  regarded 
us  the  last  written  speculations  of  one  who 
employed  his  pen  almost  every  clay  fur 
more  than  half  a  century.     If  the  articula- 


PREFACE.  13 

tion  of  this  important  member  with  the 
body  of  the  discourse  seem  less  obvious 
than  might  be  desired,  it  will  become  suf- 
ficiently clear  to  such  as  reflect  on  the  great 
earnestness  with  which,  in  the  former  part, 
the  author  maintains  the  intuitive  percep- 
tions of  conscience  as  independent  of  ever) 
doctrine  of  theology,  even  the  greatest. 

A  casual  inspection  will  be  enough  to 
show  any  reader  that  this  is  a  book  cf 
elements;  laying  down  principles,  dealing 
the  statement  of  fundamental  questions, 
and  marking  limits  around  the  science.  It 
does  not  descend  therefore  to  the  more 
usual  and  far  easier  work  of  gathering, 
naming,  and  tabliug  the  human  duties. 
This  labour  he  did  not  undervalue ;  indeed 
it  was  part  of  his  course  of  instructions ; 
and  his  unfinished  manuscripts  contain 
large  contributions  towards  a  separate 
work  in  this  kind,  embracing  even  all  the 
range  of  duties  which  are  properly  Chris 


14  PREFACE 

tian  and  even  ecclesiastical.  But  the  trea- 
tise now  presented  was  intended  to  lay 
foundations  and  elucidate  principles;  in 
other  words  it  is  upon  the  Philosophy  of 
Morals.  At  the  same  time,  however,  that 
the  topics  here  discussed  are  some  of  the 
most  puzzling  which  have  exercised  human 
acuteness,  patience  and  abstraction,  from 
the  days  of  the  Greek  authors  till  our  own, 
they  are  such  as  cannot  be  set  aside  or 
turned  over  to  others  as  matter  for  autho- 
rity ;  for  the  very  reason  that  they  concern 
the  springs  of  daily  action,  are  presented 
every  hour  in  the  household,  and  meet  us 
in  the  very  babblings  of  the  nursery.  And 
notwithstanding  the  tenuity  of  the  objects 
brought  under  review,  and  the  delicate 
thread  of  inquiry  along  which  the  analysis 
must  often  feel  its  way,  the  writer  seems  to 
derive  an  advantage  from  his  unusual  sim- 
plicity and  transparency  of  language,  which 
alight  betray  a  superficial  reader  into  the 


FREFAOE.  15 

opinion  that  the  train  of  argument  is  not 
original  or  profound.  In  none  of  the 
author's  works  is  this  quality  more  appa- 
rent than  in  that  which  follows. 

One  of  the  reasons  which  impelled  Dr. 
Alexander,  at  a  stage  of  life  which  was 
encumbered  with  cares  and  infirmities,  to 
address  himself  to  this  toilsome  composi- 
tion, was  the  desire  to  furnish  a  Manual  for 
the  young  men  of  America,  in  our  colleges, 
theological  seminaries,  and  other  schools. 
He  was  repeatedly  besought  to  supply 
such  a  volume,  and  never  wavered  in  his 
persuasion  that  it  was  necessary  ;  especially 
when  he  saw  with  pain  to  what  an  extent 
the  place  of  a  class-book  was  occupied  by 
the  great  but  dangerous  work  of  Archdea- 
deacon  Paley.  In  common  with  other 
sound  ethical  inquiries  lie  recognised  the 
value  of  President  Way  land's  labours,  and 
the  eloquence  and  richness  of  Dr.  Chal- 
mers's striking  but  fragmentary  contribu- 


16  PREFACE. 

tions.  Yet  lie  thought  he  saw  room  for  a 
brief  hand-book  level  to  the  capacity  of 
all ;  and  he  had  a  natural  and  pardonable 
desire  common  to  all  original  thinkers,  to 
give  vent  to  his  own  opinions  in  his  own 
order.  In  regard  to  the  ethical  system 
here  expounded,  the  work  may  safely  be  left 
to  speak  for  itself.  It  is  positive  and  di- 
dactic rather  than  controversial,  yet  there 
is  scarcely  a  chapter  which,  however  tran- 
quil and  subdued  in  its  tone,  will  not 
awaken  opposition  in  some  quarter  or  other. 
The  polemic  aspect  of  the  treatise  is,  how- 
ever, apparent  only  in  cases  where  to  avoid 
the  naming  of  opponents  would  have  been 
an  affectation  no  less  than  a  breach  of  trust. 
No  one,  whatever  his  private  dissent  may 
DC,  will  justly  complain  that  his  opinions 
have  been  treated  with  unfairness  or  rigour. 
The  connection  of  ethics  with  theology  is 
such  that  no  one  can  treat  of  the  nature  of 
virtue,  of  the  will,  of  motives,  and  the  like, 


PREFACE.  17 

without  at  loast  indicating  his  tendencies  in 
regard  to  the  great  dividing  questions  of 
revelation ;  which  only  increases  the  neces- 
sity for  giving  the  right  direction  to 
juvenile  studies ;  unless  we  would  receive 
to  the  professional  curriculum  minds 
already  pre-occupied  with  ethical  tenets 
subversive  of  great  truths  in  law,  politics 
and  theology.  Those  who  have  watched 
the  progress  of  modern  speculation  will 
not  fail  to  apprehend  the  drift  of  this 
observation.  Yet  the  way  in  which  even 
these  somewhat  delicate  parts  of  moral 
science  are  here  set  forth,  is  such  as 
never  to  awaken  suspicion  of  any  sinister 
intention,  or  to  betray  any  irregular  pas- 
sage into  a  neighbouring  but  separate 
science.  Even  those  discussions  which,  at 
a  first  view,  might  seem  to  belong  rather  to 
natural  theology,  were  deliberately  assigned 
to  their  place  after  long  experience  ic 
teaching,  as  pertaining  to  the  limits  where 


18  TEEFACE. 

the  two  fields  osculate  if  they  do  not  cut} 
and  with  a  clear  pre-eminence  given  to  the 
ethical  side  of  the  truths  common  to  both. 

The  labours  of  the  author  were  arrested 
by  his  last  illness,  when  the  work  here 
published  was  complete  indeed  as  has  been 
said,  but  not  ready  for  the  press  in  the 
sense  of  beins:  revised  and  corrected.  It  is 
this  whicli  has  made  these  prefatory  pages 
necessary ;  an  introduction  from  the  au- 
thors  hand  would  have  precluded  all 
such  attempts  as  weak  and  impertinent. 

As  he  gave  the  work  in  charge  with  his 
dying  lips,  after  having  no  doubt  offered  it 
to  God  in  many  of  his  solicitous  and  ele- 
vated thoughts  during  the  preparation,  so 
it  is  now  humbly  dedicated  to  Him,  with 
#ut  whose  blessing,  no  human  effort,  even 
in  the  best  cause,  is  other  than  worthless. 

New  Yot.k,  Aug.  1,  1852. 


MORAL    SCIENCE. 


CHAPTER  I. 

CONSCIENCE,  OR  THE  MORAL  FACULTY. 

As  all  men,  when  reason  is  developed,  have  a 
faculty  by  which  they  can  discern  a  difference  be- 
tween objects  of  sight  which  are 

,  .  „   ,  ,    ,,  i'i  i        All  men  discern  mor- 

beautiful  and  those  which  are  cte-  a  qualities. 
formed,  so  all  men  possess  the  power 
of  discerning  a  difference  between  actions,  as  to 
their  moral  quality.  The  judgment  thus  formed 
\s  immediate,  and  has  no  relation  to  the  useful- 
ness or  injuriousness  to  human  happiness,  of  the 
objects  contemplated. 

Whatever  difference  of  opinion  may  exist  re- 
specting the  origin  of  this  faculty,  it  is  univer- 
sal^ admitted   that  men,   in   all 

J  True  in  all  ages 

ages  and  countries,  have  judged 

some  actions  to  be  good  and  deserving  of  appro 


20  MOEAL   SCIENCE. 

bation,  while  they  have  judged  others  to  be  bad, 
and  of  ill  desert. 

In  all  languages,  we  find  words  expressive  of 
the  ideas  of  moral  excellence,  and  moral  evil. 

In  the  laws  and  penalties  estab- 
AgreeS.°fman'   hshedin  all  ages  throughout  the 

world,  it  is  evidently  implied  that 
some  actions  ought  to  be  done,  and  others 
avoided.  In  cases  of  flagrant  injustice  or  in- 
gratitude, all  men,  of  every  country  and  of  every 
age,  agree  in  their  judgment  of  their  moral  evil. 
There  is,  in  regard  to  such  actions,  no  more  dif- 
ference in  the  judgment  of  men,  than  respecting 
the  colour  of  grass,  or  the  taste  of  honey.  If  any 
man  does  not  perceive  grass  to  be  green,  or  ho- 
ney to  be  sweet,  we  do  not  thence  conclude  that 
men's  bodily  senses  are  not  similarly  constituted, 
but  that  the  organs  of  the  individual  who  does 
not  see  and  taste  as  other  men  do,  are  defective. 
or  depraved  by  disease. 

To  determine  whether  all  men  have  one  ori- 
.         einal  moral  faculty,  the  case  pro- 

Case  proposed  must    o  J  »  i 

be  simple.  posed   for   their    moral  judgment 

should  be  simply  good  or  evil.     For  a  complex 


CONSCIENCE.  21 

act,  in  which  there  is  something  good  and 
something  evil,  or  rather  where  there  must  be  an 
accurate  weighing  of  motives  in  order  to  ascertain 
♦lib  quality  of  the  action,  is  not  a  proper  test  as  to 
the  existence  of  a  uniformity  of  moral  judgment 
in  men.  Therefore,  the  historical  fact  adduced 
by  Dr.  Paley,*  from  the  history  of  Valerius  Max- 
mius,  is  not  at  all  suited  to  his  purpose ;  because 
the  case  is  very  complex,  and  one 
on  which  it  is  difficult  to  determine  Caae  °f  Toranin3  * 

relative. 

at  first  view,  what  the  true  moral 
character  of  the  action  is.  The  facts,  as  related 
by  him,  are  as  follows:  The  father  of  Caius 
Toranius  had  been  proscribed  by  the  Trium- 
virate. Caius  Toranius — coming  over  to  the  in- 
terests of  that  party — discovered  his  father's 
place  of  concealment  to  the  officers  who  were  in 
pursuit  of  him,  and  gave  them,  withal,  a  descrip 
tion  of  his  person  by  whicV  they  might  distin- 
guish him.  The  old  man,  more  anxious  for 
the  safety  and  fortunes  of  his  son  than  for  the 
little  "that  might  remain  of  his  own  life,  began 

*  In  the  chapter  of  his  Moral  Philosophy,  under  the  head 
'•  The  Moral  Sanse." 


22  MORAL    SCIENCE. 

immediately  to  inquire  of  the  officers  whether 
his  son  were  well,  and  whether  he  had  done  his 
duty  to  the  satisfaction  of  the  generals.  '  That 
son  (replied  one  of  the  officers),  so  dear  to  tlrv# 
affections,  has  betrayed  thee  to  us ;  by  his  infor 
mation  thou  art  apprehended,  and  diest.'  With 
this,  the  officer  struck  a  poniard  to  his  heart, 
and  the  unhappy  parent  fell,  affected  not  so 
much  by  his  fate,  as  by  the  means  to  which  he 
owed  it."  Now,  the  question  is,  if  this  story 
were  related  to  the  wild  boy  caught  some  years 
ago  in  the  woods  of  Hanover,  or  to  a  savage 
without  experience  and  without  instruction,  cut 
off  in  his  infancy  from  all  intercourse  with  his 
species,  and  consequently  under  no  possible  influ- 
ence of  example,  authority,  education,  sympathy, 
or  habit,  whether  or  not  such  a  one  would  feel 
upon  the  relation  any  degree  of  that  sentiment 
of  disapprobation  of  Toranius's  conduct  which  we 
feel. 

In  our  judgment,  such  a  case  would  afford  no 
.m    ,.  „~  .         criterion    by  which  to  determine 

why  it  affords  no  J 

criterion.  whether  men  possess  constitution- 

ally a  moral  sense.     For,  in   the  first  place,  the 


CONSCIENCE,  23 

trial  would  be  no  better  thau  if  the  question  were 
proposed  to  a  child  two  years  old,  in  whose 
mind  the  moral  faculty  is  not  yet  developed 
A  human  being,  arrived  at  adult  age  without  in- 
truction  or  communication  with  others,  would  be 
— as  it  relates  to  the  mind — in  a  state  differing  very 
little  from  that  of  infancy.  It  is  not  held  that 
the  moral  sense  will  be  exercised  without  the 
usual  means  by  which  human  faculties  are  devel- 
oped. If  an  organical  defect  in  the  brain  should 
prevent '  the  intellectual  faculties  from  coming 
into  exercise,  the  unhappy  individual  thus  de- 
prived of  reason  would  prove  nothing  in  regard 
to  the  operations  of  reason  where  it  is  developed. 
So,  also,  if  a  human  being  were  brought  up  from 
early  infancy  in  a  dark  dungeon,  and  if  no  infor- 
mation were  communicated  to  him,  the  mental 
faculties  would  not  be  developed,  and  it  would 
be  absurd  to  have  recourse  t4fcBuch  a  one  to  ascer- 
tain what  faculties  belong  to  the  human  mind. 
The  same  remark  will  apply  to  the  case  of  the 
wild  boy,  referred  to  by  Dr.  Paley ;  and  also, 
though  in  an  inferior  degree,  to  savages  of  the 
most  degraded  class. 


24  MORAL   SCIENCE. 

Let  it  then  be  fairly  understood  what  it  is 

which  is  asserted  in  regard  to  conscience,  as  an 

original,  universal  faculty.     It  is 

Vi"hat  is  meant   by 

anonginai,uriiver-  that  every  human  mind,  when  its 

sal  faculty. 

faculties  have  been  developed,  and 
have  arrived  at  some  degree  of  maturity,  dis- 
cerns a  quality  in  certain  actions  which  is  termed 
moral ;  that  is,  it  intuitively  perceives  that  some 
actions  are  right  and  some  wrong. 

Another  objection  to  the  historical  fact  ad- 
duced by  Dr.  Paley,  is,  that  it  presents  to  the 
mind,  not  a  case  of  simple,  unmix- 

Pt£InStan0eC°m'  ed  S°od  or   evil>  but  a  comPle* 
case,  in  which — before  a  judgment 

can  be  formed  of  the  action  of  the  son — it  must  be 

decided  whether  a  man  ought  to  be  governed  by  a 

regard  to  the  welfare  of  a  parent,  or  to  the  public 

good.  If  the  son  believed  that  the  party  in  pursuit 

of  his  father  was  promoting  the  public  good,  he 

might  feel  that  he  ought  to  be  governed  by  this 

rather  than  by  filial  affection.     Here,  then,  we 

have  presented  a  complex  and  difficult  case  in 

morals,  about  which  men  would  be  very  apt  to 


CONSCIENCE.  25 

differ ;  an  J  we  are  to  determine  whether  all  men — 
even  those,  totally  uneducated — would  view  it  in 
the  same  lisrlxt. 

To  render  the  case  a  suitable  one  to  De  a  test 
of  the  question  under  consideration,  it  should  be 

supposed  that  the  father  was  act- 
po«!*r  °     Snp"  inS  m  conformity  with  the  strictest 

principles  of  rectitude ;  that  his  life 
was  sought  by  wicked  men,  aiming  not  at  the  good 
of  the  commonwealth  but  its  destruction ;  and  that 
the  son,  in  betraying  the  place  of  his  concealment, 
was  actuated  by  mercenary  motives,  or  by  unjust 
and  unnatural  dislike  to  a  good  parent.  If  a  case 
like  this  were  presented  to  a  thousand  persons, 
from  as  many  different  parts  of  the  world,  there 
would  be  but  one  judgment  and  one  feeling, 
all  would  judge  the  conduct  of  the  son  to  be 
blamable.  Different  degrees  of  moral  disappro- 
bation would  be  felt  by  those  ^hose  moral  faculty 
was  in  a  cultivated  state ;  but  there  would  be  no 
difference  in  the  opinion  entertained  of  his  con- 
duct. All  would  feel  disapprobation,  accom- 
panied by  a  desire  for  the  punishment  of  the 


26  MORAL   SCIENCE. 

offender.     It  is  found  that  savages   appear  to 
have  but  an  obscure  exercise  of  conscience,  but 
in  proportion  as  their  minds  are  cultivated,  this 
faculty  becomes  more  manifest,  and  operates  mor 
forcibly. 


CHAPTER  II. 

THE  MORAL  FACULTY,  ORIGINAL  AND  UNIVERSAL 

If  conscience  were  not  an  original  faculty,  en- 
abling us  to  form  a  conception  of  moral  qualities, 
man  could  never  acquire  such  an 
idea  by  any  other  means.  The  *££*£? 
opinion,  therefore,  that  moral  feel- 
ings are  merely  the  effect  of  instruction  and  edu- 
cation, is  erroneous.  For  every  class  of  simple 
ideas  there  must  be  an  appropriate  faculty,  without 
which  these  ideas  can  never  be  acquired.  In  re- 
gard to  the  bodily  senses,  this  is  too  evident  to  be 
called  in  question.  Without  the  organ  of  vision 
the  simple  idea  of  light  and  colours  could  never  b  e 
communicated  by  any  instructions ;  without  the 
organ  of  hearing,  no  idea  of  sound  can  be  convey- 
ed; and  so  of  the  other  senses.  And  it  is  equally 
true  of  that  knowledge  which  is  acquired  by 


28  MORAL   SCIENCE. 

what  some  have  called  the  internal  senses  If 
there  were  in  man  no  such  faculty  as  taste,  by 
which  beauty  is  perceived,  no  idea  of  the  beau- 
tiful could  possibly  be  communicated.  A  horse 
has  no  perception  of  the  beauty  of  a  scene  which 
perhaps  enchants  his  rider,  even  though  the  ani- 
mal sees  all  the  objects  with  equal  distinctness.  So 
it  is  in  regard  to  moral*  qualities.  There  must 
be  an  original  faculty  to  give  us  the  simple  idea 
which  we  have  of  morality ;  otherwise  the  idea 
of  virtue  or  vice  could  never  have  entered  the 
human  mind,  and  the  feelings  of  moral  obligation, 
of  which  all  men  are  conscious,  would  never 
have  been  felt. 

I  am  aware  that  those  who  advocate  the  utili- 
tarian scheme,  resolve  all  our  ideas  of  morality 
and  moral  obligation  into  the  mere 
Ttc^'im  °b'  principles  of  benefit  or  injury,  ap 
prehended  to  be  connected  witb 
each  action.  Dr.  Paley  informs  us,  that  the  sub- 
ject continued  to  be  involved  in  impenetrable 
mystery,  until  he  took  this  view  of  it. 

It  is  deemed  useless  to  argue  this  point ;  it 
cannot  be  decided  by  reasoning.     The   appeal 


UNIVERSALITY   OF   CONSCIENCE.  29 

must  be  made  to  the  consciousness  of  every 
man. 

If  any  one  persists  in  declaring 

-  ...  .  Appeal  to  consclous- 

tliat  he  sees  no  evil  m  any  action  nesa. 
but  as  it  is  evidently  detrimental  to 
human  happiness,  nothing  can  be  said  in  the  way 
of  argument  to  alter  convictions  derived  from  hia 
own  consciousness.  All  that  is  proper  to  be  said 
is,  that  the  mind  of  such  a  person  is  differently 
constituted  from  that  of  most  men;  or  rather 
that  an  impartial  examination  of  this  subject  has 
not  been  made.  It  is  recommended  to  such  per- 
sons carefully  to  scrutinize  the  exercises  of  their 
own  minds ;  they  will  perceive  that  the  idea  of 
virtue  or  moral  good  is  entirely  distinct  from 
that  of  mere  utility.  There  is,  indeed,  a  con- 
nection between  these  two  things  which  is  very 
intimate,  and  this  seems  to  have  misled  many 
in  their  judgments.  Virtuous  conduct  leads  to 
happiness,  and  is  always  beneficial ;  yet  our  idea 
of  its  moral  character  is  not  derived  from  this 
consideration,  but  from  the  nature  of  the  action 
itself. 


CHAPTER  ffl. 

A  MORAL   FACULTY  BEING  SUPPOSED,  WHETHER  ITS  DIC 
TATES  ARE  UNIFORM? 

One  of  the  strongest  objections  which  has  been 

brought  against  the  doctrine  laid  down  is,  that 

among  men  of  different  countries, 

°%22£l£i  a*d  of  e^ely  different  education, 
there  is  no  agreement  in  their 
judgments  respecting  the  morality  or  immorality 
of  the  same  actions.  Whereas,  it  is  alleged,  that 
if  such  a  faculty  were  originally  a  part  of  man's 
constitution,  there  would  as  certainly  be  uniform- 
ity, as  in  the  perception  of  objects  by  the  exter- 
nal senses.  Now,  if  the  dictates  of  conscience 
in  men  of  different  ages  and  countries  do  so 
much  differ,  does  it  not  show  that  the  moral  feel- 
ings of  men  are  just  what  education  makes  them? 
And  what  is  gained  by  maintaining  the  existence 


UNIFORMITY    OF   MORAL   DICTATES.  31 

of  a  moral  faculty,  as  part  of  man's  original 
constitution  ? 

It  mil,  I  think,  oe  admitted,  that  in  all  coun- 
tries and  conditions  in  which  men  have  been 
found,  there  exists  a  perception  of 

-■ .  rtn  .i  it  Moral     differences 

a  difference  in  the  moral  character  pcrceived  by  ^ 
of  actions ;  that  is,  some  things  are 
accounted  wrong,  which  ought  not  to  be  done, 
and  some  right,  which  ought  to  be  done. 

Again,  it  has  never  been  pretended  as  being  a 
matter  of  fact,  that  between   men  of  different 
countries  there  is  a  total  difference 
in  the  opinions  entertained  respect-  To^J  pSST*  ' 
ing  what  is  right    and  what   is 
wrong.     A  few  cases  only  of  difference  are  al- 
leged, in  which  this   discrepance   is   observed; 
but  in  regard  to  those  actions  which  are  reckoned 
good  or  evil,  there  is  a  general  agreement.   '  As 
to  those  in  which  there  seems  to  be  a  fundamen- 
tal difference,  an  explanation  will  be  given  here- 
after.    No  nation,  or  tribe,  or  class  of  mankind 
has  ever  held  that  it  is  a  virtuous  and  proper 
thing  to  do  injury  to  men,  or  that  there  is  no  more 
harm  in  taking  away  life  than  in  preserving  it.   Tt 


32  MORAL   SCIENCE. 

has  never  been  held  that  ingratitude — though 
everywhere  common  in  practice — is  a  commend- 
able thing ;  or  that  deceit  and  fraud  are  as  praise- 
worthy as  honesty  and  fair  dealing. 

There  is  in  every  country  a  difference  made 

in  the  estimation  of  the  character  of  men,  derived 

from  the  course  of  their  conduct, 

Proof  from  common 

estimate  of  char-  Some  men  are  reckoned  good  in 

Hcter. 

the  public  estimation,  while  others 
are  considered  wicked ;  the  former  obtain  esteem, 
the  latter  are  despised.  That  course  of  conduct 
which  secures  a  good  reputation,  does  not  in 
any  country  consist  of  actions  which  we  con- 
sider wicked,  but  of  actions  which  in  all  coun- 
tries are  considered  praiseworthy ;  and  men  have 
never  obtained  a  bad  character  by  a  course  oi 
good  behaviour. 

It  is  also  important  to  observe,  that  the  con- 
duct of  a  people  is  not  a  fair  test  of  the  internal 
state  of  the  mind,  as  it  relates  to 

Practice   docs    not  _^_^ 

prove  absence  of  morals.     We  know  that  individu- 

moral  judgment. 

als  often  pursue  a  course  of  con- 
duct, which  in  their  serious  moments  they  con 
demn.     Yet  the  power  of  temptation,  and  the 


UNIFOEMITY    OF   MORAL   DICTATES.  38 

aabit  of  indulgence  are  such,  that  notwithstand- 
ing the  convictions  of  conscience,  they  continue 
in  a  course  of  evil-doing.  It  would  be  a  very  in- 
conclusive inference  to  determine  from  their 
habitual  conduct,  that  they  acted  in  accordance 
with  the  dictates  of  conscience.  And  what  is 
true  of  individuals,  may  be  true  of  nations  and 
tribes.  Those  customs  which  they  have  received 
from  their  forefathers,  may  not  meet  with  the 
approbation  of  their  moral  sense,  and  yet  such 
is  the  force  of  an  established  custom,  that  they 
go  on  in  the  way  in  which  they  were  brought  up. 

But  a  more  satisfactory  explanation  of  those 
facts,  in  which  men  seem  conscientiously  to  go 
contrary  to  the  fundamental  prin- 
ciples of  morals,  is,  that  the  prin-  potion."  *  *P" 
ciple  on  which  they  act  is  correct, 
but  through  ignorance  or  error  they  make  an 
erroneous  application  of  it. 

When  parents  murder  their  own  female  chil 
dren — a  thing  very  customarj7  in  China — it  is  on 
the   principle   that  they   will    be 

Infanticide 

subject  to  more  misery  than  hap- 
piness in  the  world ;  and    therefore  it  is  doing 
2* 


34  MORAL   SCIENCE. 

them  a  favour.  Hero,  the  general  principle  is 
correct — that  parents  should  consult  the  best  in- 
terests of  their  offspring — but  the  mistake  is  in 
the  application.  The  same  may  be  said  of  the 
practice  of  exposing  aged  parents,  when  they 
become  incapable  of  enjoying  the  world. 

As  to  those  acts  of  cruelty  which  the  Pagans 

perform  in  their   religious   services,    (the   wife 

committing  herself  to  the  flames 

Heathen     enormi-      ^    ^    -^     Qf    ^     deceaged 

husband ;  children  voluntarily 
thrown  into  the  Ganges,  or  persons  devoting 
their  own  lives  by  falling  under  the  car  of  Jug- 
gernaut,) they  are  performed  on  the  principle 
that  what  God  requires,  or  what  pleases  him,  or 
what  will  secure  happiness  for  ourselves  or 
friends,  should  be  done.  It  is  true  that  the  will 
of  God  should  be  obeyed,  whatever  sacrifice  he 
may  require ;  their  error  is  in  thinking  that 
such  sacrifices  are  required  by  Him. 


CHAPTER  IV. 

UOW  FAE  ALL  MEN  ARE  AGREED  IN  THEIR  MDRAL  JUDO 
MENTS. 

As  the  subject  of  morals  is  very  extensive,  and 
particular  cases  may  be  complicated,  and  as 
men  are  not  only  ignorant,  but 
prejudiced  by  the  errors  received  **£"*****' 
in  their  education,  it  is  no  more 
wonderful  that  they  should  adopt  different  opin- 
ions on  these  subjects  than  on  other  matters. 
That,  however,  which  is  true  in  regard  to  every 
department  of  human  knowledge,  is  doubtless 
true  in  regard  to  the  science  of  morals.  There 
are  certain  self-evident  truths,  which  are  intui 
tively  perceived  by  every  one  who  has  the  exer- 
cise of  reason,  as  soon  as  they  are  presented  to 
the  mind.  In  regard  to  these  fundamental  truths, 
there  has  never  been  any  difference  of  opinion. 


36  -        MORAL   SCIENCE. 

It  is  not  meant  that  all  men  distinctly  think  of 
these  primary  truths  in  morals ;  for  many  arc  so 
inattentive,  or  so  much  occupied  with  sensible 
objects,  that  they  can  scarcely  be  said  ever  to 
reflect  on  the  subject  of  moral  dut}^.  But  let  an 
act  of  manifest  injustice  be  performed  before 
their  eyes,  and  among  a  thousand  spectators 
there  will  be  but  one  opinion,  and  but  one  feel- 
ing. If  a  strong  man,  for  example,  violently 
takes  away  the  property  of  one  weaker  than 
himself,  and  for  no  other  reason  than  because  he 
covets  it,  all  men  will  condemn  the  act.  So,  if 
any  one  who  has  received  from  another  great 
benefits,  not  only  refuses  to  make  any  grateful 
return,  but  on  the  contrary,  returns  evil  for  good, 
all  men  will  agree  in  judging  his  conduct  to  be 
wrong.  All  intuitively  discern  that  for  a  ruler 
to  punish  the  innocent  and  spare  the  guilty,  is 
morally  wrong.  It  is  not  true,  in  fact,  that  there 
is  no  agreement  among  men  as  to  the  funda- 
mental principles  of  morals.  Their  judgments 
on  these  points  are  as  uniform  as  on  the  axioms 
of  mathematics ;  as  in  their  agreement  that  t  ie 
starry  firmament  is  grand  and  beautiful ;  .yea,  as 


AGREEMENT   IN   MORALS.  37 

uniform  as  concerning  the  greenness  of  the  grass, 
or  the  varied  colours  of  the  rainbow. 

Mr.  Locke,  in  his  zeal  to  disprove   the  ex- 
istence of   innate  truths,  attempts 
to  render  uncertain  some  of  these 
first  truths  of  morals. 

When  we  go  beyond  'these  first  principles, 
we  may  expect  to  find  men  falling  into  grievous 
error  respecting  moral  duty ;  and 
this  often  appears  in  their  applica-        intuitive  judg- 

x  x  A  ■*■  ments. 

tion  of  general  principles  to  parti- 
cular cases.  Most  men  either  reason  not  at  all, 
or  reason  badly,  and  draw  from  sound  principles 
incorrect  conclusions.  For  the  most  part,  they 
receive  implicitly  what  they  have  been  taught ; 
or  they  are  governed  in  their  opinions  by  the 
common  sentiment ;  or  they  adopt  as  true  what 
is  most  for  their  interest,  or  most  agreeable  to 
their  feelings.  And  as  men  are  often  under  the 
influence  of  feelings  or  passions  which  produce 
perturbation  of  mind,  and  so  bias  the  judgment, 
it  is  easy  to  see  how  errors  of  judgment  respect- 
ing moral  conduct,  in  many  cases,  may  spring 
up.     And  yet  it  is  true,  that  there  are  primary 


38  MORAL   SCIENCE. 

truths  in  morals,  in  which  all  men  agree,  so  soon 
as  they  are  presented  to  the  mind.  As  in  other 
eases,  by  pursuing  a  course  of  sophistical  reason- 
ings, conclusions  may  be  arrived  at  which  are 
contradictory  to  these  first  principles,  and  this 
will  produce  perplexity  ;  or  even  a  kind  of  spe- 
culative assent  may  be  yielded  to  such  conclu- 
sions of  ratiocination ;  but  whenever  it  is  neces- 
sary to  form  a  practical  judgment,  the  belief  of 
intuitive  truths  must  prevail.  Our  assent  in 
these  cases  is  not  a  matter  of  choice,  but  of  ne- 
Berkei  cessity.    Bishop  Berkeley  thought 

he  had  demonstrated  that  there 
was  no  external  world ;  and  many  others  thought 
there  was  no  flaw  in  his  reasoning :  but  all  these 
speculative  skeptics  were,  nevertheless,  practical 
believers  in  the  real  existence  of  external  ob- 
jects. Atheistical  and  infidel  philosophers  have 
often  endeavoured  to  prove  that  there  is  no  in- 
trinsic difference  between  right  and  wrong,  and 
some  of  them  probably  persuaded  themselves 
that  this  opinion  was  true ;  but  these  very  men, 
when  an  act  of  great  injustice  towards  them- 
selves or  friends  was  committed,  could  not  but 


AGREEMENT   IN   MORALS.  39 

feel  tliat  it  was  morally  evil;  and  when  they 
saw   an    act   of  disinterested  benevolence   per- 
formed, they  could  not  but  approve  it  as  morally 
ood. 


CHAPTER  V. 

WHETHER  CONSCIENCE  IS  THE  SAME  AS  THE  UNDERSTAND 
ING,  OR  A  FACULTY  DIFFERENT  FROM  AND  INDEFEND- 
ENT  OF  IT. 

Some  have  maintained  that  our  moral  feelings 
and  judgments  are  the  exercise  of  a  peculiar 
C4_4     ,  „  sense,  and  that  the  perceptions  and 

State  of  the  ques-  '  *  ± 

tlon*  feelings  of  this  sense   cannot  be 

referred  to  the  understanding.  Such  as  main- 
tain this  theory  suppose,  also,  that  the  dictates 
of  conscience  are  infallibly  correct,  if  the  mind 
is  in  a  proper  state. 

Others  have  maintained  that  the  dictates  of 

conscience  are  the  judgments  of  the  understand 

ing,  in  regard  to  moral  duty,  and 

Truths  premised. 

that,  of  course,  an  error  in  the 
judgment  of  the  understanding  must  affect  the 
decisions  or   dictates   of  conscience.     To  clear 


CONSCIENCE   AND   KEASON.  41 

this  subject,  if  possible,  from  all  obscurity  and 
perplexity,  I  would  make  the  following  re- 
marks:  ^J  % 

1st.  The  exercise  of  the   moral  faculty,  01 
conscience,  is  not  simply  an  intellectual  act ;  it 


is  complex,  including  two  things 

The  act  complex 

— a  judgment  and  an  emotion,  or 


feeling  of  a  peculiar  kind. 

2d.  All  judgments  of  the  mind,  whatever  be 

the  subject  of  them,  appertain   to   the  under- 

r- 
standing.    This  comprehensive  fa- 
culty includes  all  intellectual  acts,  AsJaJsm^it!si„ 

J  '  tellectaaL 

whether  relating  to  external  ob- 
jects, mathematical  relations,  natural  beauty  and 
sublimity,  or  moral  duty.  So  far,  therefore,  as 
conscience  is  a  judgment  respecting  any  moral 
subject,  so  far  it  is  an  exercise  of  the  understand 
ing.  We  have  not  one  faculty  by  which  we 
discern  physical  truths,  another  by  which  we 
judge  of  mathematical  theorems,  and  another  for 
matters  of  taste ;  but  all  these  are  the  one  and 
the  same  understanding,  exercised  on  different 
objects.  Accordingly,  when  moral  qualities  are 
the  objects  of  our  contemplation,  it  is  not  a  dif- 


42  MOKAL   SCIENCE. 

ferent  faculty  from  the.  reason  or  understanding 
wliich  thinks  and  judges,  but  the  same,  exercised 
on  other  subjects;  and  the  only  difference  is  in 
the  object.  Our  conclusion  therefore  is,  that  so 
far  as  conscience  is  an  intellectual  act  or  judg- 
ment of  the  mind,  so  far  it  belongs  to  the  under- 
standing. 

3d.  But  as  more  is  included  under  the  name 
conscience  than  a  mere  intellectual  act  or  judg- 
ment, and  as  this  judgment  is  at- 

More  than  intellect- 
ual acts  in  con-  tended    with    a    peculiar  feeling, 

science 

called  moral,  and  easily  distin- 
guished from  all  other  emotions;  and  as  mere 
emotion  or  feeling  can  with  no  propriety  be  re- 
ferred to  the  reason,  therefore  conscience  is,  so 
far  as  this  is  concerned,  different  from  the  un- 
derstanding. 

4th.  If  the  moral  judgments  of  the  mind 
were  from  a  faculty  distinct  from  the  under- 
standing, and  often  differing  from 

Harmony  of  mentai 

operations  as  to  it,    the    harmony   of  the  mental 

morals. 

operations  would  be  destroyed. 
While  reason  led  to  one  conclusion,  conscience 
might    dictate    the    contrary.     And  upon  this 


ONSCIENCE   AND   REASON.  43 

theory,  conscience  must  always  be  correct,  un- 
less the  faculty  be  morbid. 

All  experience  and  history  show  that  men 
may  act  under  the  influence  of  an  erroneous 
conscience.  The  dictates  of  con- 
science are  always  in  conformity  Hoj£r^eilce 
with  the  practical  judgments  of 
reason.  When  these  are  erroneous,  conscience 
is  erroneous.  The  conclusion  therefore  is  that 
conscience  is  not  a  distinct  faculty  from  reason, 
so  far  as  it  consists  in  a  judgment  of  the  quality 
of  moral  acts.  Eeason  or  understanding  is  the 
genus ;  the  judgments  of  conscience  are  the 
species.  Eeason  has  relation  to  all  intelligible 
subjects ;  the  moral  faculty  is  conversant  about 
moral  qualities  alone. 


CHAPTER  VI. 

THE  m<;ral  sense  compared  with  taste. 

From  what  was  said  in  the  preceding  chapter,  it 

appears  that  conscience,  or  the  moral  sense,  is 

not  a  simple  but  a  compound  fac- 

The    term   moral  uity  incluclmg  both  an  intellectual 

sense.  J  >  ° 

act  or  judgment,  and  a  peculiar 
feeling  or  emotion.  The  name  moral  sense  was 
probably  adopted  to  express  this  feeling,  or 
internal  emotion.  It  will  serve  perhaps  to  illus- 
trate this  subject,  if  we  bring  into  view  another 
faculty,  between  which  and  the  moral  sense 
there  is  a  remarkable  analogy.  I  refer  to  what 
is  commonly  called  Taste,  or  that  faculty  by 
which  men  are  in  some  degree  capable  of  per- 
ceiving and  relishing  the  beauties  of  nature  and 
art,  In  this  there  is  a  judgment  respecting  that 
quality  denominated  Beauty,  but  there  is  also 


CONSCIENCE   AND   TASTE.  45 

a  vivid  emotion  of  a  peculiar  kind,  accompany- 
ing this  judgment.  The  external  objects  in 
which  beauty  is  resident,  might  be  distinctly 
seen,  and  yet  no  such  quality  be  perceived ;  as 
was  before  mentioned  in  regard  to  certain  ani- 
mals, whose  sight  and  hearing  is  more  acute  than 
those  of  men,  and  which  yet  appear  to  be  utterly 
insensible  of  the  quality  called  beauty. 

If  the  question  should  be  raised  whether 
Taste  is  merely  an  exercise  of  the  under- 
standing, the  proper  answer  WOUld  Analogy  between 
.  ,  ,  r  judgments   of  tasta 

be  precisely  as  m  the  case  of  and  of  conscience, 
conscience,  viz.,  so  far  as  it  consists 
in  judgment,  it  appertains  to  the  intellectual  facul- 
ty ;  but  so  far  as  it  consists  in  emotion,  it  does 
not.  •  And  in  this,  as  in  matters  of  conscience, 
errors  of  judgment  will  affect  the  emotions  pro- 
duced. In  cultivating  Taste,  it  is  of  the  utmost 
importance  that  correct  opinions  be  adopted  in 
relation  to  the  objects  of  this  faculty. 

The  question  may  perhaps  be  asked,  why 
either  of  these  should  be  considered  a  distinct 
faculty  of  the  mind.  In  regard  to  mental  facul- 
ties or  powers,  there   is   a  want  of  agreement 


46  MORAL   SCIENCE. 

among  philosophers,  as  to  what  is  lequisite  to 

entitle  any  mental  operation  to  be  referred  to  a 

distinct  and  original  faculty.     In 

Whether   in  ei-  .         .        , 

ther  case  a  distinct  these  two  cases,  there  exists  m  the 

faculty.  .    . 

mind  a  capacity  for  perceiving  pe- 
culiar qualities  in  certain  appropriate  objects. 
Though  the  ideas  of  beauty  and  morality  are 
judgments  of  the  understanding,  it  requires  a 
faculty'suited  to  the  objects,  to  enable  the  under- 
standing to  obtain  the  simple  ideas  of  beauty  and 
morality.  We  can  conceive  of  a  rational  mind 
without  such  a  capacity.  There  is  also  in  these 
faculties,  the  susceptibility  of  a  peculiar  emo- 
tion, dissimilar  from  all  others ;  and  these  two 
things  constitute  the  faculty  of  Taste  or  Con- 
science But  it  is  a  matter  of  no  importance 
whether  taste  and  conscience  be  called  distinct 
and  original  faculties,  if  what  has  been  said  re- 
specting their  nature  be  admitted. 

There  is  in  the  human  mind  a  capacity  of 

discerning  what  is  termed  beauty, 

0ri^lswfptibi1'  in  the  works  of  nature  and  art. 

ity  in  both. 

This  judgment  is  accompanied  by 
a  pleasurable  emotion,  and  to  this  capacity  or 


CONSCIENCE   AND  TASTE.  47 

susceptibility  we  give  the  name  Taste.  There  is 
also  a  power  of  discerning  moral  qualities,  which 
conception  is  also  attended  with  a  vivid  emo- 
tion ;  and  to  this  power  or  faculty  we  give  the 
name  Conscience,  or  the  moral  faculty.  Both  these 
are  so  far  original  parts  of  our  constitution,  that 
if  there  did  not  exist  in  every  mind  a  sense  of 
beauty  and  its  contrary,  and  a  sense  of  right  and 
wrong,  such  ideas  could  be  generated,  or  com- 
municated by  no  process  of  education. 


CHAPTER  VII. 


MOBAL  OBLIGATION. 


Much    has  been  written  to   explain   the   true 

ground  of  moral  obligation.     But  the  subject 

has  been  rather  darkened  and  per- 

Obligation. 

plexed  than  elucidated,  bj  these 
comments.  It  is  always  so  when  men  undertake 
to  explain  that  which  is  so  clear  that  it  needs  no 
explanation. 

Every  idea  of  morality  includes  in  it  that  of 

moral  obligation.     A  moral  act  is  one  which 

ought   to  be  performed ;    an  im- 

aJSJiSS^  moral  act'  is  one  whicl1  ou§bt  not 
to  be  performed.     As  soon  as  we 

get  the  conception  of  a  moral  act,  we  receive 

with  it  the  idea  of  moral  obligation.     It  would 

be  a  contradiction  to  say  that  any  act  was  moral, 

and  yet  that  there  was  no  obligation  to  perform 


MOHAL   OBLIGATION.  49 

11  One  of  the  best  definitions  which  can  be 
given  of  a  moral  act,  is  that  it  is  an  act  which 
we  are  bound  to  perform,  and  of 

,  ,  .       .  What  a  moral  act  is. 

an  immoral  act,  that  it  is  one 
which  ought  not  to  be  done.  The  more  clearly 
we  see  any  thing  to  be  moral,  the  more  sensibly 
we  feel  ourselves  under  a  moral  obligation  to 
perform  it.  This  being  a  matter  of  common 
intuition,  and  universal  experience,  all  that  is 
necessary  to  convince  us  of  its  truth,  is  to  bring 
it  distinctly  before  our  minds.  There  is  there- 
fore no  need  to  look  any  further  for  the  grounds 
and  reasons  of  moral  obligation,  than  to  the 
morality  of  the  act  itself,  as  this  idea  is  involved 
in  every  conception  of  morality. 

The  following  citation  from  Dr.  Price's  work 
on  Morals,  is  in  accordance  with  the  view  just 
given:  "From  the  account  given  of  obligation, 
it   appears   how   absurd   it  is  to 

,  .         Why  we  are  obliged 

inquire,  what  obliges  us  to  practise     to  do  right-not 
virtue?    as  if  obligation  were  no 
part  of  the  idea  of  virtue,  but  something  adven- 
titious and  foreign  to  it :  that  is,  as  if  what  waa 
our  duty  might  not  be  our  duty ;  as  if  it  might 


50  MORAL   SCIENCE. 

not  be  true,  that  what  is  fit  to  do,  we  ought  to 
do,  and  that  what  we  ought  to  do,  we  are 
obliged  to  do.  To  ask  why  we  are  obliged  to 
practise  virtue,  to  abstain  from  what  is  wicked, 
or  perform  what  is  just,  is  the  very  same  as  to 
ask  why  we  are  obliged  to  do  what  we  are 
obliged  to  do.  It  is  not  possible  to  avoid  won- 
dering at  those  who  have  so  unaccountably 
embarrassed  themselves,  on  a  subject  that  one 
would  think  was  attended  with  so  little  diffi- 
culty :  and  who,  because  they  cannot  find  any 
thing  in  virtue  and  duty  themselves,  which  can 
induce  and  oblige  us  to  pay  a  regard  to  them — 
fly  to  self-love,  and  maintain  that  from  hence 
alone  are  derived  all  inducement  and  obligation." 
Dr.  Paley  commences  his  second 

k:Z%t?  CHea'  book  on  Moral  Philosophy,  by  an 
inquiry  into  the  nature  of  moral 
obligation.  He  asks,  "Why  am  I  obliged  to 
keep  my  word  ?  "  and  mentions  several  answers 
which  would  be  given  by  different  persons,  and 
which  he  says  all  coincide.  But  he  goes  on  to 
say  that  all  the  answers  leave  the  mattej  short ; 
Tor   the   inquirer    may   turn    round    up.^n    his 


MORAL   OBLIGATION.  51 

teacher  with  a  second  question,  "  "Fi  Ly  am  I 
obliged  to  do  what  is  right,  to  act  agreeably  to 
the  fitness  of  things,  to  conform  to  reason,  nature 
or  truth,  to  promote  the  public  good,  or  to  do 
the  will  of  God?" 

All  this,  it  appears  to  us,  is  fitted  to  mystify 
as  plain  a  subject  as  ever  engaged  the  thoughts 
of  a  rational  mind,  and  is  designed 
to   remove  the   true    ground    of  insufficient, 

moral  obligation,  and  reduce  all 
such  obligation  to  the  single  principle  of  self-love, 
or  the  tendency  of  an  act  to  promote  individual 
happiness. 

Suppose  then,  after  Dr.  Paley  had  made  all 
obligation  to  rest  on  the  ground  that  the  per- 
formance of  a  good  act  promotes 
our  eternal  happiness,  the  inquirer  The  ^w^y  nni«*- 

*■ x  sonablc. 

should  again  ask,  "Why  am  I 
bound  to  perform  that  which  will  promote  my 
happiness?"  The  question,  indeed,  would  be 
unreasonable,  because  all  men  are  agreed  that 
happiness  is  a  good  ;  but  is  it  not  equally  unrea- 
sonable, when  an  action  is  seen  to  be  virtuous, 
or  morally  right,  to  ask  "  Why  am  I  obliged  to 


52  MORAL   SCIENCE. 

do  it  ?"  The  moment  we  see  a  thing  to  be  mor 
ally  right,  the  sense  of  obligation  is  complete, 
and  all  further  inquiring  for  reasons  why  I  am 
obliged  to  do  right  is  as  absurd  as  would  be  in- 
quiring for  reasons  why  I  should  pursue  hap- 
piness. 

"Where   we  have  intuitive  certainty  of  any 

thing  it  is  foolish  to  seek  for  other  reasons.     If 

there   is  any  thing  clear    in   the 

Intuitive     certainty    y[QW  Qf  a  rati0nal  milld,  it  is  this  I 

is  ultimate. 

that  virtue  should  be  practised, 
that  what  is  right  should  be  done.  But  still 
further  to  perplex  this  plain  subject,  Dr.  Paley 
has  undertaken  to  inform  us  what  is  meant  by 
obligation.  "A man,"  says  he,  "is  said  to  be 
obliged  when  he  is  urged  by  a  violent  motive 
resulting  from  the  will  of  another." 

This  is,  indeed,  a  very  extraordinary  defini- 
tion.    The   motive,  he  says,  must   be  violent 

but  what  should  hinder  that  a  mo- 
raid's  definition,     tive  not  violent  should  create  an 

obligation  according  to  its  force? 
The  main  error  of  this  definition  is  that  it  con* 
founds  moral  obligation  with  other  motives  of 


MOKAL   OBLIGATION.  53 

an  entirely  different  kind.  The  obligation  of 
which  he  speaks,  is  created  by  the  will  or  com- 
mand of  another.  The  law  of  a  tyrant  requir- 
ing his  subjects  to  do  what  is  evidently  wrong 
cannot  create  a  moral  obligation.  A  rational 
being  may  be  urged  by  the  threats  of  a  tyrant, 
on  the  universal  principle  of  self-love,  and  this 
force  may,  by  an  abuse  of  terms,  be  called  an 
obligation ;  but  according  to  the  common  usage 
of  the  language,  when  a  man  is  said  to  be  un- 
der obligation  to  perform  an  act,  we  mean  that 
he  is  morally  bound.  But  whether  the  opera- 
tion of  any  violent  motive,  resulting  from  the 
will  of  another,  may  be  said  to  oblige  a  man  01 
not,  the  main  inquiry  is,  what  is  the  ground  of 
moral  obligation?  The  difference  between  a 
moral  obligation  and  other  motives  which  may 
oblige  should  be  kept  in  view. 

He  then  returns  to  the  question,  "  Why  am 
I  obliged  to  keep  my  word?"  and  applies  the 
preceding  definition  of  the  nature 
of  obligation,  and  gives  the  follow-  PaS^,mt  °f 
ing answer:  "Because  I  am  urged 
to  do  so  by  a  violent  motive  (namely,  the  ex- 


54  MORAL   SCIENCE. 

pectation  of  being  after  this  life  rewarded  if  I  do; 
or  punished  if  I  do  not),  resulting  from  the  com- 
mand of  another  (namely,  of  God)."  He  goes 
on  to  say,  "  When  I  first  turned  my  attention  U 
moral  speculations,  an  air  of  mystery  seemed  to 
hang  over  the  whole  subject,  which  arose,  I  be- 
lieve, from  hence  ;  that  I  supposed  with  many 
nuthors  whom  I  had  consulted  that  to  be  obliged 
to  do  a  thing,  was  different  from  being  induced 
to  do  it ;  and  that  the  obligation  to  practise  vir- 
tue, and  to  do  what  is  justice,  is  quite  another 
thing  and  of  another  kind  from  the  obligation 
which  a  soldier  is  under  to  obey  his  officer,  or  a 
servant  his  master,  or  any  of  the  ordinary  obli- 
gations of  human  life." 

We  cannot  but  be  of  the  opinion  that  Dr.  faley 
has  here  made  a  radical  mistake,  which  it  is  ex- 
ceedingly important  to  consider, 

erroneous.  since,  unhappily  for  sound  morals, 

his  system  is  so  much  employed  in 

the  instruction  of  youth. 

The  theory  of  morals,  of  which,  the  above 

principle  is  a  part,  is  no  other  than  this :  that  the 

only  difference  between  virtue  and  vice,  consists 


MORAL   OBLIGATION.  51 

in  their  tendency,  respectively,  to  promote  or 
hinder  the  happiness  of  the  indi- 
vidual; so  that  if  a  man  could  ^S^f""*"  °* 
persuade  himself  that  no  evil  would 
arise  to  him  from  telling  a  lie,  he  would  be 
under  no  obligation  to  speak  the  truth.  It  is  a 
scheme  of  morals  which  obliterates  all  intrinsic 
difference  between  virtue  and  vice,  and  makes 
the  one  preferable  to  the  other  on  no  other  ac- 
count than  its  tendency  to  promote  individual 
happiness  in  the  future  world. 

If  a  man  does  not  believe  in  a  future  world, 
he  can,  according  to  this  theory,  feel  no  obliga- 
tion to  keep  his  word.  We  be- 
lieve,  on  the  contrary,  that  moral  "^  th8 
obligation  is  felt  by  the  atheist, 
and  that  he  cannot  divest  himself  of  it.  "When 
men  are  tempted  by  some  strong  motive  to  de- 
viate from  the  truth,  and  yet  are  enabled  to  re 
sist  the  temptation,  there  is  in  most  cases  no  dis- 
tinct consideration  of  any  future  good  to  be 
gained  by  it,  but  the  man  feels  himself  under 
an  obligation  to  do  that  which  is  in  itself  right. 
The  conflict  is  not  between  a  greater  and  a  less 


56  MOEAL   SCIENCE. 

happiness,  but  between  the  prospect  of  happi- 
ness and  moral  obligation. 

On  this  subject,  the  appeal  must  be  to  the 
common  judgment  of  men.  And  we  are  per- 
suaded that  this  confounding  of  moral  obligation 
with  motives  of  another  kind,  is  a  radical  defect 
in  Dr.  Paley's  system,  which — lying  at  the  foun- 
ds tion — vitiates  the  whole,  and  has  already  been 
the  cause  of  great  evil  to  society. 

The  true  doctrine  is,  that  vir- 

■tatST  d°Ctrine     tue  and  vice  are  distinct  and  op- 
posite, and  that  when  we  know 
any  act  to  be  right,  we  are  bound — aside  from 
all  considerations  of  self-interest — to  perform  it. 
Dr.  Paley  maintains  that  "  we  can  be  obliged 
to  nothing,  unless  we  are  to  lose  or  gain  some- 
thing by  it,  for  nothing  else  can  be 
doctSL  opposito    a  '  violent  motive'  to  us.    And  as 
we  should  not  be  obliged  to  obey 
the  laws  or  the  magistrate,  unless  rewards  01 
punishments,  pleasure  or  pain,  somehow  or  othei 
depended  on  our  obedience ;  so  neither  should 
we,  without  the  same  reason,  be  obliged  to  do 


MORAL   OBLIGATION.  57 

wliat  is  right,  to  practise  virtue,  or  to  obey  the 
command  of  God." 

According  to  this  view,  unless  a  man  is  per- 
suaded that  he  shall  gain  something  by  keeping 
his  word,  he  is  under  no  obligation 

,        .,  -,-,  •  /»    st  '  -i-    '  i         it      Virtue  thus  made 

tO    do    it.        Even    II    (jOd    Should         mercenary. 

clearly  make  known  his  will,  and 
lay  upon  him  his  command,  he  is  under  no  obli- 
gation to  obey,  unless  certain  that  he  shall  re- 
ceive benefit  by  so  doing.  This  is,  indeed,  to 
make  virtue  a  mercenary  thing,  and  reduce  all 
motives  to  a  level.  And  as  self-love,  or  the  de- 
sire of  happiness,  is  the  only  rational  motive, 
and  all  men  possess  this  in  a  sufficient  degree  01 
strength,  the  only  conceivable  difference  between 
the  good  and  the  bad,  consists  in  the  superioi 
sagacity  which  the  one  has  above  the  other  te 
discern  what  will  most  contribute  to  happiness. 
And  if  what  we  call  vice  or  sin  could  be  made 
to  contribute  to  happiness,  then  it  would  change 
its  nature  and  become  virtue. 

The  definition  of  obligation,  given  by  Dr, 
Paley,  upon  his  own  principles,  is  unnecessarily 
encumbered  with  what  acids  nothing  to  its  im- 


58  MORAL   SCIENCE. 

port.  Why  should  the  "  violent  motive"  resull 
from  the  command  of  another? 
uonroEre.defin"  ThQ  command  of  another  ought 
to  have  no  influence,  except  aa 
obedience  or  disobedience  will  be  attended  with 
loss  or  gain.  It  would,  therefore,  have  been 
more  simple  and  intelligible  to  say  at  once,  what 
is  certainly  implied,  that  the  only  motive  which 
can  oblige  us  to  be  virtuous,  is  the  expectation 
of  the  happiness  to  be  derived  from  such  con- 
duct in  the  future  world. 

Cicero,  in  his  work  "  De  Finibus,"  says  that 

those  men  who  confounded  the  honestum  with 

the  utile,  deserved  to  be  banished 

The  ho^tum    from  society>     The  result  of  the 

and  the  utile.  J 

whole  scheme  is,  that  there  ifi  no 
such  thing  as  moral  excellence,  abstractly  con- 
sidered ;  that  the  only  good  in  the  universe  is 
happiness ;  and  that  other  things,  among  w  trich 
virtue  is  included,  are  good  only  as  related  to 
this  end.  If  this  is  true,  the  moral  attributes  of 
God  have  no  intrinsic  excellence ;  they  are  all 
merged  in  his  infinite  felicity.     Surely  this  view 


MORAL   OBLIGATION.  59 

is  not  suited  to  increase  our  reverence  for  the 
Supreme  Being. 

But  every  man  who  carefully  examines  into 
his  own  primary  ideas  of  morality,  will  find  that 
he  has  a  sense  of  right  and  wrong, 
independent  of  all  considerations  maryApdpei  t0  pri 
of  personal  happiness,  or  its  loss. 
This  distinction  is  too  deeply  engraven  on  the 
mind  to  be  erased  by  any  process  of  reasoning. 


CHAPTER  VIII. 

THE  SUPREMACY  OF  CONSCIENCE. 

That     the    dictates   of   conscience   should    be 

obeyed,  is  one  of  the  most  evident  perceptions 

of  the  human  mind.     No  matter 

going  contrary  to  conscience,  every 
honest  mind  has  the  same  judgment,  that  duty 
should  be  done.  If  it  is  plain  that  a  certain 
act — such  as  confessing  the  truth  of  the  gos- 
pel— is  a  duty,  and  we  are  convinced  that  no- 
thing but  suffering  will  ensue  from  performing 
it;  yet  the  judgment  of  the  impartial  mind  is, 
that  no  prospect  of  pain  or  loss  can  ever  justify 
us  in  denying  the  truth,  or  in  doing  any  thing 
else  that  we  know  to  be  wrong.  On  this  point, 
there  is  no  room  for  reasoning.  The  judgment 
that  conscience  should  be  obeyed,  is  intuitive:; 


SUPREMACY   OF   CONSCIENCE.  61 

all  men  must  acknowledge  it,  unless  they  belie 
the  clear  convictions  of  their  own  reason. 

That  conscience  should  be  obeyed,  that  duty 
should  be  performed  at  every  risk,  are  maxima 
which  must  receive  the  assent  of 

Admitted  maxim. 

all  who    are    capable   of   under- 
standing them.    On  the  subject  of  the  supremacy 
of  conscience,  the  following  quotation  from  Dr. 
Chalmers,  is  very  much  to  our  purpose : 

"In  every  human  heart  there  is  a  faculty— 
not,  it  may  be,  having  the  actual  power,    but 
having  the  just  and  rightful  pre- 
tension to  act  as  judge  and  master  ohaimom 
over  the  whole  of  human  conduct. 
Other  propensities  may  have  too  much  sway, 
but  the  moral  propensity — if  I  may  so  term  it — 
never  can ;  for,  to  have  the  presiding  sway  in  all 
our  concerns,  is  just  that  which  properly  and 
legitimately  belongs  to  it.     A  man  under  anger, 
may  be  too  strongly  prompted  to  deeds  of  retali- 
ation, or  under  sensuality  may  be  too  strongly 
prompted  to  indulgence,  or  under  avarice,  be  too 
closely  addicted  to  the  pursuit  of  wealth,  or  even 
under  friendship   be   too   strongly  inclined    to 


62  MORAL   SCIENCE. 

partiality ;  but  he  never  can,  under  conscience, 
be  too  strongly  inclined  to  be  as  he  ought,  and 
to  do  as  he  ought.  "We  may  say  of  a  watch, 
that  its  main-spring  is  too  powerful,  but  we 
would  never  say  that  a  regulator  was  too  power- 
ful."   "And  neither  do  we  urge  the 

proposition  that  conscience  has  in  every  instance 
the  actual  direction  of  human  affairs,  for  this 
were  in  the  face  of  all  experience.  It  is  not 
that  every  man  obeys  her  dictates,  but  that 
every  man  feels  that  he  ought  to  obey  them. 
These  dictates  are  often,  in  life  and  practice, 
disregarded ;  so  that  conscience  is  not  the  sove- 
reign de  facto.     Still  there  is  a  voice  within  the 

hearts  of  all  which  asserts  that 
er2rienceiS """  conscience  is  the  sovereign  dejure: 

that  to  her  belongs  the  command 
rightfully,  even  though  she  do  not  possess  it 
actually."  ....  "All  that  we  affirm  is,  that  il 
conscience  prevail  over  the  other  principles,  then 
every  man  is  led,  by  the  very  make  and  mechan- 
ism of  his  internal  economy,  to  feel,  that  it  is  as 
it  ought  to  be ;  or  if  these  others  prevail  over 
eonscience,  that  it  is  not  as  it  ought  to  be."  .... 


SUPREMACY   OF   CONSCIENCE.  63 

"  When  stating  the  supremacy  of  conscience,  in 
the  sense  that  we  have  explained  it,  we  but  state 
what  all  men  feel ;  and  our  only  argument  in 
proof  of  the  assertion  is — our  only  argument 
can  be,  an  appeal  to  the  experience  of  all  men." 
These  sentiments  wil1  find  a 

Inward  verdict 

response  in  every  honest  mind. 
However  often    we  disobey  the   voice  of  this 
monitor,  we    always  have  the   feeling   of  self- 
condemnation  accompanying  our  disobedience. 


X 


/ 

/ 


CHAPTER  IX. 


WIlx/T  1ER  "WE  ALWAYS  DO  EIGHT  BY  OBEYING  THE 
DICTATES  OF  CONSCIENCE  ? 

This  is  me  of  the  most  perplexing  questions  ld 

the  scieA'v?  of  morals.     Many  are   of  opinion 

that  all  that  is  necessary  to  render 

Difficulty  of  vV  . 

problem.  an  action  good  is  that  the  agent 

act  agreeably  to  the  dictates  of  his 
own  conscience.  This  may  be  considered  a  vu, 
gar  opinion,  usually  taken  up  without  much 
consideration.  But  there  is  an  opinion,  neai 
akin  to  this,  which  has  been  advocated  by  some 
of  the  greatest  men  of  the  age ;  namely,  that 
nen  are  not  responsible  for  their  opinions  or  be- 
lief. It  is  thought  that  the  adoption  of  this  as 
a  maxim  is  the  only  effectual  method  of  putting 
an  end  to  the  bitter  animosities  and  oontrover. 
eies  among  the  advocates  of  different  creeds. 


OBEYING   CONSCIENCE.  65 

It  is  not  wonderful  that  they  who  make  the 
moral  sense,  in  a  sort,  infallible, 
and  the  ultimate  standard  of  right       source  of  error, 
ind  wrong,  should  hold  that  men 
cannot  go  astray  if  .they  will  honestly  listen  to 
the  voice  of  conscience,  and  obey  her  dictates. 

But  as  we  have  shown  that  conscience  is  the 
judgment  of  the  mind  respecting  duty,  and  as  no 
man's  knowledge  is  perfect  or  in- 
fallible,   it  follows,    therefore,  that        Error  of  under- 
standing may  affect 

so  far  as  there  is  error  in  the  un-  moraj  judgments, 
derstanding  in  relation  to  matters 
of  duty,  just  so  far  the  conscience  will  be  mis- 
guided.     The   question   at  issue,    therefore,    is 
whether  an  action,  wrong  in  itself,  can  be  con- 
sidered  as   a  good  and  virtuous  action  if  the 
agent  believes  that  it  is  right.     If  the  affirma- 
tive were  true,  then  the  discovery 
of  truth  would  be  of  no  value,       otherwise  truth 

would  be  needless. 

for  obviously  upon  this  principle 
error  is  just  as  good  as  truth.     But  as  soon  would 
we  believe  that  darkness  is  as  good  as  light  to 
direct  us  in  the  way  which  we  wish  to  travel. 
Again,  this  theory  supposes  that  a  man  is  uncle? 


6Q  MOEAL  SCIENCE. 

no  law  but  his  own  opinion,  or  the  dictates  of 

conscience ;  that,  therefore,  which 

opinion  would  is  a  sin  in  one  man  may  be  a  duty 

be  law.  J  J 

to  another  in  precisely  the  same 
external  circumstances  and  relations';  which 
would  be  to   confound  all  moral   distinctions. 

This  theory  would  go  to  sanction 

False  religion  would    every    form    0f    relimon,   however 
be  right,  J  °        ' 

corrupt  and  superstitious  ;  and  to 
make  the  vilest  immoralities  virtuous ;  for  there 
can  be  no  doubt  that  the  votaries  of  idolatry,  in 
their  most  cruel  and  abominable  rites,  follow  the 
dictates  of  an  erring  conscience.  "When  the 
heathen  sacrifice  to  demons,  and  when  the  vic- 
tim is  a  human  being,  or  even  a  first-born  son, 
there  is  nothing  wrong,  for  all  these  acts  of  wor- 
ship are  performed  in  obedience  to  conscience. 
Every  species  of  persecution  and  the  Inquisition 
itself  may  be  justified  on  this  principle.  In 
stead,  therefore,  of  putting  an  end  to  all  animos- 
ity, it  would  bring  back,  in  all  their  horrors,  the 
days  of  persecution  for  conscience'  sake. 

On  this  subject,  again,  our  appeal  must  be  to 
the  unbiassed  judgment  of  mankind ;  and  we 


OBEYING   CONSCIENCE.  67 

think  the  verdict  will  be,  tliat  error  which  niio-ht 
have  been  avoided,  and  ignorance, 

,  .   ,       .  ,...,,  ,  Avoidable    and 

which  is  not  invincible,  do  not  unavoidable, 
excuse.  The  knowledge  neces- 
sary to  duty  is  within  the  reach  of  every  man 
were  he  disposed  sincerely  to  seek  after  it.  But 
it  is  a  truth  which  is  of  importance  on  this  sub- 
ject, that  one  false  step  leads  to  another ;  and 
though  a  man  who  has  adopted  fundamental 
error,  labours  under  a  kind  of  necessity  to  do 
wrong,  yet  this  does  not  excuse  him,  because  he 
ought  to  have  exercised  more  diligence  and  im- 
partiality in  seeking  for  the  truth,  and  is  justly 
liable  to  all  the  evil  consequences  resulting  from 
this  neglect. 

Suppose  a  man  to  have  been  educated  in  a 
wrong  system  of  religion  and  morals ;   he  is  re- 
sponsible, because,  when   arrived 
at  the  vears  of  maturity,  he  should    Duty  of  correcting 

J  ^  errors. 

have  brought  the  opinions  received 
by  education  under  an  honest  examination.    The 
more  difficult  it  is  to  divest  ourselves  of  preju- 
dices thus  imbibed,  as  it  were,  with  the  mother's 
milk,  the  more  necessary  is  it  that,  under  the  in- 


68  MORAL   SCIENCE. 

fluence  of  a  sincere  love  of  truth,  we  should,  with 
impartiality,  diligence,  and  resolution,  endeavour 
to  do  so.  It  is  no  proof  that  such  a  course  is  not 
the  solemn  duty  of  man,  that  few  ever  perform 
it.  The  prevalence  of  error  in  the  world,  is  very 
much  owing  to  the  neglect  of  this  duty.  This 
neglect  arises  from  culpable  indolence,  from  a 
desire  to  remain  in  agreement  with  the  multitude 
or  with  our  parents  and  teachers,  from  aversion 
to  the  truth  and  an  unwillingness  to  deny  our- 
selves, and  incur  the  inconvenience  and  perse- 
cution which  an  avowal  of  the  truth  would  bring 
upon  us.  But  none  of  these  reasons  will  justify 
us  in  adhering  to  opinions  which  are  detrimental 
to  ourselves  and  others,  or  contrary  to  our  moral 
obligations.  It  is  true,  if  a  man's  conscience 
dictates  a  certain  action,  he  is  morally  bound  to 
obey ;  but  if  that  action  is  in  itself  wrong,  he 
commits  sin  in  performing  it,  nevertheless.  He 
who  is  under  fundamental  error,  is  in  a  sad 
dilemma.  Do  what  he  will,  he  sins.  If  he  dis- 
obey conscience,  he  knowingly  sins ;  doing  what 
he  believes  to  be  wrong ;  and  a  man  never  can 
be  justified  for   doing  what  he  believes  to  bo 


OBEYING   CONSCIENCE.  69 

wrong,  even  though  it  should  turn  out  to  be 
right.  And  if  he  obey  conscience,  performing 
an  act  which  is  in  itself  wrong,  he  sins ;  because 
he  complies  not  with  the  law  under  which  he  i 
placed.  It  may  be  asked,  "How  can  a  man  be 
responsible  in  such  circumstances, 

The  seat  of  respon- 

when  he  is  under  a  necessity  of  sibmtyinsuchacase. 
loing  wrong  ?"  We  are  responsi- 
ble for  suffering  ourselves  to  be  brought  into 
such  a  state  ;  we  are  responsible  for  our  ignor- 
ance of  the  truth.  Hence  we  see  how  important 
the  doty  of  seeking  after  truth  with  untiring  dili- 
gence, and  honest  impartiality.  The  same  neces- 
sity is  found  to  arise  from  forming  bad  habits, 
and  cherishing  evil  passions.  The  heart  in  which 
envy  to  another  has  been  indulged  until  it  has 
become  habitual,  cannot  exercise  kind  and  bro- 
therly affections  to  that  person ;  but  this  is  no 
excuse.  The  fault  may  be  traced  far  back,  but 
guilt  is  attached  to  every  act  of  envy,  however 
inveterate  the  habit.  If  this  were  not  so,  the 
greater  the  sinner,  the  less  his  responsibility. 

The  objection  to  making  a  man  responsible 
for  his  opinions,  is,  that  his  belief  does  not  de- 


70  MORAL  SCIENCE. 

pend  upon  his  will,  but  results  necessarily  from 

the  evidence  existing  before  the  mind,  at  any 

moment.     This  is  true;  but  we  may  turn  our 

minds    away  from   the    evidence 

objection,  that  be-  which  would  have  produced  a  con- 

li'ef  is  involuntary.  x 

viction  of  the  truth.  And  this  is 
not  all ;  there  may  be  such  a  state  of  mind,  that 
evidence  of  a  certain  kind  cannot  be  perceived 
Depravity  produces  blindness  of  mind,  in  regard 
to  the  beauty  and  excellency  of  moral  objects. 
But  every  man  ought  to  be  free  from  such  a 
state  or  temper  of  mind,  as  produces  distorted  or 
erroneous  views.  Surely,  moral  depravity  can- 
not be  an  excuse  for  erroneous  opinions.  All 
actions  proceed  from  certain  principles ;  if,  there- 
fore, the  action  is  wrong,  because  of  the  corrupt 
principle,  the  burden  of  culpability  must  be  rolled 
back  upon  the  principle,  or  state  of  the  soul,, 
which  sends  forth  evil  acts,  as  a  poisoned  foun-1 
ain  sends  forth  deleterious  streams. 

Metaphysical  reasoning,  however,  rather  per- 
plexes and  obscures  than  elucidates  such  points. 
Let  us  hold  fast  by  the  plain  principles  of  com- 
mon sense,  and  appeal  to  the  common  judgment 


OBEYING  CONSCIENCE.  71 

of  mankind ;  and  the  decision  will  be,  that  igno- 
rance or  error  which  might  have 

Avoidable  igno- 

been  avoided,  never  excuses  from  ranee  does  not  ex- 
cuse, 
olame.     The  same  is  true  of  all  evil 

aabits  and  inveterate  passions,  which  have 
3een  voluntarily  or  heedlessly  contracted.  The 
whole  course  of  a  moral  agent  must  be  taken 
together;  his  moral  acts  are  complicated,  and 
intimately  connected.  They  form  a  web,  in 
which  one  thread  is  connected  with  another,  and 
one  serves  to  give  strength  to  another.  If  we 
honestly  consult  our  conscience,  we  feel  guilty 
when  we  have  done  wrong,  even  though  we  did 
it  ignorantly ;  because  we  ought  not  to  have 
been  in  ignorance. 

Two  things,  therefore,  are  necessary,  in  or- 
der to  determine  that  an  action  is  right :  first, 
that  the  si-ate  of  mind  of  the  agent 

■         What     consti- 

be  such  as  it  ought  to  be  ;  and  se-  tutes  a  right  ac- 


tion. 


condly,  that  the  action  be  in  con- 
formity with  the  law  under  which  we  are  placed ; 
for  the  very  idea  of  morality  supposes  us  to  be 
under  a  moral  law. 

While,  then,  we  cannot  do  better  than  obey 


72  MORAL   SCIENCE. 

conscience  ;    yet    if    conscience    is    erroneous. 

we  do  not  fulfil  our  duty  by  such -obedience, 

but    may    commit   grievous    sm. 

led  by  obeying  erro-  For,  following  the  dictates  of  con- 

neous  conscience.  .  . 

science,  is  only  one  circumstance 
essential  to  a  good  action.  When  we  do  wron,t> 
while  obeying  the  dictates  of  conscience,  the 
error  does  not  consist  in  that  obedience,  but  in 
not  following  the  right  rule,  with  which  rule  the 
accountable  moral  agent  should  be  acquainted. 


CHAPTER  X. 

WHETHER  THERE  IS  IN  THE  MEND  A  LAW  OR  RULE,  BY 
WHICH  MAN  JUDGES  OF  THE  MORALITY  OF  PARTICU- 
LAR ACTIONS? 

If  such  a  rule  existed  in  the  mind  prior  to  the 
observation  of  particular  acts  of  a  moral  nature, 
we  should  be  conscious  of  it :  no- 

Mental  rules  are 

thing  of  the  nature  of  a  law  or  objects  of  conscious- 
ness, 
rule  can  have  existence  in    the 

mind,   without    the    knowledge   of   the    mind 

itself. 

There  seems  to  be  a  common  mistake  as  to 

the  process  of  the  mind  in  regard  to  general 

principles.   It  seems  to  be  thought 

The  actual  process 

that  in  order  to  judge  whether  an  of  the  mind  in  mor- 
al judgments. 

action  be  right  or  wrong,  there 

must  be  something  like  a  general  rule  or  law, 

which  the  mind  applies,  as  the  workman  does 


74  MORAL   SCIENCE. 

his  rule,  to  ascertain  whether  the  quality  of  the 
action  be  good  or  bad.  But  as  we  are  conscious 
of  no  such  process  as  the  application  of  a  gene- 
ral rule,  there  seems  to  be  no  evidence  whatever 
of  its  existence.  The  real  process  of  the  mind  is 
very  simple.  When  a  moral  action  is  viewed, 
if  its  nature  is  simple  and  palpable,  the  mind 
intuitively  perceives  its  quality,  ^nd  is  conscious 
of  no  other  mental  process.  Suppose  a  man, 
created  as  Adam  was,  in  the  full  possession  of 
his  rational  faculties :  until  some  occasion  offer- 
en,  to  elicit  its  exercise,  he  would  not  be  con- 
scious of  any  moral  faculty  or  feeling.  But 
suppose  an  act  of  flagrant  injustice  to  be  perpe- 
trated before  him,  he  would  at  once  have  his 
moral  faculty  brought  into  exercise.  He  would 
see  that  the  action  had  in  it  a  moral  turpitude, 
that  it  ought  not  to  have  been  done,  and  that 
the  agent  deserved  to  be  punished.  So  long  as 
this  was  the  only  moral  act  observed  or  thought 
of,  there  would  be  in  the  mind  nothing  but 
the  judgment,  with  the  accompanying  feeling 
that  such  an  act,  and  of  course  every  other  act 
of  the  same  kind,  was  evil.    As  such  an  observ 


TH.E   INTERNAL   LAW.  75 

er  would,  however,  soon  observe  a  multitude 
of  acts,  of  different  kinds,  which  were  judged  to 
be  good  or  bad,  a  general  rule  or  law  would  be 
obtained,  by  degrees,  out  of  these  particulars. 
The  process  of  the  mind,  in  all  cases,  is  from 
particulars  to  generals,  and  the  tendency  in  the 
mind  to  put  into  classes  those  things  which 
resemble  each  other,  exists  also  in  regard  to 
moral  actions.  After  observing  a  great  number 
of  acts,  of  different  kinds,  all  of  which  are 
morally  good  or  evil,  these  particulars  are  classi- 
fied, and  form  a  general  rule  or  law ;  and  when 
a  new  act  is  observed,  it  is  referred  to  its  proper 
class.  But  how  can  we  know  an  action  to  be 
good  or  bad,  without  a  rule  with  which  to  com- 
pare it,  in  the  first  instance?  The  answer  is, 
that  it  is  as  easy  to  conceive  of  a  faculty  by 
which  we  can  at  once  perceive  the  moral  charac- 
ter of  an  act,  as  of  the  power  of  judging  of  the 
rectitude  of  a  general  rule. 

There  is  a  sense  in  which  it  may  be  said,  that 
reason,  or  the  moral  faculty  having  the  power  of 
discerning  the  moral  quality  of  actions,  has  the 
rule  in  itself.     If  this  is  all  that  is  intended  by 


76  MORAL   SCIENCE. 

a  general  rule  of  right  and  wrong  in  the  mind, 
there  can  be  no  objection  to  it. 

Whether  the  moral 

faculty  has  the  This  is  saying  no  more  than  that 

rule  in  itself. 

the  mind  has  a  faculty  by  which 
it  judges  intuitively  of  many  moral  acts,  as  soon 
as  they  are  observed.  The  idea  may  be  thus 
illustrated :  here  is  a  straight  line,  as  soon  as  I 
see  it,  I  perceive  it  to  be  straight;  there  is  a 
crooked  line,  which  at  once  I  perceive  to  be 
crooked.  There  is  no  need  of  a  rule  in  the 
mind,  by  the  application  of  which  I  know  that 
the  one  is  straight,  and  the  other  crooked.  The 
quality  of  the  lines  is  seen  at  once.  So  of  many 
moral  actions,  the  moment  the  mind  apprehends 
them,  their  moral  character  is  perceived. 

Here  are  some  boys  going  to  school.     I  ob- 
serve  one,  who  is   large   and  strong,  forcibly 
taking  from  another,  who  is  small 

A  case  stated. 

and  weak,  some  fruit  which  the 
latter  has  with  much  pains  gathered  for  a  sick 
mother.  I  need  no  general  rule  to  guide  my 
judgment.  I  need  only  to  know  the  real  cir- 
cumstances of  the  action.  That  a  large  and 
strong  boy  should  by  force  take  away  from  one 


THE    INTERNAL   LAW.  77 

weaker  than  himself,  property  to  which  he  has 
no  right,  and  to  which  the  other  has  a  rightr  is 
so  evidently  immoral,  that  every  mind  sees  the 
vil  at  once. 

The  general  law  or  rule  of  morals  is   there- 
fore made  up  by  the  observation 

General  law  of 
and  Classification  of  particular  acts  ;      morals  from   par- 
ticular acts. 

just  as  the  general  law  of  gravity 

is  formed  by  observation  of  particular  facts. 

All  our  knowledge  relates  originally  to  par- 
ticular cases  ;    and  general  ideas 
and  general  rules  and  laws,  are  g^Saf^ 
formed  by  a  process  of  the  mind, 
which  may  be  called  generalization  or  classifica- 
tion. 


CHAPTER  XI. 

TflE  MORAL  FEELING  "WHICH  ACCOMPANIES  EVERY  MOEAl 
JUDGMENT. 

Whether  our  judgments  and  feelings  are  dis- 
tinct and  separate  mental  exercises,  or  whether 
what  we  call  feeling  or  emotion  is 

Feelings  of  appro- 
bation and  disappro-  only  an  idea  of  a  more  vivid  kind, 

bation. 

is  a  question  which  we  need  not 
discuss,  as  the  decision  of  it  is  not  necessary  to 
our  purpose.  All  men  make  a  distinction  be- 
tween acts  which  are  purely  intellectual,  and 
those  exercises  of  mind  called  emotions ;  and  no 
practical  error  can  arise  from  observing  this  dis 
t!  action — whether  philosophically  correct  or  not. 
In  every  case  where  a  moral  object  or  relation 
comes  before  the  mind,  there  is  a  feeling  of  ap- 
probation or  disapprobation,  according  to  the 
moral  character  of  the  object,  of  which  we  are 


THE   MORAL   EMOTION.  79 

immediately  conscious.  This  approbation  or 
disapprobation  will  not  be  equal  in  all  cases,  but 
exceedingly  different  in  degree.  While  some 
moral  actions  elicit,  when  jDerceived,  a  very 
slight  degree  of  approbation  or  disapprobation, 
others  excite  strong  emotion;  the  disapproval 
arising  to  indignation,  and  the  approval  to  ad- 
miration. 

In  every  instance  where  a  gootl  act  is  ob- 
served, there  is  a  feeling  of  esteem  for  the  agent, 
as  well  as  approbation  of  the  act. 

A    disposition,    tOO,    is    felt    tO    be-    The  idea  of  merit 

stow  some  reward  on  the  person 
who  performs  a  good  action.  If  we  see  a  man, 
at  the  imminent  risk  of  his  own  life,  plunge  into 
the  sea  to  save  a  stranger  who  has  fallen  over- 
board, we  approve  the  action,  and  feel  that  he 
deserves  a  reward.  "We  therefore  call  it  a  meri- 
torious action ;  for  the  simple  idea  of  merit  is 
that  which  deserves  a  reward. 

On  the  other  hand,  when  we  are  witnesses  of 
a  wicked  act  of  an  enormous  kind,  as,  for  ex 
ample,  a  man  murdering  a  good  parent  or  a 
kind  benefactor,  without  any  provocation,  but 


80  MORAL  SCIENCE. 

instigated  by  avarice  or  resentment — we  feel  in« 
stantaneously  a  degree  of  disap- 
The  vindicatory   prokation  which  may  properly  be 
called  indignation.     This  feeling 
would  be  accompanied  by  a  strong  desire  that 
condign  punishment  should  be  inflicted  on  the 
wicked  perpetrator  of  such  a  deed.     If  there 
were  no  other  means  of  executing  justice,    we 
should  feel  disposed  to  aid  in  punishing  the  cul- 
prit ;  and  the  idea  of  such  a  person  escaping 
without  punishment,  is  painful  to '  the  impartial 
mind,  and  revolting  to  the  moral  feelings. 

These  moral  emotions  are,  however,  of  very 
different  degrees  of  intensity  in  different  per- 
sons, and  in  the  same  person  at  different  pe- 
riods of  his  life.  Persons  who 
ii  raouons.511  m°T"  ^ave  been  long  accustomed  to  see 
■  atrocious  crimes  committed,  lose 
in  time  their  moral  sensibility,  and  become  ac' 
customed  to  scenes  of  blood  and  robbery.  In 
proportion  as  the  minds  of  men  are  enlightened 
by  the  truth,  and  their  hearts  upright,  will  be 
the  sensibility  of  the  moral  faculty.  But  by 
committing  sin,  as  well  as  by  observing  it,  the 


THE   MORAL   EMOTION.  81 

moral  sensibilities  are  blunted.  This  want  of 
right  feeling  in  the  conscience  is  what  is  called  a 
"seared  conscience,"  which  expression  is  bor- 
rowed from  the  effect  produced  on  any  part  of  a 
living  body,  by  the  repeated  application  of  a 
heated  iron.  The  result  is,  that,  by  degrees,  the 
skin  thickens,  and  the  sensibility  of  the  seared 
part  is  lost,  or  rendered  obtuse. 

Besides  this  feeling  of  approbation  or  disap- 
probation of  moral  acts,  good  or  evil,  there  is  a 
peculiar   emotion,  in    relation    to 
moral  acts,  according  to  their  na-     Emoti°* iu  Kg"** 

°  to  acts  as  our  own. 

ture,  when  performed  by  ourselves. 
In  this  case,  the  emotion  is  much  more  vivid  than 
when  we  contemplate  the  same  action  as  per- 
formed by  another.  When  a  person  is  conscious 
of  having  performed  a  truly  good  action,  and  from 
the  proper  motives,  he  experiences  an  emotion 
of  pleasure,  of  a  very  peculiar  and  exalted  nature 
For  this  emotion,  we  have  no  distinctive  name-, 
it  may  be  called  the  pleasure  of  a  good  or  ap- 
proving conscience.  It  must  not  be  confounded 
with  self-complacency,  or  a  proud  opinion  of  our 
own  worth,  which  may  also  arise  from  the  per- 

4* 


82  MORAL   SCIENCE. 

forrnance  of  a  meritorious  action.  The  feeling 
of  which  mention  has  been  made,  is  a  simple 
emotion  arising  in  the  mind,  from  the  principles 
of  the  human  constitution,  upon  the  performance 
of  a  good  action.  One  reason  why  it  has  not 
been  more  noticed  is,  that  it  has  no  distinctive 
name.  The  emotion  experienced  on  the  per- 
formance of  a  wicked  action  is  well  known  to 
every  one.  It  has  a  distinctive  appellation — re- 
morse. It  is  a  feeling  distinguishable  from  all 
others,  and  more  intolerable  than  any  other  spe- 
cies of  pain.  When  violent,  it  often  drives  the 
unhappy  subject  of  it  to  the  most  desperate  acts. 
It  is  like  a  scorpion,  stinging  the  soul  in  its  ten- 
derest  part.  No  language  can  exaggerate  the 
misery  of  a  soul  abandoned  to  the  torture  of  this 
feeling.  And  though  in  time  it  may  seem  to 
be  allayed  by  forgetfulness  of  the  crime,  yet 
when  any  circumstance  or  association  brings  the 
evil  action  distinctly  before  the  conscience,  tho 
torment  is  renewed.  Thus,  acts  of  iniquity  com 
mitted  in  heedless  gayety,  often  produce  sensible 
remorse  in  the  time  of  solitude  and  reflection  ; 
and  the  sins  of  youth  embitter  old  age.     This 


THE   MORAL   EMOTION.  83 

feeling  often  accompanies  the  sinner  to  Lis  times 
of  decline,  and  is  the  pain  which  most  annoys 
him  on  his  bed  of  death.  As  the  feeling  accom- 
panies the  guilty  unto  the  last  moment  of  their 
earthly  existence,  there  is  much  reason  to  think 
that  it  will  cause  the  bitterest  anguish  of  a 
future  state. 


CHAPTER  XII. 

SELIEF  IN  GOD,  AS  CONNECTED  WITH  THE  OPERATIC 5  uP 
CONSCIENCE. 

The  question  is,  whether  an  atheist  is  completely 
divested  of  the  feeling  of  moral  obligation.     To 
those  who  suppose  that  speculative 
The  question  sta-  atheism   is    impossible,  this  ques- 
tion will  appear  irrelevant ;  for  it 
would  be  useless  to  inquire  what  would  be  the 
effect  of  a  state  of  mind  which  never  can  exist. 

As,  however,  the  evidences  of  the  actual  ex- 
istence of  atheism  are  as  strong  as  those  of  most 
other  fundamental  errors  ;  and  as 
The  atheist  per-  the  doctrine  of  certain  ideas  being 

ceives    right     and 

wrong.  impressed  on  the  mind  in  its  crea- 

tion (on  which  the  opinion  that 
men  could  not  become  atheists  was  founded),  is 
now  generally  exploded,  it  may  be  here  taken  as 
admitted  that   there  are  atheists  in  the  world. 


BELIEF  IN  GOD.  85 

The  question  proposed  is  therefore  a  proper  sub- 
ject for  consideration.  Bishop  War  burton  in  his 
"Divine  Legation  of  Moses,"  seems  to  adopt  the 
opinion,  that  a  belief  in  the  being  of  God,  is  re 
quisite  to  the  exercise  of  conscience,  or  the  sense 
of  moral  obligation.  But  his  reasonings  on  the 
subject  are  by  no  means  satisfactory.  If  we  may 
refer  to  the  experience  of  the  atheist  himself,  he 
will  assure  us,  that  he  perceives  the  difference 
between  right  and  wrong,  as  plainly  as  others, 
and  that  he  is  conscious  of  being  under  a  moral 
obligation  to  pursue  a  virtuous  course.  This, 
however,  they  consider  an  instinctive  or  consti- 
tutional principle,  which  should  be  obeyed,  just 
as  our  appetites  and  other  natural  propensities 
should  be  obeyed. 

If  there  are  intuitive  perceptions  of  moral 
relations,  when  actions  of  a  certain  kind  are  pre- 
sented to  the  view  of  the  rational 
mind,  then  it  is  certain  that  con-     intuitive  percep 

tions  not  dependent 

science  may  and  will  operate,  what-  on  other  knowledge. 
ever  may  be  the  opinions  of  the 
■  person  on  other  subjects.     No  one,  when  he  con- 
templates an  act  of  flagrant  injustice,  is  conscious 


86  MORAL   SCIENCE, 

of  a  reference  to  the  existence  of  a  moral  Gov 
ernor,  prior  to  his  moral  judgment  of  the  quality 
of  the  action.  The  perception  of  its  moral  evil  is 
as  immediate  as  that  of  the  colour  of  the  sky,  or 
the  grass.  But  how  can  a  man  feel  a  moral  obli- 
gation, unless  he  admits  that  there 
objection  and    jg  a  SUperi0r  to  whom  he  is  bound  ? 

answer.  x 

how  can  he  feel  himself  under  a 
law,  unless  there  is  a  law-giver?  The  answer 
is,  that  this  part  of  the  human  constitution  fur- 
nishes a  conclusive  argument  in  favour  of  the  be- 
ing of  God.  We  have  a  law  written  within  us, 
and  from  the  sense  of  obligation  to  obey  this  law, 
we  cannot  escape.  The  great  Creator  has  not 
left  himself  without  a  witness,  in  the  breast  of 
every  man.  It  is  possible  that  a  man  may  be  so 
abandoned  as  to  believe  in  lies,  and  that  he  may 
come  to  disbelieve  in  the  God  that  made  and 
supports  him.  But  he  cannot  obliterate  the  law 
written  on  his  heart ;  he  cannot  divest  himself 
of  the  conviction  that  certain  actions  are  mo- 
rally wrong ;  nor  can  he  prevent  the  stings  of 
remorse,  when  he  commits  sins  of  an  enormous 
kind.     Men  may,  indeed,  spin  out  refined  meta« 


BELIEF   IN    GOD,  87 

physical  theories,  and  come  to  the  conclusion 
that  there  is  no  difference  between  virtue  and 
vice,  and  that  these  distinctions  are  the  result  of 
education.  But  let  some  one  commit  a  flagrant 
act  of  injustice  toward  themselves,  and  their 
practical  judgment  will  give  the  lie  to  their  the- 
oretical opinion. 

As  those  speculatists  who  argue  that  there  is 
no  external  world,  will  avoid  running  against  a 
post,  or  into  the  fire,  as  carefully 

Moral      dlstinc 

as  other  men;  so  they    who   en-  tkms  cannot  be  re» 

soned  away 

deavour  to  reason  themselves  into 
the  belief  that  virtue  and  vice  are  mere  notions, 
generated  by  education,  cannot,  nevertheless, 
avoid  perceiving  that  some  actions  are  base,  un- 
just, or  ungrateful,  and  consequently  to  be  dis- 
approved of,  whether  committed  by  themselves 
or  others. 

The  inferences  from  what  has  been  said  are, 
that  by  no  arts  or  course  of  conduct  can  men  so 
eradicate  the  moral  faculty,  that 
there  shall  no  longer  be  any  sense  ^CS^e  r 
of  right  and  wrong.     And  again, 
it  is  evident  that,  although  the  belief  of  the  ex- 


88  MOItAL   SCIENCE. 

istence  of  God  is  not  necessary  to  the  operations 
of  conscience,  yet  from  the  existence  of  this  fa- 
culty the  existence  of  God  may  be  inferred. 

And  finally,  that  although  the  atheist  cannot 
destroy  the  moral  faculty,  yet  the  firmer  the  be- 
lief of  God's   existence,  and  the 

Dictates  of  con- 
science modified  by  clearer  the  knowledge  of  his  attri- 

belief  in  God. 

butes,  the  more  distinct  and  for- 
cible will  be  the  dictates  of  conscience.  More- 
over, while  the  blindness  of  atheism  continues, 
there  will  of  course  be  no  perception  of  the 
moral  duties  which  arise  out  of  our  relation  to 
the  great  Creator;  and  thus  the  largest  and 
most  important  class  of  moral  actions  will  be 
out  of  view.  And  this  is  true,  to  a  great  degree, 
in  regard  to  the  practical  atheist,  who  forgets 
God  habitually ;  he  feels  very  little  sense  of 
obligation  to  worship  and  serve  him. 


CHAPTER  XIII. 

MOBAL  AGENCY,  AND  "WHAT  IS  NECE33AET  TO  IT. 

As  actions  of  moral  agents  are  the  proper  and  on- 
ly objects  of  moral  approbation  or  disapprobation, 
it  becomes  necessary  to  institute  an 

The  question  to 

inquiry  into  the  nature  of  moral  be  determined  by 

experience 

agency ;  or  into  what  are  the  con- 
stituents of  a  moral  agent.  The  decision  of  this 
question  must  depend  entirely  on  experience, 
and  can  never  be  determined  by  reasoning  on 
abstract  principles.  The  process  is  simply  this  : 
we  contemplate  a  great  variety  of  acts,  which  by 
the  moral  faculty  we  judge  to  possess  a  moral 
character.  "We  next  examine  the  circumstances 
in  which  those  acts  were  performed,  and  we  con- 
clude those  things  which  are  found  in  all  of 
them,  to  be  necessary  to  moral  agency.  Or,  to 
render  the  examination  more  simple,  we  may 


90  MORAL   SCIENCE. 

suppose  some  one  condition  of  the  action  to  be 
ybsent,  and  then  another,  and  then  viewing  the 
action  as  thus  changed  in  its  circumstances,  we 
may  bring  it  before  the  mind,  and  if  the  moral 
quality  of  the  act  appear  unchanged,  we  conclude 
that  that  which  has  been  removed  from  it  is  no 
essential  circumstance  in  moral  agency.  But  if 
the  change  in  the  circumstances  of  the  action, 
leads  all  men  to  take  an  entirely  different  view 
of  its  nature,  then  we  conclude  that  this  circum- 
stance is  essential  to  moral  agency, 
instance  touch-  To  illustrate  this  principle,  let  us 

lng  moral  agency.  r  *■      ' 

suppose  the  following  case :  If  we 
see  a  man  suddenly,  without  any  apparent  provo- 
cation, raise  his  hand  and  strike  another,  believ- 
ing that  it  was  freely  done,  by  a  man  compos 
mentis,  we  feel  a  strong  disapprobation  of  the 
act,  as  immoral  and  deserving  punishment.  But 
if  on  inquiry  it  is  ascertained  that  the  person 
who  committed  the  assault  was  utterly  destitute 
of  reason,  we  may  blame  his  keepers  or  friends 
who  left  him  at  liberty,  but  we  no  longer  feel 
any  moral  disapprobation  of  the  act.  For  it  is 
the  intuitive  judgment  of  all  persons,  that  a  man 


MOEAL    AGENCY.  91 

destitute  of  reason  is  not  a  moral  agent,  nor  ac- 
countable for  his  actions,  whatever  evil  may 
be  produced.  "We  consider  such  a  man  as  ex- 
actly in  the  same  predicament  as  a  wild  beast 
which  does  -  an  injury.  This  is  the  common 
judgment  of  men ;  for  in  all  courts  of  justice, 
when  a  man  is  arraigned  for  an  assault,  if  it  can 
be  proved  that  he  was  a  maniac  at  the  time,  he 
is  acquitted,  and  all  men  approve  the  judicial 
decision  which  exempts  him  from  punishment. 
Hence  it  is  apparent  that  the  ex- 
ercise  of  reason  is    essential,  to  J"^"™- 

son  indispensable. 

moral  agency.  We  may  bring 
before  our  minds  a  thousand  acts,  under  different 
circumstances,  but  all  performed  by  agents  with- 
out reason,  and  no  man  can  believe  that  such 
actions  are  of  a  moral  nature,  or  of  good  or  ill 
desert. 

It  may  seem  to  be  an  objection  to  this  broad 
assertion  that  there  are  some  who  entertain  the 
opinion    that    infants    are   moral 

No  objection  lies, 

agents  from  their  birth,  and  com-  from  the  case  of  in 

fants. 

mit  actual  sin.     But  these  persons 

do  not  suppose  that  an  irrational  being  can  be  a 


92  MORAL   SCIENCE. 

moral  agent,  but  they  think  that  infants  have  an 
obscure  exercise  of  reason.  Their  mistake  is 
not  in  the  general  principle  which  has  been  laid 
down,  but  in  the  fact  that  infants  have  reason  in 
exercise. 

Again,  let  the  case  supposed  be  varied.     Let 

it  be    that  the  person  committing  the  assault 

had  the  full   exercise  of  reason, 

Another  instance.  ..  . 

but  that  the  stroke  was  not  voiun 
tar j,  but  the  effect  of  a  spasmodic,  diseased, 
action  of  the  muscles;  or  that  the  hand  was 
moved  by  another.  Every  one,  at  once,  judges 
that  the  person  giving  the  stroke,  whatever  he 
might  be  in  other  matters,  was  no  moral  agent 
in  this  assault.  It  was  a  mere  physical  opera- 
tion, and  not  proceeding  from  the  will,  could 

not  be  a  moral  act.    Here  we  have 
voluntary  action       second  circumstance  or  charac- 

tecessary. 

teristic,  essential  to  moral  agency, 
namely,  that  the  action  be  voluntary.  No  in- 
voluntary action  can  be  of  a  moral  nature. 

Some  distinguish  the  liberty  of  the  agent 
from  voluntariness,  but  to  us  they  appear  to  be 
the  same,  or  to  involve  one  another.     If  an  act 


MORAL    AGEXCY.  93 

is  voluntary,  it  is  free ;  and  if  free,  it  must  be 

voluntary.     The  highest  conceiv- 

able  degree  of  liberty  in  a  depen-  „££*"*  vo1' 

dent  being,  is  the  power  of  doing 

as  he  wills  or  pleases.     But  as  this  subject  has 

by  metaphysical  controversy  been  involved  in 

perplexity,   something  may  be    said  hereafter, 

respecting  what  is  called  the  freedom  of  the 

will. 

When  it  is  said  that  the  actions  of  moral 
agents  are  the  only  proper  objects  of  moral  ap- 
probation or  disapprobation,  two 
qualifications  of  the  assertion  must  c^f  n  may  be 
be  taken  into  view.  The  first  is, 
that  the  omission  to  act  when  duty  calls,  is  as 
much  an  object  of  disapprobation  as  a  wicked 
action.  Should  we  see  a  number  of  persons 
sailing  on  a  river  in  a  boat,  and  while  we  sur- 
veyed them,  should  a  child  near  them  fall  into 
the  river,  and  no  hand  be  stretched  out  to  rescue 
it  from  drowning,  we  could  not  help  feeling  a 
strong  disapprobation  of  the  conduct  of  the  per- 
sons who  were  near  enough  to  render  the  neces- 
sary help.     If,  however,  it  should  be  ascertained 


94  -MORAL   SCIENCE. 

that  one  or  more  of  the  persons  were  fast  bound 
and  pinioned,  so  that  they  could  not  possibly 
stretch  out  their  hands  to  rescue  the  child,  we 
should  exempt  them  from  all  blame :  for  no  man 
is  bound  to  do  what  is  physically  impossible. 
The  second  qualification  of  the  statement  is, 
that  when  we  disapprove  an  ex- 

Blame  is  referred    ^^     ^      WQ     always    refer    the 
to  the  intent  '  J 

blame  to  the  motive  or  intention. 
But  if  we  have  evidence  that  the  agent  possesses 
a  nature  or  disposition  which  will  lead  him  often 
or  uniformly  to  perpetrate  the  same  act  when 
the  occasion  shall  occur,  we  not  only  censure  the 
motive,  but  extend  our  moral  disapprobation 
to  the  disposition  or  evil  nature,  lying  behind. 

If  we  suppose  the  case  of  an  agent  acted  on 
by  a  superior  power,   so  that  the  nature  and 

direction  of  the  act  depend  not 
Acts  under  control,  upon  the  agent  himself,  but  upon 

the  power  by  which  he  is  govern- 
ed, we  shall  consider  the  immediate  agent  as  not 
free,  and  the  acts  brought  forth,  as  not  properly 
his  acts,  but  those  of  the  governing  power.  A 
demoniac  or  person  possessed  by  an  evil  spirit 


MORAL  AGENCY.  95 

who  had  power  to  direct  his  thoughts  and 
govern  his  actions,  would  not  be  an  accountable 
agent. 

There  are  some  who  maintain  that  all  human 
actions  proceed  from  God,  as  their  first  cause, 
and  that  man  can  act  only  as  he  is 
acted  upon.     Upon  this  theory,  it  ,  DWne  effic,enc> 

A  ->•  J  '         in  human  acts. 

does  not  appear  how  man  can  be 
an  accountable  moral  agent ;  for  though  his  ac- 
tions may  be  voluntary,  and  performed  in  the 
exercise  of  reason,  yet  as  he  does  not  originate 
them,  they  can  scarcely  be  considered  his  own. 

We  will  now  suppose  the  case  of  a  man  pos- 
sessing reason,  freedom,  and  will,  and  originating 
his  own  actions,  but  destitute  of  a 

n      n        -i,  ,  t  Moral  faculty  ne- 

morai  taculty,  or  unable  to  per-  cessary   to   moral 
ceive  a  difference  between   right 
and  wrong.     Can  such  a  person  be  considered  a 
moral  agent?    We  think  not.      That   bein^— 

how  much  soever  of  reason  he  may  possess 

who  has  no  perception  of  moral  relations,  and 
no  feeling 'of  moral  obligation,  would  be  incapa 
ble  of  a  moral  law,  or  of  performing  moral  acts. 
But  the  case  is  an  imaginary  one.     There  arc  I 


t 


96  MORAL   SCIENCE. 

believe,  none,  who  possess  reason,  and  yet  are 
destitute  of  all  moral  sense ;  but  though  we  con- 
ceive of  the  intellect  of  a  dog  or  an  elephant  in- 
creased  to  any  degree,  yet,  as  being  destitute  of 
a  moral  faculty,  we  do  not  regard  them  as  moral 
agents. 


CHAPTER  XIV. 


MAN  A  MORAi.  AGENT. 


Very  few  Lave  entertained  the  opinion  that  man 

is  a  mere  machine,  governed  by 

physical  influences.    It  will  not  be     The  iuestion  "ta. 

necessary,    therefore,    to     occupy 

time  in  refuting  an  opinion  contrary  to  reason 

and  universal  experience. 

But  there  are  many  who  entertain  the  opinion 
that  man  is  the  creature  of  necessity ;  that  in  the 
circumstances  in  which  each  man 
is  placed,  he  could  not  be  different  Fatalism, 

from  what  he  is.  This  theory  of 
fatalism  is  plausible,  because  a  slight  observation 
of  the  history  of  man  shows  that  the  moral 
characters  of  most  men  are  formed  by  the  edu- 
cation which  they  receive,  and  by  the  sentiments 
and  conduct  of  those  with  whom  they  associate. 


98  MORAL  SCIENCE. 

It  lias,  therefore,  been  maintained — and  the 
opinion  lias  in  our  day  been  industriously  propa- 
gated— that  man  is  not  a  free  and  accountable 
agent ;  that  lie  is  Avliat  lie  is,  by  the  operation  of 
causes  over  which  he  has  no  control ;  that  no 

man  should  be  censured  or  pun 
cn»rncer°fCir'  ishedfor  his  conduct,  since  those 

who  censure  him,  if  placed  in  the 
same  circumstances,  would  act  in  the  same  man- 
ner. In  short,  that  no  man  is  responsible  for  his 
conduct ;  because  his  actions — whether  good  or 
bad — :are  the  effect  of  necessary  causes.  It  is 
held  by  the  same  persons  that  the  only  possible 
method  of  meliorating  the  condition  of  the  hu- 
man race,  is  to  educate  them  in  such  a  manner  aa 
to  avoid  those  prejudices  which  have  hitherto 
proved  inimical  to  the  happiness  of  men ;  and 
to  remodel   society,   rejecting  those  institutions 

which  are  supposed  to  cause  most 
Socialistic  scheme,     of  the  misery  which  is  found  in 

the  world.  This  theory  has  not 
only  been  embraced  with  confidence,  but  at- 
tempts have  been  made  to  carry  it  out  in  prac- 
tice.    Societies  founded  on  the  principles  above 


MAN  A   MOEAL  AGENT.  99 

stated,  have  been  formed  both  in  Great  Britain 
and  America.  But  thus  far  the  experiment  has 
been  attended  with  small  success.  Still  the  ad- 
vocates of  the  Social  system,  as  it  is  called,  have 
not  been  discouraged.  They  are  instituting  new 
societies  upon  an  improved  plan,  and  the  most 
sanguine  hopes  are  entertained  by  those  con- 
cerned in  these  new  associations,  that  a  far  better 
and  happier  state  of  society  than  any  hitherto 
enjoyed,  is  practicable  and  will  be  realized. 

In  answer  to  all  arguments  brought  to  prove 
that  man  is  not  a  free  moral  agent,  we  appeal  to 
the  consciousness  of  every  rational 
being.       No  arguments,  however    1Con8Clon!n ess  de 

o  o  J  dares  man  free. 

plausible,  are  of  any  force  against 
intuitive  first  principles.  Whether  we  can  01 
cannot  answer  arguments  against  liberty,  we 
know  that  we  are  free.  In  regard  to  some  ac- 
tions, we  feel  that  we  are  under  a  moral  obliga 
tion  to  perform  them,  and  in  regard  to  others, 
that  we  ought  not  to  perform  them,,  and  if  we 
are  induced  to  violate  this  obligation,  we  feel 
that  we  are  to  be  blamed,  and  are  deserving  of 
punishment. 


100  MOEAL  SCIENCE. 

Some  philosophers  have  been  persuaded  by 
their  reasonings  that  man  is  not  free,  but  under 
necessity  m  all  his  actions.  But  as  they  could 
not  deny  that  every  man  is  intimately  conscious 
of  being  free,  they  have  adopted 
^Itrr  the  opinion  that  man's  feeling  of 
liberty  is  a  deceptive  feeling,  and 
contrary  to  fact.  A  far  more  reasonable  conclu- 
sion is  that  there  must  be  some  error  in  the  rea- 
soning from  which  the  conclusion  that  man  is 
not  a  free  agent,  is  deduced.  When  a  chain  of 
reasoning  brings  us  to  conclusions  repugnant  to 
our  intuitive  convictions,  it  is  certain  that  there  is 
a  flaw  in  some  link  of  it,  whether  we  can  discover 
it  or  not.  We  are  as  certain  that  we  are  free, 
as  we  can  be ;  a  revelation  from  heaven  could 
not  render  us  more  so.  As  in  other  instances 
where  speculative  men  have  been  led  to  adopt 
conclusions  at  variance  with  self-evident  princi- 
ples, so  here,  men  act,  in  common  life,  in  con 
formity  with  the  common  notions  of  mankind. 
They  can  by  no  effort  divest  themselves  of  this 
assent  to  certain  fundamental  truths. 


CHAPTER  XV. 

MAN  NOT  UNDER  A  FATAL  NECESSITY 

Although  our  consciousness  of  freedom  ought 
to  satisfy  us,  whatever  reasonings  to  the  contrary 
may  be  adduced ;  yet  it  may  be 
useful  to  inquire  whether,  indeed,  talis^ame 
there  are  any  arguments  of  force 
against  the  free  agency  of  man.     It  is  certain 
that  one  truth  cannot  be  in  opposition  to  any 
other  truth.     If,  therefore,  the  deductions  of  rea- 
son and  the  evident  principles  of  common  sense 
and  experience  seem  to  stand  in  opposition  to 
one  another,  it  must  arise  from  some  misappre- 
hension, or  abuse  of  terms.     As  our  understand- 
ing is  given  us  to  enable  us  to  apprehend  truth, 
no  proposition    clearly  perceived  to  be  true. 


102  MOEAL  SOIENUE. 

whether  intuitively    or    by    ratiocination,   can 
possibly  be  opposed  to  any  other  truth. 

It  becomes  necessary,  therefore,  in  the  first 

place,  to  have  distinct  ideas  of  what  is  meant 

by  liberty,  and  what  by  necessity. 

Notion  of  Liber-    -g  th     reference  must  be  not  to 

ty  and  Necessity. 

metaphysical  reasoning,  but  to 
the  common  judgment  and  clear  conviction  of 
all  impartial  men.  It  has  already  been  stated 
that  that  liberty  which  is  necessary  to  moral 
agency,  can  be  nothing  else  than  the  liberty  of 
doing  what  we  will,  to  the  extent  of  our  power. 
It  is  freedom  of  action  in  conformity  with  our 
desire  and  will.  When  a  man  is  compelled  by 
force  to  strike  another  (I  mean  not  by  the  force 
of  strong  motives,  but  by  actual  physical  force), 
we  say  he  is  not  accountable,  because  not  free  to 
do  as  he  willed.  When  we  think  of  that  liberty 
which  is  necessary  to  free  agency,  and  to  the 
performance  of  a  moral  act,  this  is  the  kind  of 
liberty  which  we  have  in  our  minds.  In  judg- 
ing of  the  moral  quality  of  an  act,  we  never 
attempt  to  go  further  back  than  the  spontaneous 
inclination  of  the  mind,  and  never  think  it  ne 


FATALISM.  103 

cessary  to  know  in  what  way  this  disposition 
was  acquired.  If  the  action  proceed  from  will, 
so  far  as  liberty  is  concerned  it  is  a  moral  act. 
We  cannot  conceive  of  any  greater  or  more  de 
sirable  liberty  than  this.  Dependent  creatures, 
indeed,  cannot  possess  that  independent  liberty 
which  is  the  prerogative  of  the  Deity.  The 
creature,  notwithstanding  his  liberty,  is  still 
under  the  government  of  divine  providence. 

It  is  also  important  that  we  entertain  distinct 
and  accurate  ideas  of  that  necessity  which  is  in- 
consistent with  free  agency.  There 
is  what  has  been  termed  moral  or      The    necessity 

■which  precludes  free 

philosophical  necessity,  which  is  agency. 
not  incompatible  with  human  lib- 
erty. This  is  no  other  than  the  certain  opera- 
tion of  moral  causes,  producing  moral  effects, 
according  to  the  power  which  they  possess. 
Such  necessity,  it  has  been  shown,  must  belong 
to  God,  because  he  cannot  act  in  opposition  to 
truth,  wisdom,  and  justice.  But  this  does  not 
hinder  him  from  acting  freely.  So  the  angels  in 
heaven  and  glorified  saints  are  so  confirmed  in 


104  MORAL   SCIENCE. 

holiness  that  they  cannot  sin ;  but  still  in  loving 
and  serving  God  they  act  most  freely. 

But  as  in  the  common  use  of  terms,  and  ac- 
cording to  the  common  apprehension  of  men, 
liberty  and  necessity  are  diametri- 
incon-ect  use  of  ca]]y   opposite ;    when   the  name 

the  term  necessary.  •'         x  1 

necessity  is  applied  to  any  exer- 
cise, the  prejudice  immediately  arises  that  it  can- 
not be  free ;  especially  if  there  be  some  points  in 
which  it  coincides  with  real  necessity.  Here,  it 
is  probable,  we  have  the  true  source  of  the  diffi- 
culty and  perplexity  in  which  this  subject  has 
been  involved.  The  word  necessary  should 
never  have  been  applied  to  any  exercises  which 
are  spontaneous  or  voluntary,  because  all  such 
are  free  in  their  very  nature.  When  we  apply 
this  term  to  them,  although  we  may  qualify  it 
by  calling  it  a  moral  or  philosophical  necessity, 
still  the  idea  naturally  and  insensibly  arises,  thai 
if  necessary  they  cannot  be  free.  It  is  highly 
important  not  to  use  a  term  out  of  its  proper 
signification ;  especially  when  such  consequences 
may  arise  from  an  ambiguous  use.  An  event 
may  be  absolutely  certain  without  being  neces 


FATALISM.  105 

sary.  It  was  absolutely  certain  that  God,  in 
creating  the  world,  would  act  most 
wisely.  It  is  a  matter  of  absolute  ces^teyrtaintyr'°tn<>' 
certainty  that  the  holy  angels  will 
continue  to  love  and  serve  God  incessantly ;  but 
this  certainty  is  not  inconsistent  with  liberty. 
If  a  man  possess  good  principles,  and  all  temp- 
tation to  do  wrong  be  removed,  it  is  morally  cer- 
tain that,  in  any  given  case,  he  will  do  right; 
and  if  a  man  be  of  corrupt  principles,  and  all  vir- 
tuous considerations  be  foreign  from  his  thoughts, 
and  strong  temptations  be  presented  to  his  rul- 
ing passion,  it  is  certain  that  he  will  yield  to 
temptation  and  commit  sin.  But  in  all  these 
cases  there  is  no  necessity,  because  there  is  no 
coercion  or  compulsion.  If  the  mere  certainty 
of  an  event  were  inconsistent  with  freedom, 
then  there  could  be  no  such  thing  as  liberty  in 
God  or  the  creatures.  As  God  knows  all  things 
most  certainly,  every  thing,  in  his  view,  what- 
ever may  be  its  cause,  is  equally  certain;  the 
divine  prescience  cannot  be  mistaken.  There  ia 
no  good  reason  why  uncertainty  should  be  con- 
sidered essential  to  that  liberty  which  is  necessary 

5* 


106  MORAL   SCIENCE. 

to  moral  actions.  All  causes  operate  according 
to  their  nature  and  force.  The  reason  why  one 
effect  is  necessary  and  another  free  is  not  that 
the  one  takes  place  without  an  adequate  cause 
or  that  the  same  cause  may  produce  different 
effects ;  for  both  these  are  contrary  to  common 
sense.  The  true  reason  is  that  the  one  is  pro- 
duced against  will,  or  without  will,  whereas  the 
other  is  a  voluntary  act. 

Let  the  distinction  between  what  is  certain 
and  what  is  necessary  be  fully  comprehended 

and  attended  to,  and  a  great  part 
disanctt^r6^"18  of  the  darkness  which,  in  the  view 

of  many,  has  obscured  this  subject 
will  be  dissipated.  Although,  then,  it  should  be 
demonstrated  that  the  will  is  as  certainly  gov- 
erned by  motives  as  the  scale  of  the  balance  is 
by  weights,  yet  there  can  be  no  legitimate  infer- 
ence from  the  one  to  the  other,  as  if  that  would 
prove  that  the  will  is  not  free  but  under  a  neces- 
sity. The  difference  lies  not  in  the  difference  of 
certainty  in  the  two  cases,  but  in  the  difference 
in  the  nature  of  the  causes  of  that  certainty. 


CHAPTER  XVI.    *7>~^  U^ftt^ 


MAN'S  DIRECTION  AND  GOVERNMENT  OF  HIS  ACTIONS, 

AND  HIS  CONSEQUENT  RESPONSIBILITY. 

There  are  two  extremes  to  be  avoided  here. 
The  first  is  that  which  considers  man  as,  in  some 
sense,  a  passive  recipient  of  influ- 
ences from  without.  He  is  repre-  avofdxeJemcs  t0  bo 
sented  as  placed  in  certain  circum- 
stances and  surrounded  by  certain  objects,  in  the 
selection  of  which  he  has  had  no  choice ;  and  as 
he  is  susceptible  of  certain  impressions  which 
these  circumstances  and  objects  are  fitted  to 
make  upon  him,  he  cannot  be  considered  a  free 
and  accountable  agent. 

In  opposition  to  this  false  hypothesis  we  as- 
sert that  the  whole  force  which  governs  man  is 
within,  and  proceeds  from  himself.  External 
objects  are  in  themselves  inert.     They  exert  no 


108  MORAL   SCIENCE. 

influence  ;  no  power  emanates  from  them.     The 
only  power  and  influence  which 
frorSIerreally  tne7  can  possibly  have  over  any 
man  they  derive  from  the  active 
principles  of  his  nature.     We  are,  indeed,  accus- 
tomed in  popular  language  to  say  that  external 
objects   excite   and   inflame   the  mind;   but  in 
philosophical  accuracy  they  are  but  the  passive 
objects  on  which  the  affections  and  desires  of 
the  mind  fasten,  and  their  whole  power  of  mov- 
ing to  action  depends  upon  the  strength  of  the 
inward  affections  of  the  soul.     To  render  this 
perfectly  plain  to  every  mind,  it  will,  only  be 
necessary  to  attend  to  a  few  familiar  illustrations. 
To  a  man  who  is  under  the  influence  of  hun- 
ger or  thirst,  bread  and  water  are  said,  when 
seen,  greatly  to  excite  him,  so  that 
wJd°o5^m  °Ut"  he  k  strongly  impelled  to  appro- 
priate these  objects  to  the  craving 
wants  of  his  nature.     But  every  one  sees  at  once 
that  both  the  bread  and  the  water  are  merely 
passive  objects  on  which  the  appetite  fixes.    The 
real  force  which  impels  to  action,  is  not,  there- 
fore, the  external  object,  but  the  inward  desire 


SELF-DIRECTION,  109 

which  is  in  the  soul  itself.  For  where  no  appe- 
tite cf  hunger  or  thirst  exists,  the  bread  and 
water,  however  presented  and  urged  upon  the 
sense,  produce  no  effect;  there  is  no  motive  to 
action  experienced. 

Take  another  case.   A  man  comes  into  a  room 
where  lies  a  pile  of  gold.     Avarice  urges  him 
to  seize  the  beloved  object,  and 
appropriate  it  to   himself.      Two  .  tF°T  resid?  in 

ri       J-  internal  pnnciplee. 

desires  or  motives  counteract  the 
tendency  of  avarice ;  one  is  a  sense  of  duty  or 
regard  to  the  dictate  of  conscience,  which  he 
knows  ought  to  be  obeyed ;  the  other  is  a  regard 
to  reputation,  or  the  good  opinion  of  men.  Be- 
tween these  two  antagonistical  principles,  there 
must  of  course  be  a  conflict.  If  avarice  be 
strong,  and  the  power  of  conscience  and  desire 
of  the  good  opinion  of  men  be  comparatively 
weak,  the  consequence  will  be  that  the  man  will 
pat  forth  his  hand  and  take  the  gold,  and  at  the 
same  time  will  feel  conscious  that  he  is  doing 
wrong.  But  if  conscience  be  fully  awake,  and 
especially  if  a  love  of  moral  excellence  and  a 
hatred  of  iniquity  have  a  place  in  his  mind, 


110  MORAL   SCIENCE. 

this  motive  alone  will  be  sufficient  to  induce  him 
to  reject  at  once  the  thought  of  appropriating 
what  belongs  to  another.  In  this  case  it  is  evi- 
dent that  the  gold  on  the  table  is  altogether  pas- 
sive ;  there  is  no  secret  emanation  from  the  inert 
metal.  The  whole  power  of  gold  to  seduce  the 
mind  to  evil  depends  on  the  strength  of  the  prin- 
ciple of  avarice  within ;  and  in  a  mind  rightly 
constituted,  or  under  the  influence  of  good 
moral  dispositions,  it  could  .never  so  prevail  as 
to  induce  the  person  to  do  an  unlawful  act  for 
the  sake  of  obtaining  it. 

From  these  cases  it  is  evident  that  a  man  is 

not  governed  by  any  influence  from  without  or 

separate  from  himself,  but  that  the 

iyo^ectrsnalSarCOn"  true  sPrinS  of  nis  actions  lies  en- 
tirely  in  his*  own  inclinations  and 
will,  external  things  having  no  other  influence 
than  as  they  furnish  objects  suited  to  his  appe- 
'tites  and  other  desires. 

Some  writers  on  the  will,  in  speaking  of  the 
governing  power  of  motives,  have  expressed 
themselves  in  a  manner  which  leads  to  the  opin- 
ion that  the  motives  by  which  the  will  is  de« 


SELF-DIRECTION.  11- 

terinincd  exist  without  us,  or  separate  from 
ourselves,  whereas  those  motives 
which  possess  an  active  power  and  aTf*£ZnT* 
govern  our  voluntary  actions,  are 
within  us,  and  are  our  own  active  powers  ana 
affections,  for  which  we  are  as  responsible  as  for 
any  other  acts  or  operations  of  the  mind.  Hence 
it  may  truly  be  affirmed  that  every  man  pos- 
sesses a  self-determining  power  by  which  he 
regulates  and  governs  his  own  actions  according 
to  his  own  inclinations. 

The  other  extreme  in  regard  to  this  subject 
is,    that  the   will   possesses    a   self-determining 
power  in  itself,  independent  of  all 
motives,  and  uninfluenced  bv  any       Self-^tennining 

'  </  J     power. 

inclination.  And  it  is  maintained 
that  such  a  self-determining  power  is  essential  to 
freedom,  and  to  the  existence  of  an  accountable 
moral  agent.  If,  indeed,  this  last  opinion  were 
correct  we  should  admit  the  self-determining 
power  of  the  will,  whether  we  understood  its 
nature  or  not ;  for  we  lay  it  down  as  a  first  prin- 
ciple— from  which  we  can  no  more  depart  than 
from  the  consciousness  of  existence — that  MAN 


112  MORAL   SCIENCE. 

is  free  ;  and  therefore  stand  ready  to  embrace 
whatever  is  fairly  included  in  the  definition  of 
freedom.  But  it  is  not  yet  made  evident,  or 
even  probable,  that  such  a  power  exists,  or  that 
it  is  at  all  necessary  to  free  moral  agency,  or  that 
the  possession  of  such  a  power  would  be  valua- 
ble or  desirable. 

All  that  is  wanted  is  to  make  mnn  the  mas- 
ter of  his  own  actions,  and  this  is  jompletely 
effected  by  giving  him  the  power 
Not  necessary.  to  will  and  act  in  accordance  with 
his  own  inclinations.  Certainly  a 
man  is  not  the  less  accountable  for  his  actions 
because  they  are  in  accordance  with  his  desires. 
Every  rational  being  acts  with  a  view  to  some 
end,  and  his  regard  or  affection  for  that  end  is 
the  motive  which  governs  his  will  and  influences 
his  conduct. 

It  cannot  be  justly  denied,  and  is  generally 
admitted,  that  in  most  cases  the 

Denial    of   such 

power  does  not  con-  determinations  of  the  will  are  in- 
flict with  liberty. 

fluenced  by  strong  desires ;  and 
when  such  desires  exist,  and  there  are  none  lead- 
ing a  contrary  way,  the  decisions  of  the  will  are 


SELF- DIRECTION.  113 

in  fact  determined  by  the  previous  state  of  the 
mind.  Now  if  the  prevalence  of  these  desires 
in  such  cases  is  not  found  to  interfere  with  free 
agency,  there  is  no  reason  to  think  that  the  be- 
lief that  the  will  is  invariably  determined  by 
the  strongest  existing  desire  will  lead  to  any 
conclusion  unfavourable  to  liberty.  If  the  self- 
determining  power  in  question  is  exerted  only 
in  trivial  cases  where  motives  to  action  are  weak, 
or  when  there  is  an  equipoise  of  motives,  it  cannot 
be  a  power  of  any  great  consequence,  since  most 
of  our  moral  acts  are  performed  without  its  aid. 
Let  us  first  take  an  impartial  view  of  the  acts 
of  a  man  in  the  exercise  of  the 

Instances  examined. 

power  which   all   admit  he   pos- 
sesses, and  then  of  this  imaginary  power  which 
some  think  essential  to  moral  agency. 

In  the  first  case  the  man  exercising  his  rea- 
son, apprehends  objects  which  appear  to  him,  on 
some  account,  good  and  desirable. 

First  case 

These   objects  he  desires  to  ob- 
tain, and  puts  forth  those  volitions  which  pro- 
duce the  actions  requisite  to  the  accomplishment 
of  his  object. 


114  MORAL   SCIENCE. 

In  the  second  case  the  man  feels  an  inclina- 
tion leading  him  with  more  or  less  force  to  a 
certain. object ;  but  he  has  a  power 

Second  case. 

which  he  can  at  any  time  exert  to 
arrest  his  action  in  the  line  of  his  inclinations, 
and  by  exerting  this  power  of  willing  he  can 
counteract  any  desire,  and  act  in  opposition  to 
it.  Or  if  two  desires  exist,  he  can  by  this  power 
give  the  prevalence  to  that  which  is  the  weaker. 
The  best  way  to  bring  this  matter  to  the  test  of 
experience  is  to  suppose  a  case  in  which  such  a 
power  is  exerted.  Suppose  the  case  of  a  man  in 
whom,  by  habit  and  indulgence,  the  appetite  for 
intoxicating  drink  is  strong ;  but  he  is  induced 
by  weighty  reasons  derived  from  a  sense  of  duty 
and  a  regard  to  his  health,  reputation,  family, 
and  temporal  prosperity,  to  determine  not  to  ex- 
pose himself  to  temptation.  An  old  companion 
calls  and  solicits  him  to  go  with  him  to  a  convi- 
vial meeting.  Jlis  appetite  strongly  pleads  for 
indulgence,  if  only  for  this  one  time ;  but  con- 
science remonstrates,  and  a  regard  to  health, 
reputation,  and  the  like,  operates  strongly 
on  the  other  side.     Suppose  the  influence  felt 


SELF-DIHECTION.  115 

from  these  two  opposite  sources  to  be  almost 
equally  balanced ;  suppose  even  a  perfect  equi- 
poise. Such  a  state  of  mind,  though  possible 
and  frequently  experienced,  can  never  last  long, 
for  the  states  of  the  mind  change  in  some  re- 
spects every  moment,  and  the  least  difference  in 
the  views  of  the  subject  would  destroy  the  bal- 
ance. But  now  is  the  time  for  the  exercise  of 
the  power  which  determines  without  regard  to 
motive.  Suppose,  while  the  scales  are  thus  in 
equipoise,  this  power  to  be  exerted,  and  the  man 
determines  in  favour  of  self-denial.  Why  he 
did  thus  determine,  seems  to  be  a  reasonable  in- 
quiry ;  but  if  this  power  exists,  such  a  question  is 
entirely  irrelative.  There  was,  according  to  the 
supposition,  no  reason  or  motive  which  influ- 
enced the  determination.  Here  then  is  a  case 
for  our  consideration :  Is  an  action  prompted  by 
no  motive,  and  performed  without  a  view  to  any 
end,  an  accountable  moral  act  ?  If  this  self-de- 
termining power  exists,  it  may  be  exerted  in  op- 
position to  the  highest  and  best  motives,  and 
neither  the  person  himself  nor  any  body  else  can 
tell  why  it  was  exerted.     If  a  man  under  the  in 


116     ■  MORAL   SCIENCE. 

fluence  of  love  to  his  Creator,  should  be  abou? 
to  engage  in  the  performance  of  some  plain  and 
important  duty,  the  exertion  of  this  power  at 
the  most  unseasonable  time  might  arrest  his  ac- 
tion and  lead  him  to  a 'contrary  determination. 
Why  would  he  exert  such  a  power  at  such  a 
time?  That,  indeed,  is  the  question.  But  if 
any  reason  of  any  kind  could  be  given  it  would 
destroy  the  hypothesis,  which  is  that  a  man  has 
power  to  determine  in  opposition 

No  power  to  de- 
termine against  aii  to  all  existing  motives,  and  where 

motives.  '  , 

there  is  a  competition  can  act  in 
conformity  with  the  weakest.  Surely  such  a 
power  is  irrational  and  dangerous  in  the  ex- 
treme, and  has  no  tendency  to  increase  that  free 
dom  which  is  requisite  to  a  moral  agent. 


CHAPTER  XVII. 

OBJECTIONS  TO  THE  UNIFORM  INFLUENCE  OF  MOTIVEi. 

One  of  the  most  plausible  objections  to  the 
uniform  influence  of  motives  on  the  will  is,  the 
intimate  conviction  every  man  has, 

Objection    from 

when  he  has  done  what  he  regrets,  regret  at  wrong  ac- 
tions, 
that  he  could  have  done  other- 
wise; whereas,  upon  the  hypothesis  laid  down 
above,  the  man  could  not  possibly,  with  the 
s?.:ne  motives,  have  acted  differently  from  what 
he  did.  And  it  is  alleged  that  no  man  ever 
would  or  could  repent  of  his  most  criminal 
conduct,  were  he  persuaded  that  he  could  not 
have  willed  and  acted  differently  from  what  he 
did. 

This  objection  brings  out  the  true  issue  in 
this  inquiry.  The  real  question  in  dispute  in 
regard  to  the  will  is,  whether,  all  things  external 


118  MORAL   SCIENCE. 

and  internal  being  the  same  to  any  voluntary 

agent,  the  volitions  will  be  the 
rta1teitrae<1UeSti0U  same.     That  is,  whether  a  man  in 

the  same  state  of  mind  and  under 
the  influence  of  the  same  desires  and  motives,  in 
kind  and  degree,  will  not  always  will  and  act  in 
the  same  way.-  This  we  affirm ;  and  the  advocates 
of  the  self-determining  power  of  the  will,  deny. 

It  is  admitted  that  when  a  man  has  done 
wrong  and  is  convinced  of  his  error,  he  is  deeply 

conscious  that  he  might  and  should 
J3Z&?  tave  acted  differently.     But  when 

this  conviction  is  analyzed,  it  is 
found  to  be,  not  that  he  might  have  willed  and 
acted  differently  with  the  same  feelings  that  in- 
fluenced him  at  the  moment  of  doing  wrong, 
but  that  he  might  and  should  have  had  a  differ- 
ent state_ofJeeling,  or  a  more  considerate  atten- 
tion to  those  things  which  were  forgotten,  but 
which  if  recollected  would  have  prevented  him 
from  doing  that  which  he  now  regrets. 

Take  a  case.  A  man  in  an  hour  of  levity, 
and  under  the  influence  of  a  degree  of  envy, 
speaks  disrespectfully  of  a  person  whose  charac- 


MOTIVES.  119 

ter  is  worthy  of  esteem,  and  to  whom  he  is  under 
Special   obligation.     Upon  renec- 

**r  Example. 

tion  he  is  truly  sorry  for  what  he 
said,  candidly  confesses  his  fault,  and  says  that 
were  he  again  placed  in  similar  circumstances, 
he  would  not  be  guilty  of  the  same  fault.  Bui 
suppose  he  should  be  asked  whether,  if  the  same 
degree  of  inattention,  and  the  same  envious  feel- 
ing should  again  exist  which  characterized  the 
state  of  his  mind  when  he  spoke  unadvisedly, 
and  no  considerations  should  occur  which  were 
not  then  present  to  his  mind,  he  is  of  opinion ' 
that  he  would  act  differently  from  what  he  did. 
Under  such  a  view  of  the  matter,  few  persons 
dare  profess  that  they  would  act  differently 
when  placed  in  precisely  the  same  circumstances. 
When  we  feel  that  we  would  and  could  act  dif- 
ferently from  what  we  have  done  in  certain 
specified  circumstances,  it  is  always  on  the  sup- 
position that  our  views  and  feelings  should  be 
different.  If  the  person  speaking  disrespectfully 
of  a  friend  is  asked  what  would  induce  him 
to  act  differently,  if  the  thing  were  to  be  done 
again,  the  natural  and  reasonable  answer  is,   "I 


120  MORAL   SCIENCE. 

should  think  of  the  impropriety  of  the  thing,  and 
should  recollect  my  obligations  to  the  person* 
and  other  the  like  considerations."  This  shows 
that  men  feel  accountable,  not  only  for  their 
volitions  and  actions,  but  for  the  views  and 
feelings  which  precede  volition.  Indeed  h 
there  is  one  point  above  all  others  on  which 
responsibility  rests,  it  is  on  the  motives,  that  is, 
the  active  desires  or  affections  of  the  mind  from 
which  volition  proceeds,  and  by  which  it  is  gov- 
erned. The  murderer  could  easily  abstain  from 
murder,  if  he  would  repress  his^malignant  feel- 
ings ;  but  with  the  same  spirit  of  malice  and 
revenge  which  induced  him  to  shed  his  brother's 
blood,  and  with  the  same  absence  of  all  other 
views  and  feelings  than  those  which  he  had  at 
the  time,  there  is  a  moral  certainty  that  he  would 
commit  the  same  crime  again.  Nor  has  this 
certainty,  that  unrestrained  malice  and  revenge 
would  again  lead  to  the  perpetration  of  the  same 
horrid  crime,  the  slightest  tendency  to  alleviate 
the  guilt  of  the  murderer.  The  true  ground  of 
his  culpability,  lies  in  his  having  and  indulging 
such    malignant  tempers,    and    in    voluntarily 


M0T1YES.  121 

turning  away  his  mind  from  all  considerations 
of  piety  and  humanity,  which  would  restrain 
him  from  the  cruel  act.  And  here  a  question 
might  arise  respecting  a  man's  desires  and  affec- 
tions, and  the  power  which  he  has  over  them ; 
but  this  is  not  the  proper  place  for  a  discussion 
of  that  point. 

Another  objection  which  has  been  repeatedly 
urged,  and  which  by  many  is  considered  unan- 
swerable, is,  that  according  to  this 

Objection  from  im- 

nypothesis,  when  two  things  ex-  possibility  of  choos- 
ing between  equals. 

actly  equal,  and  viewed  to  be  so, 
are  presented  to  the  choice  of  a  rational  being, 
it  would  be  impossible  to  choose  either.  But 
every  man  (say  the  objectors)  feels  that  he  has 
Jie  power,  if  two  loaves  of  bread  or  two  eggs 
exactly  alike  be  presented,  of  choosing  between 
them ;  and  as  there  exists  confessedly  no  motive 
for  preferring  one  loaf  or  one  egg  to  the  other, 
therefore  it  is  possible  for  the  will  to  determine 
without  a  motive. 

To  this  plausible  objection  it  may  be  an 
Bwered,  that  if  the  self-determining  power  of  the 
will,   independent   of  motives,   be   confined   to 


122  MORAL   SCIENCE. 

cases  in  which,  there  are  no  motives  to  turn  the 
balance,  it  is  a  power  of  very  little 

Answer. 

importance,  and  not  worth  disput 
insr  about.     Let  it  be  admitted  that  in  such  an 

O 

equipoise  of  motives,  the  mind  can  determine  in 
favour  of  either  of  the  objects.  But  perhaps 
this  will  admit  of  a  different  solution,  and  one 
in  accordance  with  the  theory  maintained.  And 
let  it  be  remarked,  that  it  is  not  the  similarity  of 
external  objects  which  should  here  be  consid- 
ered, but  the  view  which  the  mind  takes  of  them. 
We  know  how  a  fertile  imagination  may  cast  u 
grain  into  one  of  the  balanced  scales,  and  cause 
it  to  preponderate.  But  further,  the  state  of 
mind  supposed  to  be  produced  by  objects  oi 
equal  value,  is  really  felt  for  a  moment.  Between 
two  things  we  hesitate,  not  being  able  to  come  tc 
a  decision ;  but  this  indecision  arises  not  from  a 
belief  that  the  objects  proposed  are  equal,  but 
from  a  doubt  which  is  preferable.  When  we  aro 
sure  there  is  no  difference,  this  hesitation  is  not 
experienced.  The  explanation  which  seems 
correct,  is  the  following:  two  guineas  are  laid 
before  a  poor  man,  and  he  is  told  to  take  which 


MOTIVES.  123 

one  he  pleases.  It  cannot  be  necessary  th-t  lis 
should  think  one  better  than  the  other.  If  such 
a  preference  were  necessary,  he  would  be  unable 
lo  take  either,  and  his  situation  would  be  com- 
parable to  the  ass  of  the  old  Greek  sophists, 
held  immovable  between  two  bundles  of  hay. 

The  difficulty  supposed  to  exist  in  the  case  of 
two  equal  objects  proposed  for  our  choice,  is 
perfectly  imaginary :  no  difficulty 
or  perplexity  is  ever  experienced,  J^Sf  ^ 
when  the  things  presented  to  our 
choice  are  known  to  be  equal.  It  is  only  when 
we  apprehend  that  there  may  be  a  difference  be- 
tween the  objects  offered,  that  we  hesitate.  As 
if  a  person  should  offer  to  our  choice  two  cas- 
kets, the  contents  of  which  are  unknown;  we 
find  it  difficult  to  choose,  for  the  very  reason 
that  we  suspect  the  one  to  be  more  valuable 
than  the  other,  but  are  ignorant  to  which  the 
greatest  value  attaches.  And  if  we  should  be 
informed  that  one  contained  jewels  of  great 
price  and  the  other  nothing  but  baubles,  our 
hesitancy  would  be  accompanied  with  solicitude. 
But  when  we  are  certain  that  the  things  pro- 


124  MORAL   SCIENCE. 

posed  to  our  choice  are  perfectly  alike,  in  all 
respects,  we  experience  no  difficulty  whatever. 
Suppose  it  to  be  first  a  single  guinea  which,  is 
offered  to  a  needy  beggar ;  he  is  moved 
by  his  feeling  of  want  to  take  it.  If  instead 
of  one,  two  guineas  are  offered,  he  experiences 
no  difficulty  in  choosing,  knowing  them  to 
be  alike.  But  this  furnishes  no  example 
of  an  action  produced  without  a  motive. 
The  question  is,  whether  the  man  shall  act 
or  not;  and  the  motive  for  action  is  strong, 
namely,  the  desire  of  relief.  As  he  is  at  liberty 
to  take  but  one,  and  there  is  no  difference 
between  them,  he  seizes  that,  which  from  one 
or  more  of  a  thousand  slight  reasons  of  nearness 
or  convenience,  it  happens  to  him  to  choose, 
without  any  preference  properly  so  called. 


CHAPTER  XVIII. 

SUMMARY  VIEW  OF  LIBERTY. 

Man  is  conscious  of  liberty,  and  nothing  can 
add  to  the  certainty  which  he  has  that  he  is  a 
free  agent.     Objections  to  self-evi- 

■■  .    ,         ,  i  .1  i  ^an    intuitively 

dent  principles,  however  plausible,  certain  that  he  is 

free. 

should  not  be  regarded;  for,  in 
the  nature  of  things,  no  reasonings  can  over- 
throw plain  intuitive  truths,  as  no  reasonings  can 
be  founded  on  principles  more  certain.  Though 
we  may  not  be  able  to  understand  or  explain 
with  precision  wherein  freedom  consists,  yet  this 
ignorance  of  its  nature  should  not  disturb  our 
minds.  "We  experience  the  same  difficulty  in 
regard  to  other  truths  of  this  class  without  any 
diminution  of  our  assurance.  I  am  conscious 
that  I  have  life — but  what  is  life  ?  neither  I  nor 
any  other  human  being  can  tell.     But  do  we, 


126  MORAL    SCIENCE. 

because  of  this  ignorance,  doubt  whether  indeed 
we  live  ?  Not  in  the  least.  We  know  that  we 
are  free  precisely  in  the  same  manner  that  we 
know  that  we  are  living  beings,  and  no  plausi 
ble  reasonings  should  disturb  us  in  the  one  case 
more  than  in  the  other. 

Again,  if  in  attempting  to  explain  what  is 

essential  to  free  agency,  we  should  fall  into  any 

mistake,  or  conclude  that  some- 

This  certainty  un-  .  . 

disturbed  by  errors  thing  does  not  belong  to  it,  which 

of  reasoning. 

does,  let  it  not  be  said  that  wo 
deny  the  freedom  of  man ;  for  while  we  may  err 
in  regard  to  our  conception  of  its  nature,  we 
know  that  we  cannot  err  in  regard  to  the  actual 
existence  of  freedom. 

We  are  willing  to  attribute  to  man  every 
kind  and  degree  of  liberty  which  can  properly 

belong  to   a   dependent  creature 

.niSs&sr and  a  raW1  beins; and  if  we 

deny  what  some  think  essential  to 
free  agency,  it  is  because  in  our  view  it  would 
be  no  real  privilege  to  possess  such  a  power,  as 
not  being  compatible  with  the  laws  by  which 
rational  creatures  are  governed. 


LIBERTY  127 

It  is  admitted  that  man  has  power  to  govern 
his  own  volitions,  and  does  govern 
them,  according  to  his  own  desire.  Postulates. 

He  has  the  liberty,  within  the  lim- 
its of  his  power,  to  act  as  he  pleases ;  and  greater 
liberty,  in  our  judgment,  is  inconceivable. 

To  suppose,  in  addition  to  this,  a  power  to 
act  independently  of  all  reasons  and  motives, 
would  be  to  confer  on  him  a  power 
for  the  exercise  of  which  he  could      i^erty  is  not 

power  to  act  inde- 

never  be  accountable.     It  would  potently  of  aiin*. 

sons. 

be  a  faculty  which  would  com- 
pletely disqualify  him  from  being  the  subject  of 
moral  government.  In  the  nature  of  things,  it 
would  be  impossible  that  a  creature  possessed  of 
such  a  power  could  be  so  governed  that  his  ac- 
tions could  be  directed  to  any  end. 

One  hypothesis  makes  man  the  master  of 
his  own  actions,  but  a  creature 
governed  by  understanding  and  First  hypothesis, 
choice.  He  may  be  misled  by 
false  appearances,  and  influenced  by  wrong  mo- 
tives, but  is  always  governed  by  some  reasons  or 
motives. 


128  MORAL   SCIENCE. 

On  the  other  hypothesis  a  man  may  and  doea 
act  without  any  inducement,  and  without  being 
influenced  by  any  reasons,  to  do 
Second  hypothesis,  what  is  contrary  to  all  his  inclina- 
tions and  feeling.  I  cannot  but 
think  that,  after  all,  the  abettors  of  this  scheme 
retain  in  their  minds  a  certain  obscure  but  lin- 
gering persuasion  that  the  free  agent  feels  some 
reason  for  acting  as  he  does ;  and  if  so,  the  dis- 
pute is  at  an  end,  for  whatever  may  be  the  con- 
sideration which  induces  a  man  to  act  in  oppo- 
sition to  strong  desires,  it  must  be  something 
which  is  felt  by  the  mind  to  have  force,  and  to 
be  such  a  consideration  as  ought  to  influence  a 
rational  being. 

Let  us  for  still  further  elucidation  again  sup- 
pose a  case  in  which  this  self-determining  power 
is  exerted. 

A  young  man  entrusted  with  the  property 

of   his    employer,  has  by  undue 

case   supposed  indulgence  in    amusements,    con- 

for  self-determining 

power.  tracted  debts  which  he  is  unable  to 

pay.     He  sees  a  way  by  which 

he  can  appropriate  to  his  own  use  some  of  the 


LIBERTY.  129 

money  in  his  hands  without  the  possibility  of 
discovery.  His  wants  are  urgent,  his  reputation 
is  at  stake,  and  he  feels  himself  impelled  by  a 
powerful  motive  to  the  deed ;  and  there  are  no 
motivss  to  draw  him  in  an  opposite  course  but 
such  as  are  derived  from  conscience  and  the  fear 
of  Go  1.  At  the  moment  when  about  to  perpe- 
trate the  felonious  act,  he  pauses  and  resolves 
that  he  will  not  do  it.  The  question  is,  has  he 
not  power  to  act  thus  ?  Is  he  not  the  arbiter  of 
his  own  acts  of  will  ?  Are  we  not  all  conscious 
that  we  possess  such  a  power?  There  is  no 
dispute  about  the  power,  if  it  only  pleases  the 
agent  to  exercise  it.  He  is  as  free  to  abstain 
from  embezzling  what  belongs  to  another,  as  to 
do  it.  The  only  question  is,  will  he  do  it  unless 
some  reason,  motive,  or  moral  feeling  influence 
him  ?  If  so,  then  indeed  it  would  be  the  exem- 
plification of  the  power  in  question.  But  when 
we  examine  the  case  carefully  we  shall  be  satis- 
fied that  where  there  is  a  powerful  motive  on 
one  side,  there  must  be  a  preponderating  mo- 
tive on  the  other  to  prevent  a  volition  in  ac- 
cordance with  the  first.      Suppose   the   young 


130  MORAL   SCIENCE. 

man  under  the  temptation  mentioned  10  havti 
his  mind  free  from  all  moral  considerations,  and 
to  have  no  fear  of  injuring  his  reputation,  what 
would  restrain  him  ?  Or,  if  without  any  moral 
influence,  or  any  other  consideration,  he  should 
abstain,  would  there  be  any  virtue  in  the  act  ? 
To  know  whether  an  act  is  virtuous,  we  properly 
ask,  why  was  it  done  ?  what  was  the  motive  of 
the  agent?  But  here  there  is  none,  and  con- 
sequently the  act  can  have  no  moral  character. 
And  if  we  suppose  some  faint  remonstrance  of 
conscience,  and  some  slight  fear  of  discovery, 
even  these  would  not  prevent  the  act  where  the 
contrary  motives  were  urgent. 

But  suppose,  now,  this  young  man  to  have 
had  a  religious  education,  and  to  have  been 
brought  up  to  regard  his  reputation,  and  when 
the  temptation  is  most  powerful  and  he  is  in 
danger  of  yielding,  conscience  should  utter  her 
voice  with  power,  and  dictate  imperatively  that 
this  is  a  deed  which  should  not  be  done  ;  and  at 
the  same  time,  a  lively  apprehension  of  disgrace 
ehould  operate  with  a  combined  influence  on 


LIBERTY.  131 

his  mind,  would  the  operation  of  these  mo- 
tives in  preventing  the  crime  be  less  rational 
or  less  virtuous  than  if  he  should  act  without  a 
motive  ? 


CHAPTER  XIX. 

THE  KIND  OF  INDIFFERENCE  WHICH  HAS  BEEN    CONSID- 
ERED ESSENTIAL  TO  FREE  AGENCY. 

In  every  act  of  choice  or  will,  it  is  implied  that 
the  person  willing  might,  if  he  pleased,  act  in  a 

different  way  from  what  he  does, 
ore  free.  °f  Ch°1C6  f°r  otherwise  he  would  be  under 

a  necessity  of  acting  in  one  way 
only,  and  there  could  be  no  freedom  in  such  an 
action.  There  is  no  freedom  in  the  pulsations  of 
the  heart,  for  they  are  not  voluntary,  but  go  on 
whether  we  will  it  or  not.     In  all  actions  where 

the  will  is  exercised  there  must  be 
Liberty  of  con-  at  least  two  things  which  may  be 

traduction     and    of 

contrariety.  done.      This  liberty  was  by  the 

ancients    distinguished    into    two 

kinds,  the  liberty  of  contradiction,  and  the  liberty 

of  contrariety.     In  the  first  we  have  the  choice 


INDIFFERENCE.  133 

of  doing  or  not  doing  some  proposed  act.  In 
the  second,  we  have  the  liberty  to  do  one  thing 
or  another,  or  one  thing  or  several  others.  In 
regard  to  such  objects  of  choice,  there  was  said  to 
be  indifference,  by  which  it  was  not  meant  that 
the  mind  was  indifferent  at  the  moment  of  choice. 
This  would  be  a  contradiction,  because  indiffer- 
ence towards  an  object,  and  the  choice  of  an  ob- 
ject, are  opposite  and  irreconcilable  states  of 
mind.  But  the  meaning  was,  that,  abstractly 
from  the  feelings  of  the  agent,  the  contrary  or 
different  actions  were '  indifferent.  It  was  in  the 
power  of  the  agent,  if  he  were  disposed,  to  do  or 
not  do,  to  do  this  or  that ;  but  it  was  never  un- 
derstood to  imply,  that  with  the  inclination  in  one 
direction  a  choice  might  be  made  in  the  opposite 
direction.  A  man  may  do  what  he  pleases,  but 
it  is  absurd  to  suppose  that  he  can  will  to  do 
what  it  does  not  please  him  to  do. 

The  doctrine  of  a  power  of  contrary  choice, 
as  the   thing  has  been  now  ex- 
plained, is  a  reasonable  doctrine,       Power  of  en' 

1  trary  choice. 

and  in  accordance  with  all  expe- 
rience, if  with  the  volition  you  include  the  mo- 


13-i  MOEAL  SCIENCE. 

tive,  if  with  the  choice  you  take  in  the  desire, 

But  to  suppose  a  volition  contrary 

Volition  cannot  to  the  prevailing  inclination  is  in- 
con  travene    preva- 
lent inclination,        consistent    with    all    experience; 

and,  as  has  been  shown,  such  a 
iberty  or  power  would  disqualify  a  man  for  be- 
ing an  accountable  moral  agent. 

In  the  last  century  an  able  metaphysical  wri- 
ter, convinced  that  the  common  doctrine  of  the 
self-determining  power  of  the  will 
Theory  of  Abp.  couid  not  stand,  invented  a  new 

King. 

hypothesis.  His  leading  idea  is, 
that  we  do  not  choose  an  object  because  we  de- 
sire it,  but  desire  it  because  we  choose  it.  Ac- 
cording to  this  view  of  Archbishop  King,  in  his 
work  on  the  "  Origin  of  Evil,"  there  must  be  a 
state  of  absolute  indifference  prior  to  an  act  of 
choice ;  for  all  love  or  attachment  to  an  object, 
and  all  desire  of  possessing  it,  are  produced  by 
he  act  of  the  mind  in  choosing  it.  This  is  a 
complete  inversion  in  the  order  of  the  exercise? 
of  the  mind.  Though  recommended  by  higk 
authority,  and  ingeniously  defended  by  its  au 
thor,  it  seems  strange  that  it  should  have  found 


-.^DIFFERENCE*  135 

any  respectable  abettors.     But  Dr.  Watts,  in  his 
Essay  on   the   "  Freedom  of  the 
will  in  God  and   the   creatures,"  •VVatts.°Pte       * 
adopts  the  outlines  of  the  Arch- 
bishop's scheme,  and  defends  its  principles  by 
many  arguments.     This  led  President  Edwards, 
in  his   celebrated   work    on    the 
Will,    to    take    particular    pains  J£M*T**! 
to  refute  this  false  theory.     The 
indifference   of  which  he  treats  is  that  which 
appertains   to   this    scheme.      Many,    however, 
have  been  led,  from  an  acquaintance  with  the 
work  of  Edwards,  to  suppose  that  the  doctrine 
of  indifference,  as  refuted  by  this  great  man,  is 
common  to  all  who  maintain  the  opinion  of  the 
self-determining  power  of  the  will ;  which  is  far 
from  being  the  case. 

It  is  deemed  unnecessary  to  give  a  refutation 
of  this  theory  in  this  place.  Those  who  wish  to 
see  this  effectually  done  may  consult  the  several 
sections  of  the  work  of  Edwards,  to  which  re- 
ference has  been  made.* 

*  Edwards's  "Works,  ed.  New- York,  1S44.     Vol.  ii.  pp.  IT* 
39.    Part  L,  §§  1-1. 


CHAPTER  XX. 

WHETHER  MEN  ARE  ACCOUNTABLE  FOE  THEIR  MOTIVES, 
OE  WHETHER  DESIRES  AND  AFFECTIONS  WHICH  PEE 
CEDE  VOLITION,  HAVE  A  MORAL  CHARACTER. 

There-  are  two  maxims  on  this  point,  which  we 
must   endeavour  to   reconcile,  as 

Maxims  which 

aeem  conflicting.       there  is  an  apparent  repugnance 

between  them. 

The  first  is,  that  every  action  takes  its  charac- 
ter from   the   motive  from  which  it  proceeds. 
The  second  is,  that  every  moral  act 
1.  The  motive  gives  ig   voiuntary    and  therefore,  that 

character  to  the  J  ' 

act  2.  The  act  ^es[Tes    an(i    feelings   which   pre- 

is  voluntary.  ^ 

cede  volition,  cannot  be  of  a  moral 
atnre.     This  difficulty  seems  to  have  perplexed 

the  perspicacious  mind  of  Dr. 
Chalmers.  Chalmers;  for,  pereiving  that  our 

desires  and  affections  do  possess  a 
moral  character,  he  labours,  through  a  number 


MORALITY   OF  MOTIVES.  137 

of  pages,  to  prove  that,  in  as  far  as  they  are 
such,  they  are  influenced  by   the  will.      The 
truth,  however,  is,  that  many  of  them  are  un- 
influenced by  preceding  volition,  and  the  whole 
reasoning  of  the  learned  author  is  unsatisfactory. 
The  true  solution  is  to  be  found  in  the  ambi- 
guity of  language.     When  it  is   asserted  that 
all  moral  actions   are  voluntary,  the   meaning 
is,  either  that  by  actions  only  external  actions 
are  meant,  or  that  under  the  word  voluntary, 
the   affections   of  the  mind  which  precede  vo- 
lition   are    included.      No    act    of    the    body 
can   take  place  without  an  action  of  the  will 
preceding  it;    so  that  the   maxim  is   true,   as 
it  relates  to  external  acts.      But  it  is  also  true  in 
relation   to   mental   acts,  if  we  give  a  certain 
degree  of  extension  to  the  word  "  voluntary," 
that  is,  if  we  use  it  as  synonymous  with  sponta- 
neous.    Our  desires  are  as  free  and  spontaneous 
as  our  volitions,  and  when  it  is  said  that  every 
moral  act  must  be  voluntary,  the  word  is  used 
in  this  comprehensive  sense.     There  is  no  need, 
therefore,  to  prove  that  our  affections  must  have 
received  their  complexion  from  a  preceding  vo- 


138  KORAL  SCIENCE. 

lition.  The  judgment  of  the  moral  faculty  in 
regard  to  the  moral  character  of  the  desires  and 
affections,  is  as  clear  and  undoubted  as  of  the 
volitions.  Nay,  the  volitions  receive  their  moral 
character  from  the  quality  of  the  motives  which 
produce  them ;  so  that  the  very  same  volition 
may  be  good  or  bad,  according  to  the  moral 
character  of  the  motives  by  which  it  is  produced. 
The  volition  requisite  in  order  to  pull  a  trig- 
ger and  let  off  a  gun,  is  the  same,  let  the  motive 
be  what  it  may.  It  is  a  determination  to  per- 
form that  specific  act,  and  if  it  be  performed  by 
an  insane  person,  there  will  be  no  morality  in 
the  volition.  If  the  same  volition  be  put  forth 
by  a  person  acting  in  his  just  defence,  the  vo- 
lition and  ensuing  act  will  be  good ;  but  if  the 
volition  to  shoot  a  man,  arise  from  malice  or 
avarice,  the  volition  prompting  the  act  will  be 
wicked. 

"We  do  not,  therefore,  trace  actions  to  their 

true  moral  source  when  we  ascer. 

vre  must  go  higher  tain  ^    volition  from  which  they 

than  volition.  ^ 

proceed ;   we  must  always  go  ono 
Btep  higher,  and  ascertain  the  motives. 


MORALITY   OF   MOTIVES.  139 

When  an  investigation  is  made  into  the 
character  of  an  act  of  which  some  one  is  accused, 
the   main    point,   which  by   wit- 

.  -,     .  •  i     ,  Motives  must  b« 

nesses  the  court  and  jury  wish  to  80Ught 
ascertain,  is,  from  what  motives 
the  accused  acted.  Accordingly  as  this  is  deter- 
mined, so  is  he  judged  to  be  innocent  or  guilty. 
It  hence  appears,  that  the  true  and  ultimate 
source  of  tho  morality  of  actions,  is  not  found 
in  the  will,  but  in  the  desires  and  affections. 
The  simple  act  of  volition,  namely,  a  determina- 
tion to  do  a  certain  act,  is  always  the  same, 
whatever  be  the  motive.  And  to  ascertain  that 
an  action  proceeds  from  an  act  of  will,  only  de- 
termines that  it  is  the  act  of  a  particular  agent, 
but  gives  us  no  knowledge  respecting  the  true 
moral  quality  of  the  act.  This  will  be  found 
universally  true.  Two  men  are  seen  giving  mo- 
ney to  the  poor ;  the  acts  are  the  same,  and  the 
volitions  preceding  the  acts  and  prompting  them, 
are  the  same ;  and  as  we  cannot  see  the  heart,  we 
naturally  judge  that  both  acts  are  alike  good. 
But  if  it  should  be  revealed  to  us,  that  one  01 
the  persons  was  influenced  entirely  by  a  love  foi 


140  MORAL  SCIENCE. 

the  praise  of  men,  and  the  other,  by  a  sincere 
regard  for  the  welfare  of  the  poor,  we  should 
immediately  make  a  wide  difference  between  the 
acts,  in  our  moral  judgment.  We  should  still 
be  convinced,  however,  that  the  volitions  lead- 
ing to  the  acts  were  the  same,  the  only  difference 
being  in  the  motives. 

It  is  clear  then  that  men  are  more  account- 
able for  their  motives  than  for 
any  thing  else ;  and  that,  primarily, 
morality  consists  in  the  motives;  that,  is  the 
affections. 


Man  accountabte 
for  his  motives. 


CHAPTER  XXI. 

THE  DIVISION  OF  MOTIVES,  INTO  RATIONAL  AND  ANIMAL 

Dr.  Thomas  Eeid,  in  his  work  on  the  Active 

Powers,    endeavours   to   maintain   his   doctrine 

that  the  will  is  not  always  gov- 

Eeid's  distinction. 

erned  by  motives,  by  a  reference 
to  a  certain  distinction.  Animal  motives  act  by 
a  blind  impulse  on  the  will,  without  regard  to 
remote  consequences.  Eational  motives  operate 
by  the  force  of  reasonable  considerations.  Dr. 
Reid  asserts  that  these  classes  of  motives  are  so 
widely  different,  that  their  influence  can  never 
be  compared :  that  what  may  be  the  strongest  of 
one  class,  may  be  the  weakest  of  the  other, 
and  that  the  mind  must  determine  between 
them. 

The  distinction  is  no  doubt  just.     There  are 


142  MORAL   SCIENCE. 

principles  in  the  human  constitution,  which  act 
on  the  will  with  great  force,  by  a 

JThe     difference    b]ind  impu]se#       gucll    are  fae    ap_ 

petites  and  passions,  and  the  de- 
sire of  happiness,  and  especially  the  desire  to 
escape  pungent  pain,  at  present  experienced. 

The  appetite  of  hunger  urges  the  subject  of  it  to 
eat,  whether  it  can  be  clone  lawfully  and  consist- 
Appetite  ently  with  health,  or  not.  This  in- 
fluence is  sensibly  present,  and  it 
requires  some  strength  of  purpose  to  resist  it,  when 
the  agent  is  convinced  that  the  act  cannot  be  done 
with  propriety.  Here  then  is  the  simultaneous 
operation  of  an  animal  and  a  rational  motive; 
and  it  is  evident  that  they  counteract  each  other, 
and  that  according  to  the  strength  of  one  or  the 
other,  the  will  is  determined  this 

™:^:*:j:z  ™* or  *»*  *«*■  xt  is  not  trae< 

therefore,  that  these  different  kinds 
f  motives  cannot  be  compared  as  to  their  effect- 
ive force.  The  fact  is,  they  are  brought  into 
comparison  every  day,  and  every  day  victories 
are  obtained  by  one  over  the  other,  accord- 
ing to  the  strength  or  influence  which  they  re- 


MOTIVES  TWOFOLD.  143 

spectively  possess,  at  the  moment.  Hunger  im- 
pels a  man  to  eat ;  reason  tells  him  that  it  will 
be  injurious  to  health.  Here  is  a  fair  trial  of 
trength  between  the  force  of  blind  appetite,  and 
rational  regard  for  health.  If  the  appetite  be 
very  strong,  it  will  require  a  strong  resolution  to 
oppose  it.  In  such  cases,  however,  appetite 
commonly  prevails ;  but  not  without  resistance. 
In  every  case  of  the  kind,  there  is  a  trial  of 
strength  between  these  different  motives.  Sup- 
pose food  to  be  placed  before   a 

.  _     ,  ,  Case  of  hunger  ani 

hungry  man ;  it  there  be  no  con-  self-preservation, 
siderations  of  duty  or  utility  to 
prevent,  he  will  of  course  indulge  his  appetite. 
But  if  he  should  be  informed  that  the  food  is 
poisoned,  although  he  be  still  impelled  by  his 
appetite  to  eat,  yet  the  love  of  life  or  fear  of 
death,  will  be  sufficient  to  induce  him  to  refrain. 
Suppose,  again,  that  the  food  is  the  property 
of  another,  whose  consent  to  use  it  cannot  be 
obtained.      Here  the   moral  feel- 

.        i     •        ,i  j?   •      i    i  Case    of  hiingei 

mgs  stand   m  the  way  of  mdul-  andduty 

gence  ;  and  upon  the  comparative 

strength  of  his  appetite  and  of  the  vigour  of  his 


144  MOKAL   SCIENCE. 

conscience,  will  depend  his  determination.  So 
far  is  it  from  being  true,  then,  that  animal  and 
rational  motives  cannot  be  compared,  in  regard 
to  their  influence  on  the  will,  that  there  is  no- 
thing in  human  life  more  common  than  the  ex- 
perience of  the  struggle  for  mastery  between  the 
higher  and  lower  principles  of  our  nature. 

When  it  is  said  that  the  mind  determines  bo- 

tween  these  contending  motives,  it  is  true,  bat 

not  in  the  sense  intended.     It  is 

The    determina- 
tion  accords   with  true  that  the  mind  determines,  and 

prevalent  desires. 

of  course  the  volition  is  on  one  side 
or  the  other ;  but  this  determination  is  not  indepen- 
dent of  the  strength  of  the  contending  motives, 
being  always  in  accordance  with  the  strongest 
existing  desires. 

There  is  this  important  difference  between 
animal  and  rational  motives,  that  a  sensible  im- 
pulse of  the  former  as  merely  felt, 

th8TtwodifferenC6°f  is  not   of  a  moral   nature-     The 
hunger    of    a  man    is   no     more 

moral  than  the  hunger  of  a  beast.    These  animal 

feelings  are  unavoidable  and  constitutional.    The 

point  at  which  such  feelings  begin  to  partake  of 


MOTIVES   TWOFOLD.  145 

a  moral  quality,  is  when  they  require  to  be 
governed  and  directed.  It  was  not  wrong  for 
the  hungry  man  when  he  saw  bread  before  him 
to  desire  it.  But  when  he  knew  it  to  be  the 
property  of  another,  it  would  have  been  wrong 
to  take  it ;  and  when  he  knew  that  the  food 
would  injure  him,  it  became  his  duty  to  for- 
bear. 

We  cannot  extinguish  the  animal  feelings  by 
an  act  of  the  will ;  they  arise  involuntarily,  and 
therefore  cannot  be  in  themselves  of  a  moral 
nature.  Yet  as  man  has  other  principles  and 
powers  by  which  he  should  be  governed,  he  be- 
comes faulty  when  he  neglects  to  govern  these 
lower  propensities  in  accordance  with  the  dic- 
tates of  reason  and  conscience.  But  in  regard  to 
other  desires  and  affections,  they  are  good  or  bad 
in  every  degree  in  which  they  exist.  Fo^  ex« 
ample,  not  only  are  malice  and  envy  sinful 
when  ripened  into  act,  but  the  smallest  conceiv- 
able exercise  of  such  feelings  is  evil;  and  as 
they  increase  in  strength,  their  moral  evil  in 
creases.  It  does  not  require  an  act  of  volition, 
consenting  to  these  feelings,  to  render  them  evil; 


146  MORAL   SCIENCE. 

their  very  essence  is  evil,  and  is  condemned  by 
the  moral  sense  of  mankind. 

A   clear   understanding   of    this   distinction 
might  have  prevented  or  reconciled  an  old  dis- 
pute, viz.  whether  concupiscence* 

Concupiscence. 

was  of  the  nature  of  sin,  in  the 
first  rising  of  desire,  prior  to  any  act  of  the 
will. 

*  It  may  remove  ambiguity  to  say  that  the  word  concupis- 
cence is  here  used  not  in  its  popular  and  modern,  but  its  theo- 
logical acceptation.  The  controversy  to  which  allusion  is 
made  began  early  in  the  schools,  and  was  actively  waged  at 
the  time  of  the  Reformation.  The  following  references  will 
enable  the  reader  to  inquire  further :  Augustini,  Opp.  x.,  ed. 
Benedict,  pp.  387,  1029,  1828,  1881,  1955. — Catechismus  Cone. 
Trident,  ed.  Lips.  1851,  pp.  385,  3S6. — Chemnitii  Examen.  ed. 
Genev.,  1641,  pp.  88,  89,  90,  94,  95.— Turretlini  Instt.  P.  ii. 
Qu.  21. — Bretschnrider,  Syst.  Entwickehmg ;  4  ed.  1841,  pp. 
5«tt  641. 


CHAPTER  XIII. 

WUET1IER   MORALITY  BELONGS  TO   PBINCIPLE8  A8  WEU. 

AS  ACTS,  OE  IS  CONFINED  TO  ACTS  ALONE. 

It  seems  to  be  generally  agreed,  that  in  the  hu- 
man soul  there  exist  certain  principle^  from 
which  actions  proceed,  as  streams 

P  P  .    •  i  .i      ,    ,i         t  Moral   principles 

irom  a  fountain ;  and  that  the  cha-  prior  t0  vo!ition. 
racter  of  the  actions  corresponds 
with  that  of  the  principle.  Those,  however,  who 
maintain  that  the  will  possesses  a  ^elf-determining 
power,  independent  of  motives,  deny  the  exist- 
ence of  any  such  principles  lying  back  of  the 
acts  of  the  mind,  especially  in  moral  exercises. 
They  hold  that  the  evil  of  an  act  arises  entirely 
from  the  exercise  of  free  will,  and  that  there  is 
no  propriety  in  referring  it  to  any  thing  previous- 
ly existing  in  the  mind.  They  allege  that  nothing 
can  be  of  a  moral  nature  but  that  which  is  volun- 


148  MORAL   SCIENCE. 

tary,  and  therefore  that  virtue  or  vice  can  be  predi- 
cater)  of  nothing  but  actions.  They  argue,  how- 
ever, that  to  make  virtue  and  vice  consist  in  the 
occult  qualities  of  the  soul,  is  to  conceive  of  the 
essence  of  the  soul  as  corrupt;  and  that  this 
would  be  to  make,  s'.n  a  physical  quality,  exist 
ing  without  any  relation  to  the  will.  It  would 
oe  entirely  out  of  place,  here,  to  consider  the 
bearing  of  this  controversy  on  certain  theological 
points,  concerning  which  polemics  have  waged 
an  interminable  war.  We  have,  at  present,  no- 
thing to  do  with  any  principles  or  questions  but 
such  as  may  be  learned  from  reason  and  expe- 
rience. 

In  the  first  place,  let  it  be  observed,  that  we 

know  nothing  of  the  soul  but  by  its  acts.     "We 

have    no    consciousness    of    any 

toSSS"*™*  tLinS  but  acts  of  Afferent  kinds; 
yet  we  know  as  certainly  that  we 
have  a  soul,  as  that  we  think  and  feel.  So, 
also,  we  are  not  conscious  of  the  existence  of 
what  is  called  disrjosition,  temper,  principle ; 
but  we  as  intuitively  believe  in  the  existence  01 
these,  as  in  the  existence  of  the  soul  itself.     If 


MORAL    PRINCIPLES.  149 

we  see  one  man  doing  ev  il  whenever  lie  has  the 
temptation,  and  another  as  habitually  doing  good, 
we  cannot  help  considering  that  the  one  is  actuated 
by  an  evil  disposition  which  dwells  in  him,  and 
hat  the  other  is  influenced  by  a  good  disposition. 
Whether  moral  good  and  evil  may  with  pro- 
priety be  predicated  of  these  hidden  tempers  of 
the  mind,  must  be  determined  by 

n     ,        ,  i  •     -i  Morality  predica 

an  appeal  to  the  common  judg-  bleofprinciple8. 
ment  of  mankind ;  and  this,  I 
think,  is  manifestly  in  favour  of  the  affirmative. 
When  a  man  is  observed  to  manifest  wicked, 
malignant  passions  as  often  as  occasion  serves  to 
elicit  them,  all  men  agree  that  he  possesses  a  ma- 
lignant temper.  The  soul  of  such  a  man,  when 
his  acts  of  iniquity  are  finished,  cannot  be  free 
from  every  taint,  until  he  again  put  forth  a  volun- 
tary act.  The  doctrine  of  a  uniform  series  of 
evil  acts,  is  irreconcilable  with  the  doctrine  that 
all  evil  consists  in  self-determined  acts,  unless  the 
will  itself  be  corrupt ,  for  why  should  all  acts  be 
of  one  kind,  when  no  cause  exists  why  they 
should  be  one  thing  rather  than  another?  We 
might  suppose  such  a  power  would  act  as  fre* 


150  MORAL  SCIENCE. 

quently  one  way  as  another.  But  if  there  be 
any  causes  without  the  will,  which  give  a  uni- 
form character  to  its  acts,  then  the  will  cannot 
be  free.  It  is  determined  by  something  without 
itself,  which  is  incompatible  with  the  hypothesis. 
Again :  the  fountain  must  partake  of  the 
quality  of  the  streams.     If  these  are  uniformly 

evil,  it  is  fair  to  conclude  that  the 
JX3f  fountain  is   polluted.     Voluntary 

wickedness  is  nothing  else  but 
bringing  into  act  what  before  existed  in 
principle  in  the  soul.  If  malice  in  act  is  sinful, 
surely  malice  in  principle  must  be  evil. 

No  man  can  bring  himself  to  believe  that  the 

wretch  who  has  perpetrated  thou- 

Crime   infers    a    san(Js    Qf   ^gg    crmles,  and    Stands 
bad  principle.  ' 

ready  to  commit  others  of  the  same 
kind,  has  no  evil  inherent  in  his  soul,  by  which 
he  is  distinguised  from  the  most  innocent  person. 
Another  evidence  that  men  do  judge  some- 
thing to  be  sinful  besides  sinful  acts,  is  that  men 
who  palpably  omit  important  duty,  are  consi- 
dered equally  guilty  with  those  who  offend  by 
positive  act.     That  man  who  neglects  to  rescue 


MORAL    PRINCIPLES.  151 

from  death  a  human  being,  when  it  is  easily  in 
his  power  to  do  so,  is  by  all  men 
reckoned  guilty  of  a  great  crime,  „  J^r  ^ 
though  he  performs  no  act  of  any 
kind.  Suppose  a  helpless  woman  or  infant  to 
fall  overboard  from  a  boat,  in  which  there  is  a 
strong  man  who  might  afford  relief,  but  makes 
no  attempt  to  do  so.  Is  there  a  person  in  the 
world  who  would  not  view  such  a  neglect  as  a 
great  sin  ?  Now,  on  what  principle  do  we  cen* 
sure  the  person  who  has  committed  no  act  oi 
transgression?  Evidently  on  the  ground  that 
he  ought  to  have  felt  a  regard  for  the  life  of  a 
fellow-creature.  "We  blame  his  indifference  to 
the  welfare  of  his  neighbour. 

As  to  the  maxim,  that  nothing  is  sinful 
which  is  not  voluntary,  it  relates  to  positive 
acts,    not   to   dispositions  of  the 

Disposition,    In 

mind.     But  as  was  explained  be-  what  sense  -?ciuC 

tary. 

before  in  regard  to   desires  and 
affections,  so  in  regard  to  dispositions,  we  say 
they  are  in  a  sense  voluntary.     They  properly 
belong  to  the  will,  taking  the  word  in  a  large 
sense.     In  judging  of  the  morality  of  voluntary 


152  •  MORAL  SCIENCE. 

acts,  the  principle  from  which  they  proceed  is 
always  included  in  our  view,  and  comes  in  for 
its  full  share  of  the  blame.  Thus  Bishop  Butler, 
in  his  excellent  essay  on  the  "  Nature  of  Vir- 
tue," says,  in  speaking  of  the  moral  faculty,  "  It 
ought  to  be  observed  that  the.  object  of  this 
faculty  is  actions,  comprehending  under  that 
name  active  or  practical  principles."  This  saga- 
cious man  saw  that  it  would  not  do  to  confine 
virtue  to  positive  acts,  but  that  principles  must 
come  in  for  their  full  share  of  approbation  or  dis- 
approbation. 

The  character  which  a  man  acquires  by  a 
series  of  acts,  is  not  merely  the  estimation  of  a 
person  who  has  performed  such 
tj£ot  from  cba-  acts,  but  it  is  of  a  person  possess- 
ing dispositions  or  principles  which 
gave  lise  to  such  acts.  Our  notion  of  a  bad  man 
is  of  one  who  not  only  has  perpetrated  wicked 
acts,  but  is  still  disposed  to  do  the  same ;  and 
we  disapprove  the  principle  as  much  as  the 
acts.  The  notion  that  corrupt  principles  must 
vitiate  the  essence  of  the  soul,  is  without  founda- 
tion.    The  soul  is  the  subject  of  many  affections 


MORAL    PRINCIPLES.  153 

which  are  not  essential  to  it.  Natural  affections 
may  be  extirpated,  and  yet  the  soul  remain  un- 
changed. Moral  qualities  may  be  entirely  chang- 
ed, without  any  change  in  the  essence  of  the 
soul.  The  faculties  remain,  while  the  moral 
principles  which  govern  them  may  be  changed 
from  good  to  bad,  <  or  from  bad  to  good.  The 
same  faculties  which  are  employed  in  the  per- 
formance of  virtuous  actions,  may  be  occupied  as 
instruments  of  wickedness.  That  innerent  moral 
qualities  may  exist  in  the  soul,  has  been  the  be- 
lief of  all  nations,  and  is  the  sentiment  of  every 
common  man  whose  judgment  has  not  been 
warped  by  false  philosophy. 

"Who  can  believe  that  the  soul  of  a  cruel 

murderer,  whose  heart  cherishes  habitual  hatred 

and  revenge  towards   his  fellow- 

Common    iudg-  ,  •  i  ■, 

ment  of  mankind,  creatures,  is,  when  asleep,  or  occu- 
pied with  indifferent  matters,  in 
the  same  state  of  purity  or  exemption  from  evil, 
as  the  soul  of  the  most  virtuous  man  in  the 
world  ?  It  cannot  be  believed.  "We  cannot  help 
thinking,  when  we  see  a  uniform  course  of  action 
whether  it  be  good  or  bad,  that  there  must  be 


154  MORAL   SCIENCE. 

corresponding  dispositions  which  lead  to  Siich 
actions.  '  Every  effect  must  have  an  adequate 
cause.  Let  it  be  granted,  for  the  sake  of  argu- 
ment, that  the  self-determining  power  is  an  ade 
quate  cause  for  any  single  act  of  any  kind ;  yet 
it  can  be  no  sufficient  cause  for  a  series  of  acts 
of  the  same  kind.  This,  however,  must  be  left 
to  the  intuitive  belief  of  every  man.  It  is  a  sub- 
ject for  the  judgment  of  common  sense,  rather 
than  reason. 


CHAPTER  XXIII. 

MOEAL  HABITS. 

Habits  differ  from  principles,  or  constitutional 
desires,   in  that  they  are  adventitious.     Every 
habit  is  acquired  by  repeated  acts. 
The  human  constitution  possesses  Habits. 

a  wonderful  susceptibility  of  form- 
ing habits  of  every  kind.  Indeed,  we  can- 
not prevent  the  formation  of  habits  of  some 
kind  or  other.  Still,  a  man  has  much  in  his 
power  as  it  regards  the  kind  of  habits  which  he 
forms,  and  is  highly  accountable  for  the  exercise 
of  this  power.  A  man's  happiness  and  useful- 
ness depend  very  much  on  the  character  of  his 
habits.  Yea,  a  man's  moral  character  derives 
its  complexion,  in  a  great  degree,  from  his 
habits.  In  this  place,  it  is  not  necessary  to  go 
into  the  philosophy  of  the  formation  of  habits. 


156  MORAL   SCIENCE. 

Our  object  is  to  consider  halm.,  *nd  habitual 
actions  as  they  partake  of  a  moral  character, -or 
as  they  are  the  object  of  moral  approbation,  or 
disapprobation.  If  we  should  remove  from  the 
list  of  moral  actions  all  those  which  are  prompted 
by  habit,  we  should  cut  off  the  larger  number  of 
those  which  men  have  agreed  in  judging  to  be 
of  a  moral  nature. 

That  there  are  virtuous  habits  and  vicious 
habits,  will  scarcely  be  denied  by  any  conside- 
rate person.  A  habit  of  lying,  of 
forhfbiCrtabmty  swearing,  of  slandering,  of  cheat- 
ing,  of  irreverence,  of  indolence, 
of  vainglory,  with  many  others,  are,  alas,  too 
common.  There  are  also  virtuous  habits,  such 
as  of  industry,  temperance,  kindness,  veracity, 
diligence,  honesty,  &c.  To  be  sure,  these  vir- 
tues commonly  flow  from  principle,  but  the 
practice  of  them  is  greatly  facilitated  by  correct 
habits.  Two  considerations  will  show  that  men 
are  properly  accountable  for  those  actions  which 
proceed  from  habit.  The  first  is,  that  in  the 
formation  of  his  habits,  man  is  voluntary.  The 
acts  by  which  they  are  formed  are  free  acts,  and 


MORAL   HABITS  157 

the  agent  is  responsible  for  all  their,  conse- 
quences. The  other  consideration  is,  that  habits 
may  be  counteracted  and  even  changed  by  the 
force  of  virtuous  resolutions  and  perseverance. 
Where  habit  has  become  inveterate,  it  may  be 
difficult  to  oppose  or  eradicate  it ;  but  the 
strength  of  moral  principle  has  often  been  found 
sufficient  to  counteract  the  most  confirmed  hab- 
its. When  it  is  asserted  that  men  long  enslaved 
by  evil  habits  cannot  make  a .  change,  it  is  on 
the  ground,  that  no  principle  of  sufficient  power 
exists  in  the  mind  of  the  agent;  but  for  that 
deficiency,  the  man  is  responsible.  Yet  a  power 
from  without  may  introduce  a  new  principle  po- 
tent enough,  to  overcome  evil  habits.  The 
importance  of  possessing  good  habits,  is  admit- 
ted by  all  moralists.  Aristotle  makes  the  es- 
sence of  virtue  to  consist  in  "practical  habits, 
voluntary  in  their  origin,"  and  agreeable  to  right 
reason.  Dr.  Thomas  Eeid,  in  his  "  Essay  on  the 
Active  Powers,"  defines  virtue  to  be  "  the  fixed 
purpose  to  act  according  to  a  sense  of  duty," 
which  definition  Dugald  Stewart  modifies,  by 
observing,  u  It  is  the  fixed  purpose  to  do  what 


158  MOKAL   SCIENCE. 

is  right,  which,  evidently  constitutes  what  we 
call  a  virtuous  disposition.  But  it  appears  tc  me 
that  virtue,  considered  as  an  attribute  of  char- 
acter, is  more  properly  defined  by  the  habit 
which  the  fixed  purpose  gradually  forms  than 
by  the  fixed  purpose  itself."  Dr.  Paley  lays  it 
down  as  an  aphorism,  that  "  mankind  act  more 
from  habit  than  reflection."  "  We  are,"  says  he, 
"for  the  most  part,  determined  at  once,  and  by 
an  impulse  which  has  the  effect  and  energy 
of  a  pre-established  habit."  To  the  objection, 
"If  we  are  in  so  great  a  degree  passive  under 
our  habits,  where  is  the  exercise  of  virtue,  or 
the  guilt  of  vice?"  he  answers,  "in  the  form- 
ing and  contracting  of  these  habits."  "And 
hence,"  says  he,  "  results  a  rule  of  considerable 
importance,  viz,  that  many  things  are  to  be  done 
and  abstained  from,  solely  for  the  sake  of  habit," 


CHAPTER  XXIV. 


THE  NATURE  OF  VIRTUE 


The  theories  on  this  subject  have  been  numep 
ous,  and  contrary  to  one  another.     It  is  now 
proposed  to  mention  some  of  the 
principal  of  them.     "We  shall  first      Various  theories 
mention  the  theory  of  Mr.  Hobbes 
and  his  followers,  who  deny  that  there  is  any 
natural  distinction  between  virtue 
and  vice,  and  maintain  that  by  na-  Hobbes. 

ture  all  actions  are  indifferent, 
and  that  our  ideas  and  feelings  on  the  subject  of 
morality  are  altogether  the  effect  of  education 
and  association.  Mr.  Hobbes  did  indeed  main- 
tain that  men  are  bound  to  obey  the  civil  gov- 
ernment under  which  they  may  happen  to  live, 
and  to  conform  to  the  religion  established  by 


160  MORAL   SCIENCE. 

law,  however  contrary  to  their  own  private 
judgment.  All  moral  duty,  according  to  this 
theory,  was  resolved  into  the  au- 
Law  of  the  land  thority  of  the  law  of  the  land.  As 
no  natural  moral  rule  existed,  it 
was  held  that,  except  so  far  as  a  man  was  re- 
strained by  civil  authority,  he  had  a  right  to  do 
what  he  pleased ;  and  while  he  confined  himself 
within  these  bounds,  he  need  feel  no  concern 
about  the  consequences  of  his  conduct. 

Perhaps  the  most  extraordinary  system  of 
virtue  ever  promulgated  was  that  of  Mandeville, 
who  maintained  that  all  preten- 
Mandeviiie.  sions  to  virtue  were  mere  hypo- 

crisy,  which   men   assumed  from 
the  love  of  praise.     This  writer  forgot  that  hy- 
pocrisy assumes  it  as  true  that  that 
The  defect  of  tho  ^^  jg  counterfeited  is  an  obiect 

hypothesis.  J 

of  esteem  and  approbation  among 
men.     That  virtue  consists  in  the  mere  pursuit 

of  pleasure,  or  of  our  own  inter- 
Epicurus.  est,  is  a  system  as  old  as  Epicurus, 

and  has  had  many  abettors  up  to 
this  time.     The  arguments  in  favour  of  this  the- 


NATURE   OF   VIRTUE.  161 

ory  are  exhibited  in  their  most  plausible  dress 
by  Nettleton  in  bis  "Treatise  on  Virtue." 

But  the  whole  plausibility  of  the  arguments 
depends  on  the  pre-established  connexion  be- 
tween happiness  and  a  virtuous 
course  of  life.  That  true  happiness  J^J^ST 
is  the  natural  effect  of  virtue,  falls 
entirely  short  of  proof  that  the  essence  of  virtue 
consists  in  the  tendency  of  certain  actions  to  the 
person's  true  interest;  whereas,  when  we  per- 
ceive an  action  to  be  virtuous,  we  are  conscious 
that  it  is  not  from  any  view  of  the  connexion  of 
the  action  with  our  own  happiness  that  we 
approve  it;  but  our' judgment  is  immediate, 
founded  on  a  moral  character  perceived  in  the 
act  itself.  And  in  many  cases  virtue  requires  us 
to  deny  ourselves  personal  gratification  for  the 
sake  of  others.  A  man  supremely  governed  by 
a  regard  to  his  own  interest,  is  never  esteemed  a 
virtuous  man  by  the  impartial  judgment  of  man- 
kind. According  to  this  theory,  the  only  thing 
censurable  in  the  greatest  crimes  is,  that  the 
guilty  person  has  mistaken  the  best  method  of 
promoting  his  own  happiness.     Upon  this  prin* 


J  62  MORAL   SCIENCE. 

tuple  a  man  is  at  liberty  to  pursue  ~iis  own  inter  • 
est  at  the  expense  of  the  happiness  of  thou- 
sands, and  if  he  is  persuaded  that  any  action 
will  tend  to  his  own  interest,  he  is  at  liberty 
to  do  it,  whatever  may  be  the  consequences  to 
others. 

Dr.  Paley  adopts  the  principle  that  all  virtue 
consists  in  a  regard  to  our  own  happiness,  tak- 
ing into  View  the  whole  Of  OUr  ex- 
Archdeacon  Paley.      _  m         '  ~    ™ 

istence.  His  definition  is,  how- 
ever, a  very  complicated  one,  and  deserves  to  be 
analyzed. 

"  Virtue,"  says  he,  "  is  the  doing  good  to 

mankind,  in  obedience  to  the  will  of  God,  for 

the  sake  of  everlasting  happiness," 

Paiey's  definition  according  to  which  definition  the 

of  virtue.  ° 

good  of  mankind  is  the  object, 
the  will  of  God  the  rule,  and  everlasting  hap- 
piness the  motive  of  human  virtue.  If  the 
question  be  asked,  why  we  should  seek  the  good 
of  mankind,  the  answer  is,  from  a  regard  to  our 
everlasting  happiness;  and  if  the  question  be, 
why  we  should  make  the  will  of  God  the  rule 
of  our  conduct,  the  answer  must  be  the  same; 


NATURE   OF   VIRTUE.  163 

bo  that  really  all  virtue  is  resolved  into  a  regard 
to  our  own  happiness. 

Now  every  man  desires  to  promote  his  own 
happiness,  and  according  to  Dr. 
Paley's  theory,  the  only  difference      consequent  dif 

J  J  "  ference   between^.' 

between  an  eminently  good  man  good  and  a  bad  man. 

and  one  of  the  opposite  character 

is,  that  the  one  pursues  a  wiser  course  than  the 

other ;  but  they  are  both  actuated  by  the  same 

motives. 

This  theory  loses  sight  of  all  intrinsic  differ- 
ence between  moral  good  and  evil, 
and  admits  the  principle  that  hap-      Neglects  intrin- 

sic    moral     differ- 

piness    is    the    only   conceivable  ences. 
good,  and  that  any  thing  is  virtu- 
ous the  tendency  of  which  is  to  promote  our 
greatest  happiness. 

A  theory  the  opposite  of  that  which  makes 
a  regard  to  private  interest  the  ground  of  virtue, 
is  the  one  which  makes  all  virtue 
to  consist  in  a  regard  to  the  public  Cumberland, 

good.   This  is  the  theory  of  Bishop 
Cumberland  in  his  work,  De  Legibus,  and  is  not 
essentially  different  from  the  scheme  of  those 


164  MORAL   SCIENCE.  • 

who  make  all  virtue  to  consist  in  disinterested 

benevolence.     No  doubt,  much  that  deserves  the 

name  of  virtue  consists  in  good 

Disinterested  be-  w^\  to   others,  and  in  contribu- 

evolence.  ' 

ting  to  their  welfare ;  but  it  is  not 
correct  to  confine  all  virtuous  actions  to  the  ex- 
ercise of  benevolence.  We  can  conceive  of  be- 
nevolence in  a  being  who  has  no  moral  constitu- 
tion.  Something  of  this  kind  is  observable  in 
brute  animals,  and  atheists  may  exercise  benev- 
olence to  their  friends.  The  indiscriminate  ex- 
ercise of  benevolence  to  creatures,  without  any 
respect  to  their  moral  character,  might  appear  to 
be  an  amiable  attribute,  but  it  could  not  pro- 
perly be  called  a  moral  attribute. 
Regard  for  one's  j±  prudent  regard  to  our  own  wel- 

own  welfare.  * 

fare  and  happiness  is  undoubtedly 
a  virtue.  It  has  been  considered  so  by  the  wis- 
est of  men,  and  we  know  that  prudence  was  one 
of  the  four  cardinal  virtues  of  the  heathen.  As 
the  whole  is  made  up  of  parts,  it  is  evident  that 
if  it  is  a  virtue  to  promote  the  well-being  of  the 
whole,  it  must  be  so  of  each  of  the  parts.  The 
pursuit  of  our  own  happiness  where  it  does  not 


NATURE   OF   VIRTCE.  165 

infringe  on  the  rights  of  others,  -has  nothing  evil 
in  it,  but  is  approved  by  every  impartial  mind. 
Some  who  maintain  that  all  virtue  consists  in 
benevolence,  admit  that  we  may  seek  our  own 
happiness  just  as  we  seek  that  of -our  neighbour; 
but  the  human  constitution  is  not 
formed  to  exercise  that  abstract  tiai^n^™1^ 
impartiality.  While  we  are  bound  pecte(L 
to  promote  the  welfare  of  our  neighbour  and  of 
strangers,  our  obligation  is  still  stronger  to  en- 
deavour to  secure  our  own  happiness;  and  if  a 
friend  and  a  stranger  stand  in  equal  need  of  a 
benefit  which  we  have  it  in  our  power  to  bestow, 
it  is  evidently  our  duty  to  consult  first  the  wel- 
fare of  our  friend,  other  things  being  equal. 

What  Bishop  Butler  has  said  on  this  subject 
in  his  short  treatise  on  "  Virtue,"  is  worthy  of 
consideration :    "  It  deserves  to  be 
considered  whether  men  are  more  on  the  disinterested 

scheme. 

at  liberty,  in  point  of  morals^  to 
make  themselves  miserable  without  reason,  than 
to  make  others  so ;  or  dissolutely  to  neglect  their 
own  greater  good  for  the  sake  of  a  present  lesser 
gratification,  than  they  are  to  neglect  the  good 


166  MORAL    SCIENCE. 

of  others  whom  nature  has  committed  to  then 
care.  It  should  seem  that  a  due  concern  about 
our  own  interest  or  happiness,  and  a  reasonable 
endeavour  to  secure  and'  promote  it,  is,  I  think, 
very  much  the  meaning  of  the  word  prudence  in 
our  language — it  should  seem  that  this  is  virtue, 
and  the  contrary  behaviour  faulty  and  blama- 
ble ;  since  in  the  calmest  way  of  reflection,  we 
approve  of  the  first  and  condemn  the  other  con- 
duct, both  in  ourselves  and  others.  This  appro- 
bation and  disapprobation  are  altogether  differ- 
ent from  mere  desires  of  our  own  and  their  hap- 
piness, and  from  sorrow  in  missing  it." 

Again,  "  Without  inquiring  how  far  and  in 
what  sense  virtue  is  resolvable  into  benevolence, 

and  vice  into  the  want  of  it,  it 
J:Z^Z  may  be   proper   to   observe   that 

benevolence  and  the  want  of  it, 
singly  considered,  are  in  no  sort  the  whole  of 
virtue  and  vice.  For  if  this  were  the  case,  in 
the  review  of  one's  own  character,  or  that  o{ 
others,  our  moral  understanding  and  moral  sense 
would  be  indifferent  to  every  thing  but  the  de- 
grees in  which  benevolence  prevailed,  and  the 


NATURE    OF   VIRTUE.  167 

degrees  in  which  it  was  wanting.  That  is,  we 
should  neither  approve  of  benevolence  to  some 
persons  rather  than  others,  nor  disapprove  injus- 
ice  and  falsehood,  upon  any  other  account,  than 
merely  as  an  overbalance  of  happiness  was  fore* 
seen  likely  to  be  produced  by  the  first,  and 
misery  by  the  second.  But  now,  on  the  con- 
trary, suppose  two  men  competitors  for  any 
thing  whatever,  which  would  be  of  equal  advan- 
tage to  each  of  them,  though  nothing  indeed 
would  be  more  impertinent  than  for  a  strangei 
to  busy  himself  to  get  one  of  them  preferred  to 
the  other,  yet  such  endeavour  would  be  virtue, 
in  behalf  of  a  friend  pr  benefactor,  abstracted 
from  all  consideration  of  distant  consequences  ; 
as  that  examples  of  gratitude  and  friendship, 
would  be  of  general  good  to  the  world.  Again, 
suppose  one  man  should  by  fraud  or  violence 
take  from  another  the  fruit  of  his  labour,  with 
intent  to  give  it  to  a  third,  who,  he  thought, 
would  have  as  much  pleasure  from  it  as  would 
balance  the  pleasure  which  the  first  possessoi 
would  have  had  in  the  enjoyment  and  his  vexa- 
tion in  the  loss;    suppose  that   no   bad    conse- 


168  MORAL   SCIENCE. 

quences  would  follow,  yet  such  an  action  wouli 
surely  be  vicious.  Nay  further,  were  treachery, 
violence  and  injustice,  no  otherwise  vicious  than 
as  foreseen  likely  to  produce  an  overbalance  of 
misery  to  society,  then,  if  in  any  case,  a  man 
could  procure  to  himself  as  great  advantage  by 
an  act  of  injustice  as  the  whole  foreseen  incon- 
venience likely  to  be  brought  upon  others  by  it 
would  amount  to,  such  a  piece  of  injustice  would 
not  be  faulty  or  vicious  at  all."  "  The  fact  then 
appears  to  be,  that  we  aie  constituted  so  as  to 
condemn  falsehood,  unprovoked  violence,  and 
injustice,  and  to  approve  of  benevolence  to  some 
rather  than  others,  abstracted  from  all  considera- 
tion of  which  conduct  is  likely  to  produce  an 
overbalance  of  happiness  or  misery." 

The  danger  of  this  theory  is  not  by  any 
means  so  great  as  that  of  the  selfish  scheme,  be- 
cause it  comprehends  a  large  part 

Defective  defini- 
tions of  virtue  are   of  actions  which  are  truly  virtuous. 

dangerous. 

But  all  definitions  of  virtue  which 
are  not  so  comprehensive  as  to  embrace  the 
whole  of  moral  excellence,  are  injurious;  not 
only  by  leaving  out  of  the  catalogue  of  virtues 


NATURE   OF   VIRTUE.  169 

such  actions  as  properly  belong  to  it,  but  by 
leaving  men  to  form  wrong  conceptions  of  what 
is  right  and  wrong,  by  applying  a  general  rule, 
which  is  not  correct,  to  practical  cases.  Whei 
.t  is  received  as  a  maxim  that  all  virtue  consists 
in  seeking  the  happiness  of  the  whole,  and  when 
a  particular  act  seems  to  have  that  tendency, 
men  are  in  danger  of  overlooking  those  moral 
distinctions  by  which  our  duty  should  be  regu- 
lated. This  effect  has  been  observed  in  persons 
much  given  to  theorize  upon  the  general  good 
as  the  end  to  be  aimed  at  in  all  actions. 

President  Edwards  has  a  treatise  on  Virtue, 
in  which  he  enters  very  deeply  into  speculation 
on  the   principles  of  moral   con- 
duct.     His  definition  of  virtue   has    Edwards  on  Virtua 

surprised  all  his  admirers:  it  is, 

"the  love  of  being  as  such."     "When,  however 

this  strange  definition  comes  to  be  explained, 

by  himself  and  his  followers,  it  amounts  to  the 

Bame  as  that  which  we  have  been  considering, 

which  makes  all  virtue  to  consist  in  disinterested 

benevolence. 

Dr.  Samuel  Hopkins,  who  was  his  pupil,  and 

3 


170  MORAL  SCIENCE. 

well  understood  his  principles,  gives  this  as  his  de- 
finition of  virtue,  and  has  it  as  a  radical  principle 
of  his  whole  system.     It  will  not 

not  bins. 

therefore  be  necessary  to  make 
any  distinct  remarks  on  President  Edwards's 
theory. 


CHAPTER  XIV. 

*HB  NATURE   OF   VIRTUE,  CONTINUED.     DIFFERENT   H\ 

POTHESES. 

Aristotle's  idea  of  the  nature  of  virtue  waa 
that  it  was  a  mean  between  two  extremes.  "Vir- 
tue, according  to  him,  consisted  in 
the  moderate  and  just  exercise  of 
all  the  affections  and  passions ;  and  vice,  in  de- 
fect or  excess.  It  would  be  easy  to  show  that 
this  definition  or  description  is  not  complete.  It 
is  not  sufficiently  comprehensive,  and  includes 
many  things  not  of  a  moral  nature.  But  it  is 
unnecessary  to  dwell  on  the  subject,  as  the  defi- 
nition is  no  longer  used. 

Dr.  Samuel .  Clarke,  who  has  a  long  estab- 
lished   character    as    a    profound 
thinker,  attempted  to  give  a  the- 
ory of  virtue,  which  should  be  free  from  ex- 


172  MOEAL   SCIENCE. 

ception.  He  makes  virtue  to  consisj  in  acting  ac« 
cording  to  the  fitness  of  things.  Whatever  is  fit 
and  suitable  to  be  done,  taking  in  all  circum- 
stances,  is  right.  But  really,  this  gives  us  nc 
conception  of  that  peculiarity  which  renders  an 
action  virtuous.  It  is  true,  all  virtuous  actions 
are  fit  to  be  done,  and  are  actions  suitable  to  the 
circumstances  of  the  agent.  But  every  fit  action 
is  not  a  virtuous  action,  and  the  fitness  of  many 
actions  depends  on  their  moral  character.  Their 
fitness,  therefore,  does  not  render  them  vir- 
tuous, but  their  being  virtuous  is  the  very  thing 
which  renders  them  fit. 

Wollaston,  in  his  "  Keligion  of  Nature  Deli- 
neated," refines  upon  this  system,  and  makes  all 
virtue  to  consist  in  a  conformity 

Wollaston.  . 

to  truth.  A  virtuous  action  is  one 
in  accordance  with  the  truth  of  things  ;  which 
when  it  comes  to  be  explained,  amounts  to  much 
the  same  as  Dr.  Clarke's  "fitness  of  things." 
Both  of  them  include,  no  doubt,-  all  virtuous  ac- 
tions, as  they  are  all  fit,  and  all  in  accordance 
with  truth ;  but  these  definitions  do  not  lead  up 
to  a  conception  of  that  quality  in  actions  which 


NATURE   OF  VIRTUE.  173 

13  moral  Certainly  all  virtuous  actions  must  be 
in  accordance  with  truth  and  reason,  but  this  is 
no  definition  of  the  nature  of  virtue ;  it  is  only  a 
circuitous  method  of  saying  that  some  actions 
are  virtuous  because  they  have  a  fitness  to  pro- 
duce a  good  end.  This  theory  supposes  the 
idea  of  virtue  already  to  exist ;  for  if  the  end  be 
not  good,  mere  fitness  cannot  be  of  the  nature  of 
virtue.  There  are  other  things  which  have  a 
fitness  to  produce  certain  ends,  as  well  as  virtue. 
It  is  not  mere  fitness  which  renders  an  action 
virtuous,  but  adaptedness  to  a  good  end.  And 
unless  by  truth  we  understand  the  same  as  vir- 
tue, it  does  not  appear  that  a  mere  conformity 
to  truth  gives  any  conception  of  a  moral  qua- 
lity, and  there  is  as  much  reality  in  a  vicious 
action  as  in  one  that  is  virtuous.  On  this  sub- 
ject Dr.  Thomas  Brown  well  observes,  "  Keason, 
then,  as  distinguishing  the  conformity  or  uncon- 
formity of  actions  with  the  fitness  of  things,  or 
the  moral  truth  or  falsehood  of  actions,  is  not  the 
principle  from  which  we  derive  our  moral  senti- 
ments. These  very  sentiments,  on  the  contrary. 
are  necessary,  before  we  can  feel  that  moral  fit- 


174  MOKAL  SCIENCE. 

ness  or  moral  truth,  according  to  which  we  are 
said  to  estimate  actions  as  right  or  wrong. 
All  actions,  virtuous  and  vicious,  have  a  tendency 
or  fitness  of  one  sort  or  other ;  and  every  action 
which  the  benevolent  or  malevolent  perform, 
with  a  view  to  a  certain  end,  may  alike  have  a 
fitness  for  producing  that  end.  There  is  not  an 
action,  then,  which  may  not  be  in  conformity 
with  the  fitness  of  things ;  and  if  the  feelings  ol 
exclusive  approbation  and  disapprobation,  that 
constitute  our  moral  emotions,  be  not  presup- 
posed, in  spite  of  the  thousand  fitnesses  which 
reason  may  have  shown  us,  all  actions  must  be 
morally  indifferent.  They  are  not  thus  indiffer- 
ent because  the  ends  to  which  reason  shows  cer- 
tain actions  to  be  suitable,  are  ends  which  we 
have  previously  felt  to  be  worthy  of  our  moral 
choice ;  and  we  are  virtuous  in  conforming  our 
actions  to  these  ends,  not  because  our  actions 
have  a  physical  relation  to  the  end,  as  the  wheels 
and  pulleys  of  a  machine  have  to  the  motion 
which  is  to  result  from  them ;  but  because  the 
desire  of  producing  this  very  end,  has  a  relation, 
which  has    been  previously  felt,  to  our  moral 


NATURE   OF   VIRTUE.  175 

emotion.  The  moral  truth,  in  like  manner, 
which  reason  is  said  to  show  us,  consists  in  the 
agreement  of  our  actions  with  a  certain  frame  of 
mind  which  nature  has  previously  distinguished 
to  us  as  virtuous,  without  which  previous  dis- 
tinction, the  actions  of  the  most  ferocious  tyrant, 
and  of  the  most  generous  and  intrepid  patriot, 
would  be  equally  true,  as  alike  indicative  of  the 
real  nature  of  the  oppressor  of  a  nation,  and  of 
the  assertor  and  guardian  of  its  rights."  The 
fitness  and'  the  truth,  then,  in  every  case,  pre- 
suppose virtue  as  an  object  of  moral  sentiment. 
The  system  of  Dr.  Adam  Smith, 

Adam  Smith. 

contained  in  his  "  Theory  of  Moral 
Sentiments,"  is  very  plausible,  as  stated  by  its 
ingenious  author,  and  has  captivated  many 
minds,  by  leading  them  to  believe  that  the  origin 
of  our  moral  feelings  is  to  be  found  in  the  prin- 
ciple of  sympathy.  According  to  this  able 
writer,  we  do  not  feel  the  approbation  or  disap- 
probation, immediately  on  the  contemplation  of 
virtuous  or  vicious  actions.  It  is  necessary  first 
to  go  through  another  process,  by  which  we 
enter  into  the  feelings  of  the  agent,  and  of  those 


176  MOEAL  SCIENCE. 

to  whom  the  actions  are  related,  in  their  conse- 
quences, beneficial  or  injurious.  If,  on  consi- 
dering all  the  circumstances  in  which  the  agent 
was  placed,  we  feel  a  complete  sympathy  with 
the  feelings  by  which  he  was  actuated,  and  with 
the  gratitude  or  resentment  of  him  who  was  the 
object  of  the  action,  we  approve  of  the  action  as 
right ;  or  disapprove  it  as  wrong,  if  our  sympa- 
thies are  of  the  opposite  kind.  Our  sense  of  the 
propriety  of  the  action  depends  on  our  sympathy 
with  the  agent,  and  our  sense  of  the  merit  of  the 
agent,  on  our  sympathy  with,  the  object  of  the 
action.  In  sympathizing  with  the  gratitude  of 
others,  we  regard  the  agent  as  worthy  of  reward ; 
in  sympathizing  with  the  resentment  of  others, 
we  regard  him  as  worthy  of  punishment.  When 
we  judge  of  our  own  conduct,  the  foregoing 
process  is  in  some  measure  reversed ;  or  rather, 
by  a  process  still  more  refined,  we  imagine 
others  sympathizing  with  us,  and  sympathize 
with  their  sympathy.  "We  consider  how  our 
conduct  would  appear  to  an  impartial  spectator ; 
we  approve  of  it  if  we  feel  that  he  would  ap- 
prove;   we  disapprove  it  if  we  think  that  he 


.NATURE   OF    VIRTUE.  177 

would  disapprove.  According  to  Dr.  Smith,  we 
are  able  to  form  a  judgment  as  to  our  own  con- 
duct, because  we  have  previously  judged  of  the 
moral  conduct  of  others ;  that  is,  have  sympa- 
thized with  the  feelings  of  others.  And  but  for 
the  supposed  presence  of  some  impartial  specta- 
tor, as  a  mirror  to  represent  us  to  ourselves,  we 
should* as  little  have  known  the  beauty  or  de- 
formity of  our  own  moral  character,  as  we 
should  have  known  the  beauty  or  ugliness  of 
our  own  features  without  some  mirror  to  reflect 
them  to  our  eye. 

That  a  principle  so  irregular  and  capricious 
as  that  of  sympathy  should  be  made  the 'origin 
of  all  our  moral  distinctions  and 
feelings,  is  indeed  wonderful.  One  fJ^  frothed, 
might  be  tempted  to  suspect  that 
the  gifted  author  intended  to  select  a  subject 
merely  for  the  display  of  his  ingenuity  in  fram- 
ing and  defending  a  plausible  hypothesis,  and 
playing  on  the  credulity  of  his  readers. 

The  great  error  of  this  hypothesis  is  one  which 
is  common  to  most  others  on  this  subject:  it 
takes  fcr  granted  the  existence  of  those  moral 


178  MORAL   SCIENCE. 

feelings  which  are  supposed  to  flow  from  sym- 
pathy—yea, their   existence  pre- 
Untenable.  vious  to   that  very  sympathy  in 

which  they  are  said  to  originate. 
When  we  suppose  this  previous  moral  feeling,  it 
is  easy  to  understand  how  we  are  led  to  approve 
of  actions  when  we  feel  sympathy  with  the  agent: 
but  the  most  complete  sympathy  of  feeling  is  not 
sufficient  to  account  for  the  existence  of  moral 
approbation  or  disapprobation.     When  there  is 
nothing  more  than  a  sympathy  of  feelings,  with- 
out the  previous  moral  sentiment,  no  such  ex- 
ercise as  that  which  Dr.  Smith  supposes  could 
ever  arise ;  so  that  the  process  which  he  de- 
scribes as  originating  our  moral  sentiments,  never 
could  take  place,  unless  there  existed  previously 
a  moral  feeling  in  the  mind.     In  contemplating 
the  beauties  of  nature  or  art,  we  may  have  a 
complete  feeling  of  sympathy  with 
Assumes  what  another  person,  our  feelings  may 

Is  sought  to  be  ex-  n 

plained.  be  in  the  most  exact  accordance, 

and  yet  no  moral  approbation  of. 

his  sentiment  of  the  beautiful  be  experienced. 

But  if  mere  agreement  in  our  emotions  would 


NATURE   OF   VIRTUE.  179 

give  rise  to  moral  feeling,  it  ought  to  arise  viv- 
idly in  this  case,  where  the  emotions  may  lie 
strong  and  in  perfect  accordance.  "  Why  is  it," 
says  Dr.  Brown,  "  that  we  regard  emotions  which 
io  not  harmonize  with  our  own,  not  merely  as 
unlike  to  ours,  but  as  morally  improper?  It 
must  surely  be  because  we  regard  our  emotions 
which  differ  from  them  as  proper.  And  if  we 
regard  our  own  emotions  as  proper  before  we  can 
judge  the  emotions  which  do  not  harmonize  with 
them  to  be  improper  on  that  account,  what  in- 
fluence can  the  supposed  sympathy  and  compar- 
ison have  had  in  giving  birth  to  that  moral  sen- 
timent which  preceded  the  comparison?  The 
sympathy,  therefore,  on  which  the  feeling  of 
propriety  is  said  to  depend,  assumes  the  previous 
belief  of  that  very  propriety.  Or,  if  there  be  no 
previous  belief  of  the  moral  suitableness  of  our 
own  emotions,  there  can  be  no  reason  from  the 
mere  dissonance  of  other  emotions  with  ours  to 
regard  these  dissonant  emotions  as  morally  un- 
suitable in  the  circumstances  in  which  they  have 
arisen." 

The  theory  of  Dr.  Smith  not  only  include* 


180  MORAL  SCIENCE. 

the  sympathy  which,  we  feel  with  the  agent  of 
an  action,  but  also  with  the  feel- 
mSST*  aDd  inSs  of  gratitude  or  resentment  in 
the  object  of  the  action,  as  it  may 
affect  others  with  benefit  or  injury.  If  we  feel 
that  in  similar  circumstances  our  emotions  would 
sympathize  with  theirs,  we  regard  the  agent  in 
the  same  light  in  which  they  regard  him  as  wor- 
thy of  regard  in  one  case,  and  of  punishment  in 
the  other ;  that  is,  as  having  moral  merit  or  de- 
merit. It  is  evident  that  this  is  an  inadequate 
and  defective  account  of  merit  and  demerit;  for 
it  confines  these  qualities  to  actions  which  relate 
to  the  welfare  of  others ;  but  all  impartial  men 
judge  that  actions  of  a  different  kind  may  have 
merit  or  demerit.  If  a  man,  from  a  sincere  de- 
sire of  improvement  in  virtue,  is  led  to  deny 
himself  habitually  such  gratification  of  his  senses 
and  appetites  as  would  interfere  with  his  pro- 
gress, and  to  submit  to  a  course  of  discipline  to 
overcome  evil  habits,  which  is  both  difficult  and 
painful,  and  yet  perseveres  in  the  midst  of  nu- 
merous temptations  to  relax,  until  he  has  ob- 
tained  a   complete  victory  over   himself;   whe 


NATURE   OF  VIRTUE.  181 

would  say  that  there  is  nothing  in  all  this  to 
call  forth  moral  approbation  ?  But  the  actions 
have  no  respect  to  the  happiness  of  others; 
there  is  no  gratitude  or  resentment  with  which 
the  observer  can  sympathize. 

That  theory  which  considers  conformity  to 
the  will  of  God  to  be  virtue,  is  undoubtedly  cor- 
rect ;  for  that  faculty  in  us  which 

approves    Of  virtUOUS    actions    Was         Theory  of  con- 

.  .         formity  to  the  will 

implanted  by  Him,  and  is  an  m-  of  God. 
duction  of  his  will.  As  soon  as 
we  get  the  idea  of  a  God  we  cannot  but  feel  that 
it  is  the  duty  of  all  creatures  to  be  conformed  to 
his  will.  But  if  the  question  be  whether,  in 
judging  an  action  to  be  virtuous,  it  is  neces- 
sary to  consider  distinctly  of  its  conformity  to 
the  will  of  God,  we  are  of  opinion  that  this  con- 
ception is  not  necessary  to  enable  us  to  perceive 
that  certain  actions  are  morally  good  and  others 
morally  evil.  In  order  to  this  judgment  nothing 
is  required  but  a  knowledge  of  the  circumstances 
and  motives  of  the  action.  Even  the  atheist 
cannot  avoid  the  conviction  that  particular  ac- 
tions  are   praiseworth}^,    and   others   deserving 


182  MORAL  SCIENCE. 

blame.     But  though  belief  in  the  existence  of 

God  is  not  necessary  to  the  exercise  of  the  moral 

faculty,  yet  this  belief  adds  great 

Dictates  of  con-  force  to  the  dictates  of  conscience, 

science   strengthen- 
ed by  Theism.         and  enables  us  to  account  for  the 

existence  of  a  faculty  by  which 
we  discern  qualities  so  opposite  in  the  actions  of 
moral  agents.  Indeed,  to  know  that  our  con- 
duct should  be  conformed  to  the  will  of  God, 
supposes  the  existence  of  a  moral  faculty,  of 
which  this  is  one  of  the  intuitive  judgments.  If 
we  had  no  moral  faculty,  the  obligation  to  be 
conformed  to  the  will  of  God  would  not  be  felt. 

It  is  true,  undoubtedly,  that  it 
But     intuitive  may  be  inferred  from  clear  data, 

moral     perceptions 

haye  not  this  basis,  that  ultimately  all  duty  and  all 
virtuous  actions  may  be  referred 
to  the  will  of  God  as  the  standard  by  which  they 
should  be  tried.  Our  original  intuitive  percep- 
tion of  the  moral  character  of  certain  actions 
does  not,  however,  take  in  this  idea,  but  is 
an  immediate  judgment  of  the  mind  upon  ob- 
serving such  actions.  Morality  is  a  quality  seen 
in  the  actions  themselves. 


NATURE    OF   VIRTUE.  183 

If  the  question  be  asked,  why  we  should  bo 
conformed  to  the  will  of  God  ?  the 
answer   is,  because  it  is  right,-  ^ to  ■» 
morally  right.      We    must    then 
have  a  faculty  of  judging  respecting  moral  obli- 
gation before  we  can  know  and  feel  that  con- 
formity to  the  win  vi  uou  its  right. 


UBAPTEP  XXV!. 

THE  NATUBE  OF  VIKTUE.    CONTINUED. 

Virtue  is  a  peculiar  quality  of  certain  actions 

of  a  moral  agent,  which*  quality  is  perceived  by 

the    moral    faculty    with    which 

Virtne. 

every  man  is  endued;  and  the 
perception  of  which  is  accompanied  by  an  emo- 
tion which  is  distinct  from  all  other  emotions, 
and  is  called  moral.  This  quality  being  of  a 
nature  perfectly  simple,  does  not  admit  of  being 
logically  denned,  any  more  than  the  colour  of 
the  grass,  the  taste  of  honey,  the  odour  of  a  rose, 
or  the  melody  of  tune. 

As  some  actions  are  morally  good,  which  are 

virtuous;  so  there  are  other  ac- 
Vic*. 

tions  which  are  morally  evil,  or 

vicious.     The  perception  of  these,  also,  is  accom- 


NATURE   OF   VIRTUE.  185 

parried  by  a  feeling  of  a  moral  kind,  bnt  very 
different  from  that  which  accom- 
panies   the  view  of   virtuous   ac-  J*J«*~* 
ions. 

Virtue,  then,  may  be  said  to  be  that  quality 
in  certain  actions  which  is  perceived  by  a  ra- 
tional mind  to  be  good  ;  and  vice,  or  sin,  is  that 
which  a  well-constituted  and  well-informed  mind 
sees  to  be  evil.  Whatever  may  be  the  rule  or 
standard  of  virtuous  actions,  the 
immediate  j udgment  of  the  moral     The  raoral  faculty 

J        o  necessary. 

faculty  on  contemplating  the  act  is 
necessary.  Without  a  moral  faculty  we  never 
could  have  the  least  idea  of  a  moral  quality,  good 
or  bad;  therefore  all  actions  must  be  brought 
before  this  faculty,  and  its  judgment  is  ultimate. 
We  can  go  no  further.  While  the  good  or  evil 
of  some  actions  is  self-evident,  much  discrimina- 
tion and  reasoning  are  requisite  to  arrive  at  a 
clear  view  of  the  true  moral  character  of  others. 
But  the  end  of  these  processes  is  to  bring  the 
true  nature  of  the  action  in  question  fairly  be- 
fore the  mind,  when  it  is  judged  by  the  mora] 


186  MORAL  SCIENCE. 

faculty.  Those  actions,  then,  which  a  sound  and 
well-informed  mind  judges  to  be  morally  good, 
are  virtuous,  and  those  which  such  a  mind 
iudges  or  feels  to  be  evil,  are  sinful. 

As  has  already  been  explained  when  treat- 
ing of  conscience,  the  judgment  of  the  mind  re- 
specting moral  qualities,  is  the 
meTnht6ispe0SiiUdS"  judgment  of  the  understanding, 
and  differs  from  other  judgments 
only  by  the  subject  under  consideration.  The 
mind  must  possess  the  faculty  of  moral  percep- 
tion, of  which  all  the  inferior  animals  are  desti- 
tute. To  see  that  an  action  is  useful,  and  will 
produce  happiness  to  him  that  performs  it,  or  to 
others,  is  one  thing ;  but  to  perceive  that  it  is 
morally  good,  is  quite  a  distinct  idea ;  and  vir- 
tue and  mere  utility  should  never  be  confounded. 
It  may  be  thought  that  this  account  of  virtue 
makes  the  moral  faculty  the  only  standard  of 
moral  excellence.  In  one  sense,  this  is  true.  It 
is  impossible  for  us  to  judge  any  action  to  be 
virtuous,  which  does  not  approve  itself  when 
fairly  contemplated  by  our  moral  sense.  To 
suppose  otherwise,  would  be  to  think  that  we 


NATUBE   OF   VIRTUE.  187 

lad  some  other  faculty  by  which  to  judge  of 
noral  actions  than  the  moral  faculty.  As  no 
judgment  of  colours  can  be  formed 

,  r  n      -I      .         "Whether    iiifal- 

but  by  the  eye,  nor  of  sounds  but  lible_ 
by  the  ear,  nor  of  odours  and  tastes 
out  by  the  senses  of  smelling  and  tasting ;  so  no 
judgment  can  be  formed  on  moral  subjects,  but 
by  the  moral  faculty.  It  may  be  asked,  then, 
whether  the  judgments  of  this  faculty  are  infal- 
lible, and  if  so,  how  it  is  that  we  have  so  many 
discrepant  opinions,  respecting  the  morality  of 
actions.  To  which  it  may  be  answered,  that 
when  the  mind  is  in  a  sound  state,  and  any 
moral  action  is  presented  to  it,  with  all  the  cir- 
cumstances which  belong  to  it,  the  judgment  of 
this  faculty  is  always  correct  and  uniform  in  all 
men.  As  an  eye  in  a  sound  state  judges  infal- 
libly of  colours,  in  which  judgment  all  in  pre- 
cisely the  same  circumstances  will  agree  in  their 
perceptions ;  so  it  is  in  regard  to  moral  qualities. 
If  in  looking  at  an  object,  one  man  has  more 
light  than  another,  or  if  one  occupies  a  more  fa- 
vourable point  of  observation,  the  object  will  ap« 
pear  differently  to  the  persons  thus  situated; 


188  MORAL   SCIENCE. 

but  this  does  not  argue  that  their  eyes  are  dif- 
ferently constructed,  or  that  there  is  any  othei 
faculty  than  the  eye,  by  which  the  object  may 
be  surveyed.  So,  in  regard  to  moral  qualities, 
when  they  are  presented  to  different  minds  with 
precisely  the  same  evidence,  the  moral  judgment 
will  be  the  same.  The  differences  observable  in 
the  dictates  of  the  consciences  of 

Discrepant  iudg-  1  n     .  i     , 

ments,  whence.  men>  maJ  be  all  traced  to  some 
cause  which  prevents  the  object 
from  being  perceived  in  its  true  light ;  such  as 
ignorance,  error,  or  prejudice.  In  regard  to  sin 
and  duty,  the  ultimate  appeal  must  be  to  con- 
science. We  may  bring  considerations  of  va- 
rious kinds  to  bear  on  the  conscience,  or  to  en- 
lighten the  mind,  so  that  the  moral  faculty  may 
be  rightly  guided;  but  still  our  ultimate  rule 
must  be  the  judgments  of  our  own  moral 
faculty. 

And  here  it   may  be  remarked,  that   con- 
science will  recognise  every  new 

New  relations  oc-  .  . 

casion  views  of  new  relation  into  which  a  moral  agent 
enters,  and  will  dictate  the  obliga- 
tion to  perform  the  duties  obviously  arising  out 


NATURE   OF  VIRTUE.  189 

of  sucli  relations.  Or,  if  such  an  agent  should 
for  a  time  be  ignorant  of  its  relations,  and  after- 
wards discover  them,  it  would,  upon  such  disco- 
very, feel  an  obligation  not  before  experienced. 
Let  us  then  suppose  the  case  of  a  child  educated 
in  a  cave,  who,  while  the  intellectual  powers 
were  cultivated,  and  the  faculties  developed,  had 
never  been  informed  respecting  the  existence  of 
its  parents  and  the  relation  it  sustains  to  them. 
Of  course,  while  in  this  state  of  ignorance,  there 
would  be  no  sense  of  obligation  to  them ;  but  so 
soon  as  the  nature  of  this  relation  should  be 
clearly  made  known,  the  obligation  to  the  ob- 
vious duties  arising  out  of  this  relation,  would 
immediately  be  felt.  Let  it  be  supposed,  also, 
that  this  human  being,  until  grown  to  maturity, 
had  never  heard  of  God,  and  of  course  possessed 
no  idea  of  such  a  being.  While  in  that  state  of 
ignorance,  it  could  have  no  sense  of  the  obliga- 
tion to  reverence,'  love  and  serve  its  Creator ; 
but  as  soon  as  the  mind  should 
take  in  distinctly,  the  conception  tT  J^i*  crea' 
of  God  as  the  Author  of  its  being, 
and  as  possessed  of  every  adorable  attribute,  the 


190  MORAL  SCIENCE. 

duties  arising  out  of  this  newly-discovered  rela- 
tion, would  be  felt  to  be  obligatory.    A  just  con- 
sideration of  this  relation  would 
The  will  of  Gcd  lead  to   the    conclusion    that,    in 

seen  to  be   obliga- 
tory, every  thing,  the  will  of  such  a  Be 

ing,  standing  in  such  a  relation  to 
the  creature,  should  be  obeyed.  Thus  the  im- 
portant principle  would  be  learned,  that  the  will 
of  God,  so  far  as  made  known  by  reason  or  re- 
velation, should  be  the  supreme  rule  of  moral 
conduct.  Conscience,  henceforth,  would  act 
under  the  influence  of  this  truth.  And  making 
the  will  of  God — so  far  as  made  known — the 
supreme  and  only  rule  of  moral  conduct,  would 
not  be  found  at  all  inconsistent  with  the  obliga- 
tion to  obey  the  dictates  of  conscience;  for  it 
would  now  become  evident  that  God,  being  the 
author  of  our  minds,  had  constituted  them  with 
this  moral  faculty,  to  admonish  them  of  duty, 
so  that  the  dictates  of  an  enlightened  conscience 
are  the  clear  indications  of  the  law  or  will  of 
God.  It  is  the  law  written  on  the  hearts  of  all 
men. 

Nothing  can  be  considered  as  partaking  of 


NATURE   OF   VIRTUE.  19i 

the  nature  of  virtue  which  does  not  meet  with 
the  approbation  of  the  moral  faculty.  This  will 
by  some  be  thought  a  dangerous 
principle,  merely  from  a  misappre-  Lle™£Y^ 
hension  of  its  nature.  They  al-  °f  moral  m'TOh&- 
lege  that  the  will  of  God  is  the 
only  perfect  and  immutable  standard  of  moral 
rectitude.  They  allege,  moreover,  that  to  define 
virtue  to  be  only  such  actions  as  the  moral  fac- 
ulty in  man  approves,  is  to  make  it  a  very  un- 
certain and  fluctuating  thing,  depending  on  the 
variable  and  discrepant  moral  feelings  of  men. 

This  objection  confounds  two  things  which 
should  be  kept  distinct,  viz.,  the  quality  of  an 
object  and  the  light  or  medium 
through  which  it  is  viewed.     The  .   Aflswer  t0  ob" 

°  jection. 

colour  of  an  object  can  be  per- 
ceived only  by  the  eye ;  but  in  order  to  have 
the  object  fairly  before  the  eye,  there  must  be 
light  reflected  from  it,  and  that  light  on  entering 
the  pupil,  must  be  reflected  so  as  to  be  conveyed 
to  a  focus  on  the  retina.  But  without  an  eye 
it  would  be  useless  to  descant  ever  so  loner  or  so 
learnedly  on  the  nature  of  colours,  or  the  laws 


192  MORAL  SCIENCE. 

by  which  light  is  reflected  and  refracted.  In 
the  case  of  sight,  it  is  evident  that  all  the  per- 
ception which  is  experienced,  must  be  by  the 
eye.  If  the  light  is  insufficient,  it  must  be  in- 
creased, and  if  any  cause  hinders  it  from  being 
duly  refracted,  vision  will  not  take  place;  but 
still,  it  is  only  by  the  eye  that  we  can  have  any 
perception  of  colours. 

Perhaps  an  illustration,  drawn  from  the 
faculty  of  taste,  may  be  more  appropriate. 
A  beautiful  landscape  is  presented  ;  I  am 
charmed  with   its   beauty.      This    emotion   or 

feeling  of  the-  beautiful  depends 
Analogy  of  taste,      on  the  faculty  of  taste.      If  that 

were  absent,  I  might  see  all  the 
objects  as  they  stand,  and  perceive  nothing  of 
the  beautiful.  Beauty  in  the  works  of  nature 
or  art  can  be  perceived  only  by  taste,  and  the 
emotion  will  depend  on  the  perfection  of  the 
faculty,  provided  the  object  is  presented  in  a 
favourable  light.  A  person  of  cultivated  taste 
sees  beauties  where  a  rude  savage  sees  none. 
Thus  also  in  regard  to  moral  acts,  or  a  connected 
series  of  moral  actions,  everv  idea  and  feeling  of 


NATURE   OF   VIRTUE.  198 

a  moral  kind  must  as  necessarily  be  through  the 
moral  faculty  as  colours  through  the  organ  of 
vision.  We  have  no  other  faculty  which  takes 
cognizance  of  moral  qualities.  The  judgments 
and  emotions  which  are  produced  by  the  con- 
templation of  such  actions,  are  always  infallibly 
correct,  when  the  mind  is  duly  enlightened  and 
the  faculty  itself  in  a  sound  and  healthy  state. 
There  is  no  inconsistency  between  this  opinion 
and  that  which  considers  the  will  of  God  as  the 
real  standard  and  ultimate  rule  of  moral  con- 
duct. 

For,  as  has  been  shown,  although  conscience 
ean  act  within  a  narrow  sphere  without  even  the 
knowledge  or  belief  of  a  God ;  yet 

,  i  •      i  -it  •  ^  Moral  feelings  de- 

so  soon  as  this  knowledge  is  ob-  pen(lent  on  the  dic. 

,    .        i  n     ,  i  i  •  tates  of  understand- 

tamed,  and  the  mind  recognises  ^ 
its  relation  to  its  Creator,  a  new 
field  is  opened  for  the  operations  of  conscience. 
It  is  soon  perceived  that  the  clear  dictates  of 
conscience,  in  cases  of  self-evident  truth,  are 
nothing  else  than  the  indication  of  the  law  of 
God  written  on  the  heart  of  every  man,  as  was 
before  taught.     We  can  refer  to  the  will  of  God 

9 


194  MORAL   SCIENCE. 

as  a  rule  of  moral  conduct  no  other  way  than  by 
the  exercise  of  the  moral  faculty,  hy  which  it  is 
clearly  perceived  that  our  Creator  and  Preserver 
has  a  just  claim  on  our  obedience,  and  ought  in 
all  things  to  be  obeyed.  But  if  conscience  did 
not  thus  dictate,  all  appeals  to  the  will  of  God, 
to  show  what  is  morally  right,  would  be  in  vain. 
The  certainty  and  immutability  of  our  moral 
standard  of  rectitude  will  then  be  in  proportion 
to  the  knowledge  which  the  mind  possesses  of 
the  existence  of  God  and  the  creature's  relation 
to  Him.  Instead,  therefore,  of  making  our 
moral  feelings  mere  instinctive  emotions,  as  is 
done  by  Hutcheson  and  Shaftesbury,  we  make 
them  depend  on  the  clear  dictates  of  the  under- 
standing; for,  as  Ave  have  often  explained,  the 
judgments  of  conscience  are  no  other  than  the 
understanding  judging  on  moral  subjects. 

If  that,  and  that  alone  is  virtue,  which  is  ap- 
proved by  a  mind  duly  enlightened,  and  in  a 
sound  state,  then  the  attempt  to 

Eril   of  attempt-  .  .- 

ing  unduo  simpim-  reduce  all  virtuous  actions  to  some 

one  kind — as  to  benevolence,  for 

example — is  not  the  way  to  arrive  at  the  truth 


NATURE   OF  VIRTUE.  196 

For  while  benevolent  actions  generally  meet 
with  the  approbation  of  the  moral  faculty,  we 
can  easily  conceive  of  an  exercise  of  benevolence 
which,  instead,  of  being  approved,  would  be 
viewed  as  morally  indifferent,  cr  merely  amia- 
ble— as  a  natural  affection,  or  even  as  evil.  We 
never  ascribe  morality  to  the  kind  feeling  of 
brutes  to  one  another.  The  natural  affection  of 
parents,  called  storge  by  the  Greeks,  is  no  more 
of  a  moral  nature  than  the  same  affection  in  in- 
ferior animals.  The  natural  affection  of  our  re- 
latives, our  neighbours,  and  countrymen,  is 
amiable  and  useful,  but  not  of  a  moral  character. 
If  a  judge  should  feel  a  strong  benevolence  to- 
ward all  criminals,  so  as  to  avoid  inflicting  on 
them  the  penalty  of  the  wholesome  laws  of  the 
country,  we  should  judge  it  wicked.  It  might 
be  said  that  a  benevolence  which  counteracts  a 
greater  good,  is  not  virtuous  but  sinful ;  yet  it  is 
an  exercise  of  benevolence,  and  serves,  on  the 
concession  of  those  who  make  all  virtue  to  con- 
sist in  benevolence,  to  show  that  all  benevolence 
is  not  virtue,  which  is  the  very  thing  to  be 
proved.     Again,  there  are  acts  of  moral  agents, 


196  MOEAL  SCIENCE. 

which  have  nothing  of  the  nature  of  benevo- 
lence, jet  which  the  moral  faculty  judges  to  be 
morally  good.  For  example,  if  a  man  for  the 
sake  of  moral  improvement,  denies  himself  some 
gratification  which  would  in  itself  be  pleasing 
to  nature,  we  judge  such  self-denial  to  be  vir- 
tuous. 

A  thousand  acts  of  prudence  which  have  re- 
gard to  our  own  best  interests,  without  inter- 
fering with  the  interest  of  others, 

Prudence  a  Vir-    -,  1  n  i  i         • 

tne>  have  always  been  reckoned  vir- 

tuous. Indeed,  among  the  ancient 
sages,  prudence  was  one  of  the  four  cardinal 
virtues.  The  attempt,  therefore,  to  reduce  all 
virtue  to  the  simple  exercise  of  benevolence, 
must  be  unsuccessful.  It  is  so  evident  that  some 
actions  which  have  our  own  welfare  as  their  ob- 
ject, are  virtuous,  that  rather  than,  give  up  their 
theory  that  all  virtue  consists  in  benevolence, 
they  enlarge  the  meaning  of  the  word,  so  as 
to  make  it  include  a  due  regard  to  our  own  wel- 
fare. But  this  is  really  to  acknowledge  that  all 
virtue  does  not  consist  in  benevolence,  accord- 
ing to  the  usual  meaning  of  that  word.     Any 


NATURE   OF   VIRTUE.  197 

term  may  be  made  to  stand  for  the  whole  of 
virtue,  if  you  choose  to  impose  an  arbitrary 
meaning  upon  it.  Benevolent  affections,  how- 
ever, is  a  phrase  which  has  as  fixed  and  de« 
finite  a  meaning  as  any  in  the  language,  and 
by  all  good  writers  is  used  for  good  will  to 
others.  Benevolent  affections  are,  therefore,  con- 
stantly distinguished  from  such  as  are  selfish. 
If,  however,  any  one  chooses,  contrary  to  uni- 
versal usage,  to  employ  the  words  in  a  sense  so 
comprehensive  as  to  include  self-love,  be  it  so. 
We  will  not  dispute  with  such  a  one,  about 'the 
meaning  of  the  word,  provided  he  agree  that 
the  judicious  pursuit  of  our  own  improvement 
and  happiness  is  virtuous. 

To  determine  how  many  different  kinds  of 
actions  are  virtuous,  we  must  pass  them  in  re- 
view before  the  moral  faculty,  and  then  classify 
them ;  being  in  the  whole  process 

,      ,  ,,  f    ■%  ,        n    ,  Actions  to  be  clia- 

governed    by    the    light  01  true  sifie(i. 
knowledge,  and  taking  into  view 
all  the  relations  in  which  the  human  race,  01 
any  portion  of  it,  is  placed.     Something  of  this 


198  MORAL   SCIENCE. 

kind  we  may  attempt  in  the  sequel  of  this  "work , 
in  which  we  shall  endeavour  to  survey  the 
moral  duties  incumbent  on  men,  in  their  vari- 
ous relations. 


CHAPTER  XXVII. 

WHETHER  VIRTUE  AND  YICE  BELONG  ONLY  TO  ACTIONS. 

It  has  repeatedly  been  brought  into  view  that 
moral  qualities  are  found  only  in  actions  of  moral 
agents,  and  not  in  all  actions,  but 
only  in  those  performed  under  cer-  cJ^  acts  flra 
tain  circumstances.  But  when  we 
consider  those  actions  which  are  of  a  moral  na- 
ture, we  find  that  they  are  complex,  consisting 
of  an  external  and  internal  part.  At  once  we 
can  determine  that  a  mere  external  or  corporeal 
action  can  possess  no  morality,  except  as  con- 
nected with  the  internal  or  mental  exercise 
which  produced  it,  and  of  which  it  is  the  expo 
nent.  But  here,  again  there  are  several  acts  of 
the  mind  clearly  distinguishable  from  one  an- 
other, and  it  is  of  importance  to  determine  in 
which  of  these  the  moral  quality  exists.     On 


200  MORAL   SCIENCE. 

this  subject  there  is  a  diversity  of  opinion.  Il 
seems  commonly  to  be  taken  for  granted,  that 
the  act  of  volition  is,  so  to  speak,  the  responsible 
act,  and  this  has  led  to  the  maxim  almost  unu 
versally  current,  that  "  no  action  is  of  a  moral 
nature  which  is  not  voluntary." 
iunt^al  aCtS  V0'  Accordingly,  writers  of  great  emi- 
nence have  entertained  the  opin- 
ion, that  to  render  our  desires  and  affections 
moral,  they  must  directly  or  indirectly  proceed 
from  volition.  But  here  arises  a  serious  diffi- 
culty. Our  desires  and  affections 
jecuf^"'  ^e  not  subject  to  our  volitions. 
We  may  will  with  all  our  energy 
to  love  an  object  now  odious,  and  our  will  pro 
duces  no  manner  of  effect ;  except  to  show  us 
our  inability  to  change  our  affections  by  the 
force  of  the  will.  On  the  contrary,  we  find  by 
constant  experience  that  our  volitions  are  influ- 
enced uniformly  by  our  prevailing  desires.  No 
man  ever  put  forth  a  volition  which  was  not 
the  effect  of  some  desire,  feeling,  or  inclination. 
Now,  after  the  most  attentive  examination  of 
our  minds,  we  find  that  certain  affections  which 


MORALITY   OF  VOLITIONS.  201 

are  neither  produced  by  volitions  nor  terminate 
in  volitions,  are,  in  the  judgment 

,.,  „     .,.  n  i  Yet  desires  have 

of  all  reflecting  men,  ot  a  moral  moral  quality. 
giature.      For    example,    envy   at 
the  prosperity  of  a  neighbour  is  not  the  result 
of  any  volition,  and  it  may  be  cherished  inward- 
ly without    leading   to   any   volition,    the  will 
being  controlled  by  other  feelings  which  pre- 
vent action ;  yet  all  must  admit  it  to  be  a  mor- 
ally evil  disposition.     The  truth  then  appears- to 
be,  that  our  affections  are  properly  the  subject 
of  moral  qualities,  good  and  evil. 
Volitions  take  their  character  en-  hasitseqnucaH[y.llc 
tirely  from  the  internal  affections 
or  desires  from  which  they  proceed.     The  voli- 
tion,  viewed   abstractly,   is   always    the    same, 
when  the  external  action  is  the  same ;  but  the 
moral  character  of  the  acts,  where  the  volitions 
are  the  same,  may  vary  exceedingly.     If  I  will 
to  strike  a  man  with  a  deadly  weapon,  the  sim- 
ple volition  which  precedes  and  is  the  immedi- 
ate cause  of  the  action,  is  the  same  whether  I 
give  the  stroke  in  self-defence,  in  execution  of 
the  law,  or  through,  malice  prepense.      Indeed, 

*9 


202  MORAL  SCIENCE. 

the  volition  of  an  insane  person  to  strike  a  blow 
is  exactly  similar  to  the  volition  of  a  sane  per* 
son  striking  a  similar  blow.  Hence  it  is  evident 
that  the  proper  seat  of  moral  qualities  is  not  i% 
the  will,  considered  as  distinct  from  the  affec- 
tions, but  in  the  affections  themselves,  which 
give  character  to  the  volition  as  mnch  as  to  the 

external  action.  These  internal 
of  Mtion^ne  Spnrig  affections  or  desires  are  properly 

the  springs  of  our  actions,  and  our 
wills  are  the  executive  power  by  which  they  are 
carried  into  effect.     They  are  commonly  called 

motives,  and  very  properly,  as 
Motives.  they  move  us  to   action ;   but  I 

have  avoided  the  use  of  that  word, 
because  it  is  ambiguous,"  and  has  occasioned 
much  misconception  on  this  subject.  By  mo- 
tives, many  understand  reasons  or  external 
qualities  in  the  objects  of  our  desires ;  that 
which  excites  or  moves  our  affections.  Then 
when  it  is  asserted  that  the  will  is  governed  by 
the  strongest  motives,  some  understand  the 
meaning  to  be  the  strongest  reasons,  or  those 
qualities  in  an  object  best  adapted  to  excite  our 


MORALITY    OF   VOLITIONS.  203 

affections.     In  this  sense  the  proposition  is  not 

true.     Minds  are  often  in  such  a 

state  that  they  are  not  governed      whether    gov 

erned  by  the  strong- 

by  that  reason  which  in  their  own  est  reasons, 
view    is    the    strongest ;    that   is, 
which  in  their  better  judgment  seems  wisest  and 
best.     And  often  our  minds  are  not  influenced 
or  governed  by  those  external  objects  or  consid- 
erations which  in   the  judgment   of  impartial 
reason  are  most  weighty.     But  if  by  motives  be 
understood  the  desires  themselves, 
actually  in  exercise   at  the  time,       i&  what  sense 

will      follows    the 

however  produced,  then  it  may  be  strongest  motives, 
truly  said  that  the  will  is  always 
determined  by  the  strongest  motives,  that  is,  the 
strongest  desires.  But  even  this  proposition 
needs  qualification.  The  strongest  single  desire 
does  not  always  govern  the  man,  but  the  strong- 
est combination  of  desires,  as  may  be  thus  ex- 
emplified. A  man  in  returning  from  a  journey 
on  a  cold  day  has  a  strong  desire  to  reach  home 
without  delay;  but  passing  a  house  where  he 
knows  he  can  enjoy  a  warm  fire,  and  good  re- 
freshment, and  the  company  of  a  friend,  though 


204  MORAL-   SCIENCE. 

his  desire  to  reach  home  is  stronger  than  nis  de< 
sire  to  see  his  friend,  stronger  than  his  desire  to 
enjoy  the  fire,  or  his  desire  for  food  or  drink, 
yet  all  these  combined  prove  sufficient  to  induce 
him  to  stop. 

It  is  often  said  that  the  intention  or  end  for 

which  an  action  is  performed,    determines  its 

moral  character;  and  as  our  de- 

Morality  of  an  act  -,  ...  ,  . 

from  its  intention,  sires  always  point  to  some  object 
which  is  the  end  of  the  action, 
this  account  of  the  matter  coincides  with  the 
view  already  given.  As  if  a  man  gives  money 
to  another,  though  we  see  the  action,  and  are 
sure  that  it  was  voluntary,  yet  that  determines 
nothing  respecting  the  moral  character  of  the 
action.  Before  we  can  judge  any  thing  correct- 
ly, we  must  know  the  intention  with  which  the 
act  was  performed.  If  it  was  to  pay  a  just  debt, 
we  approve  it  as  a  moral  act,  but  of  small  merit. 
If  it  was  to  supply  the  wants  of  a  poor  suffering 
family,  unable  to  help  themselves,  we  still  ap- 
prove, but  our  approbation  is,  much  stronger; 
the  act  is  more  meritorious  than  the  former.  But 
if  we  are  informed  that  the  person  on  whom  the 


MORALITY   OF    VOLITIONS.  205 

benefit  was  conferred  was  an  enemy  who  had 
sought  every  opportunity  to  injure  him  who 
is  now  his  benefactor,  we  esteem  it  the  high- 
est' degree  of  Christian  virtue.  But  if  it  should 
appear  that  the  money  was  given  to  a  common 
drunkard,  to  enable  him  to  procure  intoxicating 
drink ;  though  the  external  act  and  volition  are 
the  same,  instead  of  approving  the  action,  we 
censure  it  as  culpable.  And  finally,  if  it  should 
appear  that  the  intention  was  to  hire  an  assassin 
to  murder  an  innocent  person,  and  that  person  a 
benefactor,  our  emotion  rises  to  the  highest  de- 
gree, and  we  reprobate  the  action  as  evil  in  the 
extreme.  In  all  these  cases,  the  action  and 
the  volition  producing  it,  are  the  same.  The 
only  difference  is  in  the  end  or  intention  with 
which  it  was  done.  The  intention 
will  serve  to  characterize  actions  ifledeasser  °r  q 
very  well,  but  is  not  comprehen- 
sive enough  to  take  in  all  the  exercises  of  mina 
which  possess  a  moral  character.  I  feel  habitu- 
ally a  kind  disposition  to  my  fellow-creatures, 
but  for  much  of  my  time  I  have  not  the  oppor- 
tunity of  performing  any  particular  acts  of  kind- 


206  MORAL   SCIENCE. 

uess  All  impartial  persons  will  say  that  thia 
habitual  feeling  is  of  a  virtuous  character ;  hut 
there  is  no  intention  in  the  case.  It  is  merely  a 
feeling  which  terminates  in  no  volition  or  ac- 
tion. 

My  neighbour,  who  has  been  a  bad  man,  un- 
dergoes a  real  change  of  character,   and  from 
being  profane   and   quarrelsome, 

Intention     not 

comprehensive    e-  becomes  pious  and  peaceable.     I 

nough. 

rejoice  in  the  change.  This  joy 
is  a  virtuous  emotion,  though  it  has  no  intention 
accompanying  it.  This  will  serve  to  show  that 
making  the  intention  the  sole  characteristic  of 
morality,  is  correct  in  regard  to  actions,  but  is 
not  comprehensive  enough  to  take  in  the  whole 
of  morality. 

It  may  seem  that  in  what  has  been  said,  we 
contravene  the  maxim,  that  all  moral  actions  are 

voluntary,  a  maxim  which  has  re- 

Objection.  •        i    j/i  ■  •  n  -i 

ceived  the  sanction  01  ages,  and 
may  be  considered  an  intuitive  principle :  where- 
as it  is  now  maintained  that  there  are  exercises 
of  mind  which  do  not  involve  any  exercise  of 
will;  and  that  our  volitions  themselves  have 


MORALITY   OF    VOLITIONS.  207 

notliing  of  a  moral  nature  but  what  they  derive 
from  the  motives  from  which  they  proceed. 

The  maxim,  rightly  understood,  is  no  doubt 
just,  and  we  should  never  affect  the  wisdom  o 
being    wiser  than    the    common 
sense  of  mankind,  where  we  meet     Jh,e  ttaxim  ad" 

'  mitteu. 

with  truths  in  which  all  men  of 
sober  reflection  have  been  agreed.     It  is  safer  to 
take  them  for  granted,  as  believing  that  univer- 
sal consent  in  such  matters  furnishes  the  best 
evidence  of  truth. 

But  the  explanation  is  easy.  The  maxim 
applies  primarily  to  actions,  which  must  be  volun- 
tary to  have  the  character  of  mo- 
rality. If  the  action  is  not  volun-  n  ™eed  0bJ9Ctl 9 n  T<y 
tary,  it  is  not  properly  the  action 
of  the  person  who  seems  to  perform  it,  for  we 
can  act  in  no  other  way  than  by  the  will. 

But  again,  the  word  voluntary  as  employed 
in  the  maxim  under  consideration,  includes  more 
than  volition  ;  it  comprehends  all 
the  spontaneous  exercises  of  the    Ambiguity  of  term 

voluntary. 

mind;  that   is,    all   its    affections 

and    emotions.     Formerly    all    these    were    in- 


208  MORA!   SCIENCE. 

eluded  under  the  word  will,  and  we  still  use 
language  that  requires  this  lati- 
t&tiono7muaCCeP~  tude  m  the  construction  of  the 
term.  Thus  it  would  be  conso- 
nant to  the  best  usage  to  say  that  man  is  perfect- 
y  voluntary  in  loving  his  friend  or  hating  his 
enemy ;  but  by  this  is  not  meant  that  these  af- 
fections are  the  effect  of  volition,  but  only  that 
they  are  the  free  spontaneous  exercises  of  the 
mind.  That  all  virtue  consists  in  volition,  is  not 
true— as  we  have  seen  ;  but  that  all  virtuous  ex- 
ercises are  spontaneous,  is  undoubtedly  correct. 
Our  moral  character  radically  consists  in  Our 
feelings  and  desires.  These  being  the  sponta- 
neous actings  of  certain  latent  principles  or  dispo- 
sitions, this  hidden  disposition  is  also  judged  to 
be  morally  evil,  because  it  is  productive  of  such 
fruit.  And  of  good  dispositions  we  judge  in 
like  manner. 


CHAPTER  XXVIII. 

THE   AUTHOR   OF  OUR  BEING   CONSIDERED   IN  RELATION 
TO  MORAL  SCIENCE.      ■ 

It  lias  already  been  intimated,  that  the  very  ex- 
istence of  conscience  seems  to  indicate,  that  man 
has  a  Superior  to  whom  he  is  ame- 
nablefor  his  conduct.  The  feel-  J^gS 
ing  of  moral  obligation  which  ac-  [°rga  SuPremeB»- 
companies  every  perception  of 
right  and  wrong,  seems  to  imply,  that  man  is 
under  law ;  for  what  is  moral  obligation  but  a 
moral  law  ?  And  if  we  are  under  a  law  there  must 
be  a  lawgiver,  a  moral  governor,  who  has  incor- 
porated the  elements  of  his  law  into  our  very 
constitution.  This  argument  for  the  existence  oi 
God.  is  solid,  and  independent  of  iJl  other  argu 
ments ;  and  it  goes  further  than  arguments  de- 
rived from  the  evidences  of  design,  which  abound 
in  the  world  around  us ;  for  these  prove  no  more 


210  MOEAL   SCIENCE. 

than  that  the  Author  of  our  being  is  intelligsnt 
but  this  argument  proves  that  he  is  a  moral  Be- 
ing, and  exercises  a  moral  government  over  us. 
The  Atheist,  when  he  feels,  as  he  must,  remorse 
for  Fome  great  crime,  can  scarcely  help  belie v  , 
ing,  that  there  is  a  God  who  is  displeased  with 
his  wicked  conduct,  and  who  will  punish  him 
hereafter  ;  for  the  keen  anguish  of  remorse  seems 
to  point  to  a  punishment  which  is  future.  Hence 
it  is  that  when  Atheists  come  into  those  circum- 
stances which  have  a  tendency  to  awaken  the 
conscience,  they  for  the  time  become  believers 
in  the  existence  of  God.    Thus  in  a  storm  at  sea, 

even  the  most  confirmed  Atheist 
^:rM  has  been  found  calling  upon  God, 

for  deliverance ;  and  when  death 
is  suddenly  presented  to  them,  they  often  find, 
that  their  atheistical  theories  cannot  withstand 
the  power  of  an  awakened  conscience.  Certain- 
^y  the  existence  of  an  accusing  conscience  cannot 
n  any  way  be  so  well  accounted  for,  as  by  the  sup- 
poation  that  man  is  the  creature  of  a  Being  who 
intended  to  form  him  in  such  a  manner,  that  ho 
should  have  a  control  over  his  actions,  and  who 


DIVINE   BEING.  211 

has  left  an  indelible  proof  of  his  authority  in  the 
mind  of  every  man. 

But  omitting  to  press  this  argument  further 
at  present,  let  us  attend  to  some  of  the  other 
evidences  of  the    existence   of  a 
God.     No  one  can  contend  that  k^mtaeainei 

Atheism. 

there  is  any  vhing  absurd  in 
the  idea  of  an  eternal,  all-powerful,  intelligent, 
First  Cause,  from  whom  all  things  have  re- 
ceived their  being.  No  one  can  doubt  that 
the  supposition  of  the  existence  of  such  a  Being 
seems  to  account  for  the  phenomena  of  nature ; 
and  it  is  equally  certain,  that  they  cannot  be  ra- 
tionally accounted  for  on  any  other  hypothesis. 
To  deny  that  in  animals  and  vegetables  there 
are  evident  marks  of  design,  would  be  as  unrea- 
sonable as  to  deny  that  any  thing 
exists.  Thus  the  eye  was  formed  ^™f loglcaI  M" 
to  see,  the  ear  to  hear,  the  mouth 
to  masticate  our  food,  the  stomach  to  digest 
it,  the  various  internal  organs  to  separate  the 
particles  suited  for  nutrition  from  the  mass, 
and  by  a  wonderful  and  inexplicable  process  to 
convert,  or  assimilate  these  particles  into  the 


212  MORAL  SCIENCE. 

various  forms  and  organs  which,  constitute  the 
human  body.  For  any  man  to  affirm  that  in  all 
these  contrivances  and  operations,  there  is  no 
evidence  of  design,  is  certainly  to  contradict  the 
intimate  conviction  of  his  own  reason.  It  may 
on  many  accounts  be  expedient  and  highly  pro- 
fitable, to  accumulate  arguments  from  design,  as 
manifested  in  the  rational,  animal,  vegetable,  and 
mineral  world;  but  for  mere  ar- 
a  few  instances  of  gument  ana  demonstration,  these 

design  sufficient  o  J 

details  are  unnecessary.  A  man 
cast  away  on  a  desolate  shore,  would  be  as 
certain  that  some  rational  being*  had  been 
there,  if  he  found  one  watch,  or  one  quad- 
rant, as  if  he  should  see  a  thousand  of  such  like 
or  other  works  of  art,  strewed  along  the  shore. 
His  mind  is  soon  satisfied  with  the  force  of  this 
evidence,  as  observed  in  a  few  particulars,  and 
the  conviction  of  the  truth,  that  these  things  are 
the  effect  of  a  designing  cause,  is  as  perfect  as  it 
can  be,  by  the  contemplation  of  ever  so  many  in- 
stances. It  may,  I  think  be  taken  for  granted, 
and  even  Atheists  will  admit,  that  we  cannot 
conceive  of  any  works,  or  contrivances,  which 


DIVINE   BEING.  213 

would  more  clearly  evince  design,  than  those 
which  are  found  in  the  human,  and  other  animal 
bodies.  Though  it  is  said  that  some  ancient 
Atheists  attributed  every  thing  to 

Chanoe. 

chance,  yet  it  seems  unnecessary 
to  take  up  much  time  in  combating  such  a  the- 
ory. Atheists  no  longer  resort  to  this  very  ab- 
surd notion.  As  then  design  manifest  in  any 
effect,  leads  necessarily  to  the  conclusion,  that 
intelligence  exists  in  the  cause ;  there  is  no 
escape  from  the  conclusion,  that  the  cause  of 
the  existence  of  animals  and  vegetables  is 
a  wise  and  powerful  Being,  but  by  one  of 
the  following  suppositions.  1.  That  every 
thing  in  which  design  is  manifest,  has  existed 
from  eternity;  or,  2.  That  there  are  in  the  mate- 
rial universe,  causes  possessing  power  and  intel- 
ligence to  produce  these  effects,  but  no  one  great 
intelligent  person  ;  or,  3.  That  there  has  existed 
from  eternity  a  succession  of  these  organized  be- 
ings, producing  one  another  in  a  continued 
series ;  so  that  while  the  individuals  in  the 
series  perish,  the  succession  is  eternal. 

The  first  supposition  is  too  extravagant,  wq 


214  MORAL   SCIENCE. 

should  think,  to  have  any  advocates.  Indeed, 
as  it  relates  to  the  bodies  of  animals  and  vegeta- 
bles, we  have  a  certain  demonstration,  that  their 

organization  has  a  beginning.  And 
uni'veErsrity0fth6  if  every  thing  was  from  eternity, 

every  thing  would  be  immutable 
and  imperishable ;  but  we  see  every  kind  of 
organized  bodies  tending  quickly  to  destruction. 
Our  souls  also  had  a  beginning,  for  their  gradual 
increase  and  development  is  a  matter  of  daily 
observation.  We  have  no  remembrance  of  an 
eternal  existence,  nor  any  consciousness  of  inde- 
pendence, which  must  be  an  attendant  of  an 
eternal  being.  "We  are  conscious  that  we  can- 
not cease  to  be,  nor  control  our  own  destiny. 
Nothing  is  more  certain  in  the  mind  of  all  think- 
ing men,  than  that  we  who  now  live  are  crea- 
tures of  yesterday.  But  it  is  unnecessary  to  re- 
fute an  error  which  perhaps  no  one  is  so  unrea- 
sonable as  to  hold. 

Let  us  then  consider  tbxt  atheistical,  or  ra- 
ther pantheistical  scheme,  which  attributes  all  the 
appearances  of  design  in  the  world  to  the  world 
itself;  that  is,  to  certain  causes  existing  in  the 


DIVINE   BEING.  215 

world  which  produce  beings  of  various  species, 
not   by  creation  out  of  nothing, 

...        .  1-it  i        •  -Ti  2.  Tho    hyriothe- 

which  they  hold  to  be  impossible,  thesis  of  evolution, 
but  by  an  evolution  or  development 
of  principles  contained  in  the  world  itself.    Ac- 
cording to  this  theory  the  world  is  God,  and  all 
things  are  parts  of  this  one  being. 

This  theory  would  avoid  the  name  of  Athe- 
ism, which  has  ever  been  odious;  but  it  re- 
tains   the  virus  of  the  poison  of 

Denies  a  personal 

Atheism  under  another  name.     It  God. 
admits  a  cause,  or  rather  multitude 
of  causes,  capable  of  producing  these  marks  ot 
design  ;  but  denies  that  this  cause,  considered  as 
one  or  many,  is  a  person.     The  question  neces- 
sary to  be  determined  is,  what  is  necessary  to 
constitute  a    person?      Here   we 
have  intelligence  in  the  cause,  in  Pe»onai:ty. 

the  highest  conceivable  degree. 
But  the  structure  of  the  body  of  man  is  not  mere 
intelligence ;  there  is  an  adaptation  of  means  to 
an  end.  This  supposes  the  exercise  of  choice  or 
selection,  -which  is  obviously  an  exercise  of  will. 
Every  instance  of  contrivance  therefore  evinces 


216  MORAL   SCIENCE. 

the  exercise  of  an  intellect  and  will ;  and  that 
being  in  which  these  two  properties  are  found 
we  are  accustomed  to  denominate  a  person. 

It  would  be  difficult  to  find  a  better  defini- 
tion of  a  person.     But  we  need  not  dispute  about 

the  name ;  when  there  is  manifest 
demandld' e  °aUS6  evidence  of  wise  contrivance   in 

the  effect,  there  must  be  an  intelli- 
gent cause  to  produce  such  an  effect.  "Where, 
we  ask,  is  that  cause  ?  Is  it  in  the  individual 
which  exhibits  these  signs  of  design?  That 
would  be  to  make  the  same  thing  cause  and 
effect.  Is  there  then  for  each  individual  in 
which  wise  contrivance  appears  a  particular 
cause ;  or  is  nature  or  the  world  to  be  consid- 
ered one  general  cause,  operating  in  a  multitude 
of  ways?  To  suppose  a  particular  cause  for 
every  one  of  these  effects,  would  be  to  multiply 
deities  beyond  the  wildest  mythology  of  the 
heathen  ;  for  these  causes  being  intelligent  be- 
ings, possessing  a  wisdom  beyond  our  concep- 
tion, each  is  properly  considered  a  separate  deity. 
But  oven  this  supposition  comes  utterly  short  of 
furnishing  a  satisfactory  account  of  the  pheno- 


DIVINE   BEING.  217 

mena  of  tlie  universe ;  for  the  admirable  contri- 
vances in  the  natural  world  consist  very  often 
in  the  adaptation  of  things  which  are  entirely 
distinct,  to  each  other,  as  of  the  light  to  the 
eye,  the  air  to  the  ear  and  to  the  lungs,  the  food 
to  the  stomachs  of  the  various  species  of  ani-. 
mals,  &c.  The  same  adaptation  is  equally  obvi- 
ous in  the  vegetable  world.  That  cause,  there- 
fore, which  produced  the  eye  must  have  produced 
the  light;  and  the  cause  of  the  curiously-con- 
trived apparatus  of  hearing  must  have  formed 
the  air ;  and  the  author  of  the  stomach  must  have 
adapted  it  to  various  kinds  of  food,  &c.  The 
hypothesis  of  an  infinite  number  of  separate,  in- 
telligent causes,  will  not  be  maintained.  All 
these  effects  must  be  attributed  to  one  cause,  and 
that  cause  must  be  infinitely  wise  and  powerful, 
to  give  existence  to  so  many  wonderful  works. 

If,  then,  there  is  one  cause  of  all  these  differ- 
ent species  of  beings,  which  could  not  exist  with 
out  wise   contrivance,  that  cause 
must  be  powerful,  intelligent  and  ^^cTl* 
benevolent;    but  power,  wisdom, 

and  intelligence  can  exist  only  in  some  being, 
10 


218  MORAL   SCIENCE. 

and  that  being  which  possesses  them  must  be  a  per 
son.  The  Pantheist  will  allege  that  these  attri- 
butes belong  to  the  universe  itself,  and  therefore 
there  is  no  need  to  suppose  any  being  to  exist 
separate  from,  and  independent  of  the  world. 
All  these  phenomena  arising,  are  only  the  devel- 
opments of  this  one  substance,  in  which  the 
attributes  before  mentioned  have  their  seat. 

Before  we  receive  such  an  opinion,  let  us  in- 
quire what  constitutes  the  universe,  as  far  as  our 

knowledge  can  extend.  We  be- 
uJfJSZ*  °<>me  acquainted  with  the  world 

without  us  by  our  senses.  Trust- 
ing to  the  information  of  these  inlets  of  knowl- 
edge,  we  find  that  the  universe  consists,  as  far  as 
known  to  the  senses,  of  peculiar  objects,  com- 
bined together  in  various  ways.  These  material 
things,  though  subject  to  peculiar  laws,  appear 
entirely  destitute  of  intelligence.  In  this,  all 
men  agree.  The  light,  the  air,  the  water,  the 
rocks,  the  earth,  the  metals,  &c,  are  not  capable 
of  thought.  Indeed,  every  material  thing  with 
which  we  are  acquainted  consists  of  an  infinite 
number  of  parts,  even  when  of  the  same  kind, 


DIVINE   BEING.  219 

and  no  otherwise  related  to  each  other  than  that 
they  are  situated  near  to  each  other ;  whether  they 
are  at  all  in  contact,  we  do  not  know.  If  thought 
belonged  to  matter,  each  of  these  infinitesimal 
particles  of  matter  would  be  a  conscious  being, 
and  his  consciousness  be  independent  of  every 
other  particle.  By  what  medium  of  communi- 
cation could  these  particles  of  matter  agree  on 
forming  an  organized  body  ?  But  the  Panthe- 
ist does  not  believe  that  matter  is  endued  with 
thought.  His  theory  is,  that  in  the  world  there 
exists  not  only  external  substance,  but  thought 
or  intelligence  in  the  same  substance.  But  as 
this  intelligence  must  have  a  subject  in  which  it 
resides,  and  of  which  it  is  a  quality,  and  as  it 
cannot  be  an  attribute  of  brute  matter,  there  must 
exist  a  substance  distinct  from  matter,  of  which 
it  is  a  property.  Matter  being  divisible,  inert, 
and  extended,  cannot  have  intelligence  as  an  at- 
tribute, which  is  active,  indivisible,  and  unex- 
tended.  Extension,  and  thought,  therefore,  can- 
not be  properties  of  the  same  substance.  If  then 
the  cause  of  the  phenomena  of  nature  which  in- 
dicate design  is  in  the  world  itself,  the  world 


220  MORAL   SCIENCE. 

must,  besides  the  gross  matter  which  we  see  and 
feel,  be  possessed  of  a  soul,  or  spiritual  substance, 
in  which  this  intelligence  resides.  This  would 
bring  us  to  the  old  Pagan  theory  of  the  Soul  of 
the  World.  Under  the  material  part,  but  under 
this  only,  there  is  a  spiritual  substance,  a  soul ; 
just  as  in  a  man,  we  can  see  and  feel  the  body, 
but  we  know  that  within  this  case,  there  exists  a 
spiritual  substance  or  soul.  This  theory,  then, 
admits  the  existence  of  a  great  spirit,  possessing 
the  attributes  necessary  to  account  for  all  the  ap- 
pearances of  wisdom  in  the  world.  It  differs 
from  the  common  theistical  doctrine  only  in  this, 
that  it  would  confine  this  being  to  the  world ;  but 
for  this,  there  could  be  assigned  no  valid  reason. 
A  being  possessing  such  power  over  matter  as  to 
mould  it  into  every  organized  form  found  in  ani- 
mals, vegetables,  and  minerals,  must  have  a  com- 
plete control  over  matter,  and  be  perfectly  ac- 
quainted with  all  its  most  hidden  properties  and 
capabilities,  and  must  be  independent  of  matter, 
and  must  exist  every  where,  to  carry  on  the  pro- 
cesses of  nature.  And  as  we  do  not  know  the 
sxtent  of  the  material  universe,  we  can  set  no 


DIVINE   BEING.  221 

limits  to  the  presence  of  this  spiritual,  intelligent 
and  omnipotent  being.  The  object  of  Pantheism 
is  to  get  clear  of  the  idea  of  a  personal  God,  who 
gives  laws  to  creatures,  and  superintends  and 
governs  them  according  to  their  natures.  But 
the  hypothesis,  if  it  could  be  established,  does 
not  answer  the  purpose  for  which  it  was  devised. 
Still,  even  according  to  the  hypothesis,  we  must 
have  a  personal  God,  who  knows  all  things  and 
rules  over  all. 

The  only  other  atheistical  method  of  account- 
ing for  the  phenomena  of  the  world,  as  indicat- 
ing the  most  consummate  wisdom, 

,,  ,  .3.  Eternal    Bucces> 

as  well  as  the  most  omnipotent  Sion. 
power,  is  the  hypothesis,  that  the 
universe  in  its  present  form  has  existed  from 
eternity,  and  that  all  the  various  species  of  ani- 
mals and  vegetables  now  observed  have  always 
existed,  and  have  communicated  existence  to 
one  another  in  an  endless  series.  And  as  an 
eternal  series  has  no  beginning,  it  can  have  no 
cause.  There  is  therefore  no  need  of  supposing 
any  first  cause,  from  whom  every  thing  has  pro- 
ceeded.    As  we  must  suppose  some  being  to  ex- 


222  MDEAL   SCIENCE. 

ist  from  eternity,  we  may  as  well  suppose  that 
the  world  which  we  see  is  that  eternal  being. 

This  has  always  been  the  stronghold  of  athe 

ism,  and  therefore  deserves  a  more  special  atten 

tion.     The  only  reason,  however, 

Fortress  of  Athe- 
ism, which  gives  an  advantage  to  this 

theory  is,  that  it  carries  us  back  into  the  unfath- 
omable depths  of  eternity,  where  our  minds  are 
confounded  by  the  incomprehensibility  of  the 
subject.  It  is  also  to  be  regretted  that  some  truly 
great  men,  in  attempting  to  refute  this  theory, 
have  adopted  a  mode  of  reasoning  which  is  not 
satisfactory.  This,  we  think,  is  true  with  respect 
to  Bentley,  who  possessed  a  gigantic  intellect 
and,  as  might  have  been  expected,  many  are  his 
followers.  Dr.  Samuel  Clarke  has  also  pursued 
a  course  in  his  reasoning  on  this  point,  which, 
to  say  the  least,  is  not  entirely  free  from  objec- 
tion. The  same  may  be  said  of  many  others, 
and  especially  of  some  who  have  attempted 
mathematical  demonstration  of  the  falsehood  01 
an  infinite  series  of  living  organized  beings,  in- 
cluding the  celebrated  Stapfer. 

It  will  be  an  object,  therefore,  to  free  the 


DIVINE    BEING.  223 

subject  as  much  as  possible  from  intricacy  and 
obscurit}r,    and  to    present   argu- 

.  .   ,       -,,,-,       -,         ,   ,  Argument  against 

ments  winch  shall  be  level  to  any  eternal  series, 
common  capacity  accustomed  to 
attend  to  a  train  of  reasoning.  We  may  certain 
ly  assume  it  as  an  admitted  principle,  that  every 
effect  must  have  not  only  a  cause,  but  an  ade- 
quate cause.  If  wise  contrivance  and  evident 
adaptation  of  means  to  an  end  be  found  in  the 
effect,  to  ascribe  it  to  an  unintelligent  cause,  is 
as  unsatisfactory  as  to  assign  no  cause. 

This  then  being  assumed,  we  would  take 
this  position  as  incontrovertible,  that  if  de- 
sign manifest    in    one    effect    re- 

An       adequate 

quires   an   intelligent    cause,    the  cause  stni  mdispen- 

sable. 

same  necessity  requires  the  same 
kind  of  a  cause  for  any  number  of  similar  effects ; 
and  the  conclusion  must  be  the  same,  whether 
the  number  is  finite  or  infinite.  This  evident 
truth  has  been  often  and  happily  illustrated,  by 
supposing  a  chain  suspended  before  our  eyeSj 
but  reaching  beyond  the  sphere  of  our  vision. 
The  lowest  link  requires  a  support,  and  so  does 
the  second,  and  there  is  no  less  need  of  support 


224  MORAL.  SCIENCE. 

for  every  successive  link  as  you  ascend  the  chain  ; 
and  if  you  suppose  as  many  links  beyond  your 
sight,  as  there  are  atoms  in  the  universe,  still  the 
game  necessity  of  a  support  is  presumed  to  exist. 
There  must  ultimately  be  a  support  for  all  these 
suspended  links.  But  suppose  some  one  to 
allege  that  the  chain  is  of  infinite  length,  and 
has  no  beginning,  we  immediately 

No   relief  from 

making  series  of  ef-  begin  to  experience  some  confu- 

fects  infinite.  _  ^^ 

sion  of  ideas.  We  attempt  to 
grasp  infinity,  and  finding  ourselves  baffled  in 
the  attempt,  we  are  apt  to  lose  sight  of  the  pro- 
per logical  conclusion  in  this  case.  The  neces- 
sity of  a  supporting  power  has  no  dependence 
on  the  number  to  be  sustained.  If  one,  if  one 
hundred,  if  one  thousand  require  support,  so 
does  any  number  of  links.  The  conclusion  is 
not  in  the  smallest  degree  affected  by  th  e  number, 
except  that  the  more  links,  the  stronger  must 
be  the  supporting  power;  but  this  has  nothing  to 
do  with  our  present  argument.  The  conclusion 
will  be  of  the  same  kind,  and  will  as  necessarily 
follow,  in  the  case  of  effects  which  have  in  them 
the  marks  of  design.     The  number  cam  .ot  affect 


DIVINE   BEING.  225 

the  conclusion.  If  one  such  effect  cannot  exist 
without  an  intelligent  contriver,  an  infinite 
number  of  great  effects  cannot.  If  multiplying 
one  cipher,  or  zero,  by  any  number  in  arith- 
metic, produces  nothing,  and  the  same  is  the  re- 
sult of  multiplying  a  thousand  ciphers,  the  con- 
clusion is  inevitable,  that  an  infinite  number  of 
ciphers  multiplied  by  any  number  cannot  result 
in  any  positive  quantity.  Indeed,  if  all  the  indi- 
viduals in  the  supposed  infinite  series  are  of  the 
same  kind,  all  are  effects,  and  it  is  absurd  to 
conceive  of  an  effect  without  a  cause.  Cause 
and  effect  are  correlative  and  imply  each  other ; 
and  if  an  effect  cannot  exist  without  a  cause, 
much  less  can  an  infinite  number  of  effects  exist 
without  an  adequate  cause. 

My  next  argument  will  leave  out  of  view 
altogether    the    idea    of   infinity, 

,  .   ,  ,     j  D  t     .  1  Cause  must  be  ex- 

Which    IS    SO  apt    tO    COniOUnd.   the    isting  and  operativa 

mind.     It  is   this.     Every   effect 
must  not  only  have  a  cause,  but  that  cause  must 
be  in  existence  and  operation ;  for  it  would  be 
absurd  to  think  of  a  cause  operating;  wljsn  H  ro 

10* 


226  MORAL   SCIENCE. 

longer  had  an  active  existence.  Let  us  then  take 
that  individual  of  a  series  of  organized  beings 
which  came  last  into  existence.  Let  it  be  an 
animal — a  dog  or  horse.  This  individual  we 
know  came  recently  into  being ;  when  produced 
there  must  have  been  an  adequate  cause  in  ex 
istence  and  in  operation.  What  was  that  cause  ? 
The  hypothesis  confines  us  to  the  preceding  se- 
ries of  animals  of  the  same  species,  supposed  to 
have  come  down  in  uninterrupted  succession 
from  eternity.  But  whether  the  series  be  long 
or  short,  finite  or  infinite,  is  of  no  consequence 
as  it  relates  to  our  present  argument.  What  we 
are  inquiring  after  is  a  cause  in  existence  at  the 
time  this  curiously  organized  and  animated  be- 
ing came  into  existence.  Now  at  that  time,  the 
individuals  of  the  series  had  all  ceased  to  exist, 
except  the  immediate  progenitors.  Whatever 
cause  existed,  cannot  therefore  be  looked  for  in 
them ;  and  if  the  effect  is  such  as  manifestly  to 
be  beyond  any  power  and  skill  which  they  pos- 
sessed, the  jontriving  and  efficient  cause  cannot 
Le  louud  m  lue  series.  There  must  be  a  higher 
cause. 


DIVINE   BEING.  227 

But  lest  some  persons  should  have  a  vagu? 
lotion  that  some  hidden  power  might  be  com- 
municated through  the  series,  al- 

.  The  whole  power 

though  not  found  m  the  progeni-  ofthe  cause  must  be 

.  '  carried  through  the 

tors  of  the  animal  under  consider-  Mries.  . 

ation,  I  will  lay  down  a  princi-  « 
pie  which  is  admitted  in  mechanical  powers,  and 
is  equally  applicable  to  all  causes.  It  is  this. 
In  all  cases  where  any  power  is  communicated 
through  a  series  of  individuals,  the  whole  power 
necessary  to  produce  the  effect,  must  not  only 
be  communicated  to  the  first,  but  to  every  single 
thing  in  the  series,  until  it  reach  the  last,  which 
is  intended  to  be  affected  by  the  original  power. 
Thus,  suppose  it  to  be  required  to  communicate 
motion  to  a  ball  in  a  plane,  by  sending  an  im- 
pulse through  a  hundred  balls,  the  principle 
known  to  all  mechanicians  is,  that  the  force  ne- 
cessary to  give  the  desired  motion  must  be  com- 
municated to  the  first,  and  from  the  first  to  the 
second,  and  so  on,  until  it  reaches  the  ball  in- 
tended to  be  moved.  And  this  principle  is 
equally  applicable  to  all  causes  which  operate 
through  a  succession  of  particulars.     If  at  the 


228  MOKAL   SCIENCE. 

commencement  of  a  series,   an  intelligent  cause 

•  operated,  and  then  ceased,  or  stopped  short  of 
the  last  effect,  no  sign  of  intelligence  could  exist 
in  this,  which  brings  us  back  to  the  same  obvious 
principle  with  which  we.  commenced,-  viz.,  that 
when  anj  effect  is  produced,  an  adequate  cause 

►  must  exist,  and  be  in  operation  at  the  time  of 
its  production.  The  simple  inquiry  then,  is,  had 
the  progenitors  of  this  dog,  or  horse,  when  the 
animal  came  into  existence  and  became  ani- 
mated, the  skill  necessary  to  continue  the  ani- 
■  mal  frame,  with  all  its  furiously  contrived  parts, 
and  power  and  skill  to  give  to  this  individual 
that  constitution  of  instincts,  appetites,  and  pas- 
^ions,  suited  to  its  condition  in  the  world,  which 
•it  possesses.  I  leave  the  atheist  to  answer  this 
question?    The  same  course  of  reasoning  will  be 

•  equally  forcible  as  applied  to  fruits  and  vegeta- 
bles. Every  one  of  these  organized  beings  fur- 
nishes an  irrefragable  argument  for  the  being  of 
a  God ;  for  in  any  one  of  these  is  evidence  of 
the  existence  of  a  wisdom  and  power  which  cer- 
tainly do  not  exist  in  the  several  particulars  of 
which  the  series  consists. 


DIVINE   BEING.  229 

The  only  modern  attempt  to  invalidate  the 
argument  for  the  being  of  God  founded  on  the 
appearance  of  design  in  the  uni- 
verse,  is  that  of  Mr.  Hume,  which  ^  ^ 
is  substantially  this,  that  this  argu- 
ment supposes  that  we  have  seen* similar  work? 
performed,  from  which,  by  analogy,  we  conclude 
that  an  intelligent  cause  is  necessary  to  account 
for  them ;  as  if  we  find  a  watch  we  believe  it  to 
have  been  made  by  an  artist,  because  we  have 
before  observed  such  works  made  by  skilful 
men;  but  in  relation  to  the  world,  it  is*a  singu- 
lar work,  entirely  unique.  We  have  never  seen 
any  world  produced,  and,  therefore,  the  reason- 
ing which  would  hold  in  regard  to  the  conclu- 
sion that  the  watch  was  made  by  an  artist  doe& 
not  apply. 

More  importance  has  been  given  to*  this  o 
jection,  especially  by  Dr.  Chalmers,  than  it  de- 
serves.     The  objection  of  Hume 
is  a  mere  sophism,  and  can  unset-  Bepi.7 

tie   no   mind   which  understands 
the  nature  of  the  argument  in  'question.     Ac 
cording  to  Mr.  Hume's  argument  we  could  not 


230  MOEAL  SCIENCE. 

infer  from  any  work  of  art  that  it  had  an  intelli- 
gent author,  unless  we  had  seen  a  work  of  the 
very  same  ^:ind  by  an  artist.  Suppose  a  boy 
who  has  never  been  away  from  his  father's  farm, 
where  he  has  seen  nothing  superior  to  ploughs, 
carts,  and  harrows,  to  be  conducted  to  a  seaport, 
and  to  see  a  steam-frigate.  As  he  has  never 
seen  on  the  farm  any  thing  formed  like  this, 
according  to  Mr.  Hume,  he  could  not  infer  that 
this  stupendous  work  was  produced  by  an  intel- 
ligent cause.  To  the  boy  it  would  be  a  singu- 
lar effeel,  the  like  of  which  he  had  never  wit- 
nessed, and,  therefore,  he  could  infer  nothing 
respecting  it.  Now  every  child  knows  better 
than  this.  Any  boy  of  common  sense  will  con- 
clude in  a  moment  that  this  steam  engine  must 
have  been  the  work  of  a  skilful  artificer. 

In  order  to  apply  the  argument  from  design, 

it  is  not  at  all  necessary  that  we  should  have 

seen  an  artist  engaged  in  produ- 

*^S£.not  a  ciD§  its  like-     A11  that  is  necessary 
is,  that  there  should  immediately 
appear  an  adaptation  of  means  to  produce  a  cer- 
tain end  :  and  it  matters  not  as  to  the  argument 


DIVINE    BEING.  231 

whether  we  ever  conceived  of  a  similar  work,  or 
knew  any  thing  of  the  artist,  the  certain  appear- 
ance of  design,  or  a  skilful  adaptation  of  means 
to  an  end  is  always  sufficient  to  produce  the  cer 
tain  conclusion  that  there  has  been  a  designing 
cause  at  work.  The  works  of  nature  are  not 
a  singular  effect,  as  far  as  the  argument  a  poste 
riori  is  concerned.  The  adaptation  of  means  to 
an  end  in  these  is  similar  to  the  works  of  design 
among  men.  The  difference  between  a  telescope 
and  the  eye  of  an  animal  is  not  so  great  as  be- 
tween a  plough  and  a  steam  engine.  If  there 
was  any  difference  between  the  inference  from 
seeing  a  steam-frigate  or  a  complicated  spinning 
engine,  which  have  never  been  seen  before,  and 
another  plough  or  cart,  it  would  be  in  favour  of 
the  contrivance  not  before  witnessed.  The  ar- 
gument seems  to  be  a  fortiori  in  this  case.  An3 
as  the  whole  argument  in  regard  to  the  work4 
of  man  is  founded  simply  on  observing  an  adap- 
tation of  means  to  accomplish  an  end,  and  not 
the  adaptation  to  produce  some  particular  end 
which  we  had  before  seen  effected  by  similar 


232  MORAL   SCIENCE. 

means ;  and  as  the  adaptation  of  means  to  an 
end  is  as  evident  in  the  works  of  nature  as  in 
the  works  of  man,  the  argument  \s  as  conclusive 
in  one  case  as  in  the  othe^ 


CHAPTER  XXIX. 

THE  PHENOMENA  OF  THE  UNIVERSE. 

Let  us  now  suppose  that  a  Great  Intelligent 
First  Cause  exists,  and  has  existed      ,      .    .„ 

Accords  with  phe- 

from  eternity ;  are  not  all  the  ap-  nomena- 
pearances  of  the  universe  correspondent  with  the 
existence  of  such  a  being  ? 

Again  we  may  demand  of  an  Atheist  what 
other  evidences  of  the  existence  of  God  he  would 
require.      Let  him  suggest  some- 
thing, which,  in  the  form  of  evi-       Unre™We  to 

o'  '  ask  more  evidence. 

dence,  would 'be  more  satisfactory 
to  him,  and  he  will  not  find  it  easy  to  fix  on 
any  evidence  which  is  stronger  or  more  suitable 
than  what  we  already  possess. 

It    may   appear    strange   to   some    that  we 
challenge  the  Atheist  to  demand  any  clearer  or 


234 


MORAL   SCIENCE. 


stronger  evidence  of  the  existence  of  a  Supreme 

Being-  than  that  which  is  alreadv 

Atheist chaiieng-  before  us.     But  let  the  attempt  be 

ed  to  propose  any 

'tronger.  made  to  conceive  of  some  evidence 

of  this  truth  which  would  be  more 
satisfactory,  and  better  adapted  to  be  a  standing 
proof  to  all  nations,  and  we  have  mistaken  the 
matter,  if  the  result  will  not  be  that  the  existing 
evidence  is  as  good  as  any  which  they  could  ask. 
It  will  be  worth  while  to  spend  a  little  time 
in  considering  this  point,  for  if  we  cannot  satisfy 
the  Atheist  of  the  truth  of  our  position,  the  dis- 
cussion may  be  satisfactory  to  others  who  have 
not  been  accustomed  to  view  the  subject  in  this 
light. 

It  is  true  we  do  not  see  God,  and  the  reason 
is,  he  is  a  spirit ;  and  a  spirit,  from  the  very  na- 
ture of  the  case,  is  invisible.     We 
visibility  of  God  cannot  gee  tte  souls  of  our  nearest 

not  requisite. 

friends  ;  we  know  that  they  exist, 
not  by  any  direct  perception  of  the  intelligent 
substance,  but  by  the  actions  which  they  perform 
through  the  instrumentality  of  the  body.  If 
God  were  not  a  spirit  he  could  not  be  an  active, 


PHENOMENA  OF   XjNIVERSE.  235 

intelligent,  powerful,  and  perfect  being ;  but  be- 
ing a  spirit  lie  must  be  invisible.  Nothing  is 
visible  but  material  substances,  and  these  only 
by  means  of  light  reflected  from  them  to  tho 

eye. 

It  is  not  forgotten  that  most  Atheists,  being 
materialists,  deny  that  there  is  any  such  sub- 
stance as  spirit;  but  they  do  not 
and    cannot    deny  that  there  is      invisible  exist- 

ences  are   believed 

something  within  us  which  thinks  in- 
and  feels  and  wills,  and  has  power 
to  originate  bodily  motion.  Call  the  substance, 
of  which  thought  is  a  property,  by  what  name 
you  please,  still  it  is  an  invisible  substance. 
Who  can  pretend  to  see  a  thought  or  a  volition  ? 
or  who  would  say  that  he  can  see  the  mind, 
and  describe  its  shape  and  give  its  magnitude 
and  dimensions  ?  Let  it  be  supposed  then  that 
the  cause  of  all  intelligence  has  a  nature  resem- 
bling this  intelligent  nature  of  which  we  are 
every  moment  conscious,  but  far  more  excellent, 
as  it  must  be  supposed  that  every  excellence  ex- 
ists in  a  higher  degree  in  the  cause  than  in  tho 
effect. 


236  MOEAL  SCIENCE. 

Now  supposing  such  an  intelligent  being  to 

exist,  call  him  spiritual  or  material,  only  let  him 

be  a  being  of  thought,  will,  and 

in  no  way  could  passion ;  and  that  he  is  necessari- 

spiritual  Being  be 

better  revealed.  \j  from  his  nature  invisible  to 
eyes  of  flesh ;  the  question  is,  how 
could  such  a  being  make  himself  known  to  ra- 
tional minds  such  as  ours.  As  we  cannot  by 
any  direct  perception  look  into  the  mind  of 
another,  and  as  such  a  being  cannot  make  him- 
self visible  without  assuming  a  gross  body,  we 
can  conceive  of  no  way  by  which  he  can  make 
himself  known  but  by  performing  some  act,  or 
exhibiting  to  us  some  work  which  shall  con- 
tain the  impress  of  his  character.  For  if  he 
should  assume  a  bodily  shape,  and  thus  make 
himself  visible,  it  would  not  be  the  intelligent 
substance  which  we  perceived,  but  a  body,  which 
was  no  part  of  his  essence.  If  an  intelligent 
creature  could  be  so  situated  in  the  universe  as 
to  have  no  opportunity  of  contemplating  any 
work  of  God,  such  a  creature 'could  never  arrive 
at  the  knowledge  of  his  existence.  But  the  sup- 
position is  impossible ;  for  an  intelligent  creature 


PHENOMENA   OF   UNIVERSE.  237 

could  not  exist  without  the  consciousness  of  its 
own  thoughts  ;  and  in  the  miud  itself,  even  if  it 
were  cut  off  from  all  perception  of  material 
things,  there  is  sufficient  proof  of  an  efficient,  in- 
telligent cause.  The  impress  of  the  divine  at- 
tributes is  as  clearly  printed  on  the  soul  as 
on  any  of  the  works  of  God  to  wdrich  man  has 
access. 

As  the  First  Cause,  if  there  is  one,  must  be 
from  his  nature  invisible,  the  only  way  by  which 
he    can    be    conceived   to   make 

The  First  Cause 

known  his  existence,  is  by  setting    kn("vn    b^     hia 

J  works. 

before  us  some  work,  in  which  his 
wisdom,  power,  and  goodness  may  be  manifested  ; 
and  by  the  contemplation  of  which  a  rational 
mind  may  infer,  that  a  being  does  exist,  to  whom 
these  properties  belong.  If  then  in  the  various 
objects  in  the  world,  there  is  as  much  evidence 
of  these  attributes  as  we  can  conceive,  and  in 
fact  far  exceeding  our  most  enlarged  conceptions, 
we  have  the  best  proof  of  the  existence  of.  a 
Great  First  Cause,  which  we  couldhave.  The 
simple  question  then  is,  could  there  be  exhibited 
stronger  evidences  of  wisdom  than  we  have  in 


238  MORAL   SCIENCE, 

the  structure  of  the  body  of  man,  ami  in  the 
constitution  of  his  mind?  Could  the  various 
species  of  animals  in  the  earth,  air,  and  sea,  be 
formed  with  more  consummate  wisdom  than 
they  are,  in  relation  to  the  climate  in  which  they 
live,  and  the  provision  made  internally  and  ex 
ternally  for  their  subsistence,  and  the  propaga 
tion  of  their  kind.  Examine  also  the  vegetable 
world.  Call  in  the  aid  of  glasses  to  inspect  the 
concealed  structure  of  the  vessels ;  contemplate 
the  leaf,  the  flower,  and  the  mature  fruit,  and 
say  whether  you  can  conceive  of  contrivances 
more  exquisite.  If  any  man  thinks  that  animal 
and  vegetable  bodies  could  have  been  construct- 
ed with  more  wisdom,  let  him  point  out  in  what 
respects  these  works  of  nature  are  deficient  in 
wisdom.  But  even  if  it  were  possible  to  con- 
ceive of  more  perfect  works,  this  could  not  in 
the  least  invalidate  the  argument  from  them,  for 
he  existence  of  an  intelligent  cause.  If  the 
question  were  of  the  degree  of  perfection  in  the 
wisdom  exhibited,  then  the  skill  manifested  in 
each  work  would  be  a  proper  subject  for  con- 
sideration.    An  imperfect  time-piece  proves  the 


PHENOMENA   OF    UNIVERSE.  239 

existence  of  an  artist  as  fully  as  one  that  is  per- 
fect. 

But  there  is  here  no  need  of  this  remark,  foi 
the  Atheist  may  be  defied  to  conceive  of  any 
improvement  in  any  of  the  works 

This    manifesto 

of  God,  in  regard  to  the   adapta-  tation  needs  no  a 

mendment 

tion  of  the  means  used  to  the  end 
to  be  accomplished ;  and  these  evidences  of  the 
wisdom  of  God  are  scattered  profusely  over  the 
whole  universe.  We  cannot  turn  our  eyes  to 
the  heaven  or  the  eartb,  to  objects  of  great  mag- 
nitude, or  so  small  that  they  can  be  seen  only  by 
the  microscope,  but  the  same  admirable  perfec- 
tion of  contrivance  is  manifest  in  them  all.  The 
internal  structure  of  the  gnat  is  as  wonderful  as 
that  of  the  elephant ;  and  in  the  manifestation  of 
wisdom  in  the  creation  there  is  a  wonderful  va- 
riety. No  two  species  are  exactly  alike;  and 
the  difference  is  exactly  such  as  it  should  be 
to  accomplish  the  special  end  in  view.  The 
more  intricate  our  examination  of  the  contri- 
vance and  evident  design  in  the  organization  of 
animal  and  vegetable  bodies,  the  stronger  will 


240  MORAL   SCIENCE. 

be  our  conviction,  and  the  greater   our   admi- 
ration. 

The  only  question  then  is,  could  the  evi- 
dences of  intelligence  in  the  cause,  if  thus  innu- 
merable, be  exhibited  in  a  clearer 
manifested  °  >  and  stronger  light  than  they  are  ; 
if  not,  then  God  could  not  make 
known  his  existence  as  an  intelligent  being  more 
clearly  than  he  has  done.  The  number  of  in- 
stances in  which  design  appears,  is  far  greater 
than  can  be  examined,  and  the  degree  of  wis- 
dom in  the  various  contrivances  in  organized 
bodies,  transcends  our  conception ;  how,  there- 
fore, could  we  have  by  new  works,  greater  evi- 
dence of  an  intelligent  cause,  than  we  already 
possess? 

But  there  seems  in  most  minds  a  lurking 

suspicion,  that  the  existing  evidence  is  not  as 

convincing  as  it  might  have  been. 

Tho      evidence 

need  not  be  as  great  Even  if  this   were   so,   we  have 

as  possible.  . 

no  right  to  complain,  when  it 
cannot  be  denied  that  we  have  very  strong 
evidence.  God  is  not  obliged  to  give  to  his 
creatures  the  strongest  possible  evidence  of  his 


PHENOMENA  OF    UNIVERSE.  241 

own  existence.  He  may  choose  to  leave  scope 
for  human  industry,  and  also  make  the  recep- 
tion of  the  truth  a  part  of  our  moral  proba- 
tion ;  and  the  pleasure  of  discovering  truth  after 
laborious  research,  a  part  of  the  reward  of  vir- 
tue. No  doubt  this  is  the  fact  in  regard  to  some 
truths  of  no  small  importance.  The  honest 
inquirer  discovers  them,  while  the  proud  and 
prejudiced  mind,  though  more  acute,  misses 
them,  and  embraces  in  their  stead  dangerous 
error.  In  maintaining,  therefore,  that  the  evi- 
dence for  the  being  of  God  is  as  convincing  as  it 
could  be  to  an  impartial,  rational  mind,  it  is  not 
because  such  clearness  is  considered  essential; 
but  simply  because  the  fact  appears  to  be  as 
stated. 

But  since  many  may  still  sup- 

Can      stronger 

pose  that  they  can  imagine  much  pr0of  be  proposer- 
stronger  proof  than  any  which  ex- 
ists, let  us  consider  what  can  be  alleged  in  favour 
of  this  opinion. 

Could  not  God  speak  to  us  in  a  voice  of 
thunder,  and  thus  make  himself  known  ?     Un 
doubtedly  he  could;  and  such  a  voice  would 


242  MORAL   SCIENCE 

doubtless  greatly  terrify  us;  but  would  it  be  a 
stronger  proof  of  his  wisdom  and 

Supposition    of  ,  ,  ip, 

address  to  the  ear.  power  than  the  works  of  nature, 
which  we  behold?  If  this  tremen- 
dous sound  were  heard  very  often,  it  would  at 
length  become  familiar,  and  would  cease  to  pro- 
duce the  same  impression  as  at  first.  If  heard 
but  seldom,  it  would  leave  a  suspicion  that  it 
might  have  been  no  more  than  a  disordered 
imagination.  But  how  could  we  be  sure  that 
the  voice  proceeded  from  a  being  who  would 
not  deceive  ?  The  mere  hearing  the  noise 
could  give  us  no  certain  evidence  of  the  charac- 
ter and  veracity  of  the  speaker  ? 

But  perhaps  it  may  be  thought  that  a  glo- 
rious visible  appearance  would  place  the  matter 
beyond   all   possibility  of  doubt. 

A   visible  glory     „,  .        .  „  ,. 

not  convincing.  The  majestic  appearance  of  a  di 
vine  person,  would,  it  may  be  ai 
leged,  satisfy  every  one.  The  same  objections 
may  be  made  to  this  species  of  evidence,  as  to 
the  former;  how  could  we  know  that  this  vi- 
sible appearance  was  that  of  the  Great  First 
Cause?     Unnatural  appearances  prove  nothing 


PHENOMENA   OF   UNIVERSE.  248 

respecting  the  character  of  the  person  who 
assumes  them;  if  such  apparitions  were  only 
occasionally  exhibited,  we  should  be  prone  to 
doubt  of  their  reality;  and  if  frequent,  we 
should  become  too  much  accustomed  to  them 
to  receive  any  impression.  But  whatever  im- 
pression such  appearances  might  make,  consid- 
ered as  evidence  of  an  all-perfect  Deity,  they 
would  not  be  comparable  to  that  which  we  have 
in  the  works  of  nature. 

But  if  the  Supreme  Being  exists,  why  could 
he  not  make  himself  known  by  working  stupen- 
dous miracles  ?     Of  course,  if  mi- 

MiracJes. 

racles  might  be  demanded  by  one, 
all  have  the  same  need ;  and  the  same  claims 
and  miracles  would  become  so  common,  that  it 
would  be  difficult  to  distinguish  them  from  na- 
tural events.  And  again,  miracles  require  no 
more  power  to  produce  them  than  is  required  to 
produce  common  events.  In  many  cases  they 
would  require  no  more  than  a  cessation  of  the 
power  by  which  natural  events  are  produced. 
The  standing  still  of  the  sun,  or  the  stopping  of 
the  rctation  of  the  earth,  would  be  notning  else 


244.  MORAL   SCIENCE. 

than  removing  the  impulse  by  which  they  were 
originally  put  in  motion. 

In  a  miracle,  we  only  see  the  effect  of  divine 

power.     We  may  infer  from  this,  that  there  is  a 

Being  who  can  change  the  laws  01 

Are     effects     of  -.  -1,11 

p^er  nature;  and  a  miracle   taken  by 

itself  can  prove  nothing  more. 
But  in  the  -works  of  nature,  we  have  innumera- 
ble proofs  of  the  wisdom  and  beneficence  of  the 
Author  of  the  Universe.  And  the  number,  va- 
riety, and  wisdom  of  these  works  are  evident  to 
every  person  of  common  sense.  The  proofs  of 
a  great  intelligent  cause  are  spread  out,  over  the 
heavens  and  the  earth,  the  sea,  and  the  air.  We 
are  little  affected  by  these  objects,  because  they 
have  ever  been  before  our  eyes  since  our  earliest 
infancy.  But  as  evidences  of  a  Divine  exist- 
ence their  force  is  not  diminished  by  the  uni- 
formity of  the  laws  of  nature,  by  which  they  are 
continually  produced,  but  greatly  increased. 
The  different  species  of  animals  and  vegetables 
have  successively  been  reproduced,  according 
to  laws  that  never  vary ;  and  this  shows  that  the 
plan  of  the  Almighty  is  perfect,  and  that  He 


PHENOMENA   OF   UNIVERSE.  245 

can  accomplish  all  liis  pleasure,  and  lias  given 
uniform  laws  to  every  kind  of  being  which  his 
wisdom  and  power  have  produced. 

It  is  not  denied  that  miraculous  displays  are 
a  decisive  proof  of  a  Great  First  Cause,  who  is 
possessed    of    omnipotence ;     but 
what  we  maintain  is,  that  the  evi-    nat/f  nothtasto 

proof  of  power. 

dence  of  omnipotence  is  not  greater 
than  in  the  natural  effects  which  are  constantly 
produced  before  our  eyes.  And  as  to  the  cha- 
racter and  attributes  of  God,  they  are  far  more 
clearly  exhibited  in  the  various  productions  of 
nature,  than  they  would  be  by  a  miraculous 
interposition.  If  another  sun  were  placed  in  the 
heavens,  which  is  as  great  a  miracle  as  we 
can  imagine,  it  would  be  a  proof  of  mighty 
power,  but  not  a  stronger  proof  than  the  ex- 
istence of  the  natural  sun ;  and  as  t3  the  wisdom 
and  goodness  of  the  Deity,  there  would  be  no 
comparison,  for  in  the  former  case,  nothing  but 
the  existence  of  Omnipotence  could  be  inferred 
from  the  miracle,  for  there  would  be  no  appear- 
ance of  wisdom  in  such  a  miracle.  But  in  the 
existence  of  the  natural  sun,  which  gives  light, 


246  MORAL   SCIENCE. 

heat,  motion,  and  life  to  all  earthly  liv  iug  things, 
the  wisdom  and  goodness  of  the  Creator  are  most 
illustriously  displayed.  Who  can  enumerate 
the  benefits  which  are  derived  from  the  influ 
ence  of  the  sun  ?  and  the  same  sun,  which  com- 
municates so  many  blessings  to  our  world, 
dispenses  blessings  in  the  same  way  to  other 
planets. 

If  we  saw  the  dead  raised  in  a  thousand  in- 
stances, it  would  be  a  decisive  evidence  of  the 
existence  of  a  Being  of  almighty 

Kesultofthe  ar-  ,      ,      ,  .  ,  „  ., 

gument  power ;  but  the  evidence  is  fully 

as  strong  from  the  formation  and 
vivification  of  innumerable  animal  bodies  of 
many  species.  And  no  miracle  can  be  conceived, 
which  would  furnish  stronger  evidence  of  the 
Divine  existence,  than  the  works  of  creation 
which  are  ever  before  our  eyes  and  our  minds. 
I  think,  after  what  has  been  said,  that  we  cannot 
wish  for  more  convincing  evidence  of  the  exist- 
ence of  a  Supreme  Being,  than  we  already  pos- 
sess in  the  works  of  nature  spread  out  before  us  ; 
and  even  if  we  were  shut  up  in  a  dark  dungeon, 
we  have  this  convincing  evidence  in  our  own 


PHENOMENA   OF   UNIVERSE.  24? 

persons,  in  the  constitution  of  both  our  souls 
and  bodies. 

The  only  thing  which  can  be  alleged  further 
is,  that  this  might  have  been  made  a  self-evident 
.truth  as  much  as  our  own  exists 
ence,  or  the  existence  of  the  world  JJ^S"*  " 
without  us ;  and  many  formerly 
entertained  that  opinion  that  the  idea  of  God 
is  innate,  and  that  a  speculative  Atheist  is  a 
thing  impossible.  Some  very  learned  and  re- 
spectable philosophers  and  theologians  have  ex- 
pressly inculcated  this  opinion  in  their  writings. 
Now,  although  we  do  not  believe  there  are  any 
innate  ideas,  and  although  the  existencW»f  God 
can  scarcely  be  said  to  be  self-evident,  yet  in  the 
proof  of  it,  there  is  but  a  single  step  of  reason- 
ing. It  is  a  self-evident  truth  that  every  effect 
must  have  an  adequate  cause ;  and  when  there 
is  evident  design  in  the  effect,  the  cause  must  be 
intelligent.  The  conclusion  is  so  easily  drawn 
from  an  intuitive  truth,  that  it  is  not  wonderful 
that  it  should  be  classed  among  self-evident 
truths.  "We  can  scarcely  conceive  of  the  state 
of  that  mind  which  after  seriously  contemplating 


248  MOEAL  SCIENCE. 

the  wonderful  evidences  of  design  in  the  human 
frame,  can  doubt  the  existence  of  an  intelligent 
First  Cause,  and  an  intelligent  cause  producing 
effects  by  a  wise  adaptation  of  means  to  a  defi- 
nite end,  and  the  harmonious  operation  of  thou- 
sands of  parts  in  the  vital  functions  must,  ac- 
cording to  every  proper  definition  of  the  term, 
be  a  person. 

All  the  arguments  by  which  the  being  of 
God  is  proved,  involve  the  proof  of  some  of  his 

attributes.  If  the  marks  of  design 
Attributes  of  God.    in  creatures  prove   the   existence 

of  a  Creator,  it  is  by  showing  that 
he  must  be  possessed  of  wisdom  to  cause  so 
many  wonderful  contrivances  as  we  behold  in 
the  world.  As  the  operation  of  any  cause  is  the 
exertion  of  power,  so  the  creation  of  the  world 
is  the  action  of  omnipotence.  A  greater  power 
than  that  which  brings  something  out  of  nothing 
cannot  be  conceived :  this  indeed  we  cannot 
comprehend,  and,  therefore,  some  who  admit 
that  the  world  is  the  work  of  God,  as  far  as  re- 
lates to  the  organization  and  moulding  of  mat- 
ter, }ret  cannot  be  persuaded  that  omnipotence 


PHENOMENA   OF    UNIVERSE.  249 

itself  can  give  existence  where  there  was  uone 
before.  But  if  God  did  not  create  the  mattei 
that  is  in  the  world,  whence  came  it  ?  There 
are  but  two  suppositions ;  one  is,  that  mattei 
existed  from  eternity,  and  is,  therefore,  self-ex 
istent  and  independent ;  the  other,  that  it  is  an 
emanation  of  the  divine  essence.  The  first  is 
inadmissible ;  it  supposes  two  eternal  beings 
independent  of  each  other,  and  the  latter  leads 
to  pantheism,  or  that  all  things  are  a  part  of 
God ;  as  whatever  emanates  from  him  must  be 
a  part  of  his  essence,  for  this  is  immutably  the 
same.  Though  wisdom  and  power  are  the  attri- 
butes which  are  first  observed,  they  are  not  the 
only  attributes  of  which  we  may  learn  some- 
thing by  studying  the  works  of  nature.  For 
when  we  attentively  consider  the  nature  of  the 
end,  to  accomplish  which  the  innumerable  con 
trivances  are  adapted,  we  cannot  but  observe 
that  this  end  is  beneficent.  All  the  parts  of  ani- 
mals are  connected  with  the  vitality,  enjoyment, 
and  preservation,  of  the  animal  or  species.  The 
goodness  of  God  is  therefore  as  manifest  in  the 
creation,  as  his  wisdom.     There  is  not  a  part  in 


250  MORAL  SCIENCE. 

any  animal  body  which  can  be  shown  to  be 
without  its  use.  Every  species  is  fitted,  by  the 
bodily  structure,  and  by  the  instincts  and  pas- 
sions with  which  it  is  endued,  to  enjoy  in  th 
most  perfect  degree  that  kind  of  life  to  which 
it  is  destined.  Even  the  minutest  animal- 
cules have  bodies  organized  with  as  exquisite 
skill  as  those  of  the  larger  species.  No  living 
creature  exists  for  which  food  is  not  provided; 
suited  to  the  appetite  and  nourishment  of  the 
species,  and  which  it  has  the  means  of  pro- 
curing.. So  every  species  is  endowed  with  the 
instinctive  ability  to  provide  for  itself  and  its 
progeny  suitable  places  of  residence  ;  and  there 
are  insects  which,  though  they  undergo  a  re- 
markable metamorphosis  and  change  of  appe- 
tites, are  still  able  by  their  instinct  to  find  the 
nourishment  which  is  agreeable  and  necessary. 
And  what  is  still  more  wonderful  and  indica 
fcive  of  far-seeing  wisdom  in  the  Creator  is  the 
fact,  that  these  insects  which  were  once  in  the 
chrysalis  state,  and  afterwards  assume  the  form 
and  instincts  of  butterflies,  are  led  by  an  invari- 
able propensity  to  deposit  their  eggs  on  plants 


PHENOMENA    DF    UNIVERSE'.  251 

necessary  for  the  young  grubs,  but  on  which 
they  themselves  never  feed.  Were  it  not  for 
this  wise  provision  for  the  young,  they  would  all 
perish.  Between  the  animal  and  vegetable 
world  there  is  a  beautiful  harmony ;  the  latter 
to  a  large  extent  supplies  food  for  the  former.  It 
may  be  thought  that  the  constitution  of  things 
by  which  one  animal  preys  upon  another,  is  an 
argument  against  the  goodness  of  God ;  but 
these  animals  are  only  intended  for  a  transitory 
existence,  and  as  they  all  must  die,  and  are 
tormented  with  no  apprehensions  in  regard  to 
the  future,  and  the  pain  indeed  is  momentary,  if 
they  enjoy  much  more  pleasure  than  pain  dur- 
ing their  existence,  there  seems  to  be  no  solid 
objection  against  this  law  of  nature. 

It  has  often  been  alleged  as  an  atheistical 
objection  against  the  goodness,  and  by  conse- 
quence, against  the  existence  of 
God,  that  pain  or  misery  has  a  J^M? 
place  among  his  works.  This  per- 
haps is  the  most  plausible  of  all  objections  which 
infidels  have  ever  produced ;  and  yet  it  has  no 
certain   principles  on  which  to  rest.     With   a 


252  MORAL   SCIENCE. 

system  such  as  the  present,  where  there  is  a  gTa 
elation  of  sensitive  beings,  it  is  impossible  for  us 
to  conceive  how  all  pain  could  be  excluded.  As 
far  as  we  can  see,  the  susceptibility  of  pleasure 
carries  with  it  a  liableness  to  some  degree  of 
pain.  What  if  the  pain  which  animals  endure 
arise  out  of  the  principle  of  self-preservation,  and 
from  the  appetites,  in  the  gratification  of  which 
consists  their  enjoyment?  Without  desire  and 
appetite  there  could  be  no  animal  enjoyment, 
and  when  the  safety  of  the  animal  requires  it,  it 
is  wisely  ordered  that  by  uneasiness  or  pain  it 
should  be  stimulated  to  seek  its  necessary  food, 
or  flee  from  danger. 

And  as  to  man,  while  in  the  present  world 
we  cannot  conceive  how  he  could  have  any  en- 
joyment, unless  he  was  also  sub- 

huierace. °f  the  Ject  to  suc]l  feelings  of  uneasiness 
as  rendered  him  capable  of  relish- 
ing his  enjoyments.  This  remark  relates  to 
pains  which  cannot  be  avoided,  such  as  the  pain 
of  hunger  and  thirst,  and  the  pain  arising  from 
contact  with  some  injurious  body.  The  surface 
of  man's  body  is  the  chief  seat  of  pain,  because 


PHENOMENA   OF    UNIVERSE.  2o3 

danger  commonly  approaches  him  from  without 
It  does  not  appear,  therefore,  possible  tnat  such 
a  system  of  creatures  as  exist  in  the  world  could 
be  constituted  so  as  to  be  exempt  from  all  un 
easy  feelings.  To  make  creatures  whose  consti- 
tution would  exempt  them  from  all  liableness  to 
pain,  would,  as  far  as  we  can  see,  exempt  them 
from  all  susceptibility  to  pleasure.  And  as  to 
those  evils  which  men  bring  upon  themselves 
by  imprudence,  intemperance,  injustice,  or  bj 
disobeying  the  voice  of  conscience  within  them 
they  must  be  attributed  to  themselves  and  not  tc 
the  constitution  of  the  Avorld.  And  as  God  is  not 
obliged  to  make  every  creature  as  great  and  as 
happy  as  it  could  be  made,  it  may  seem  to  ex- 
hibit his  wisdom  and  power  to  produce  beings 
in  whose  existence  there  is  a  mixture  of  natural 
good  and  evil. 

It  appears  clear,  then,  that  the  Author  of  this 
universe  is  powerful,  Avise,  and  beneficent;  but 
how  does  it  appear  that  he  is  pos- 
sessed  of  a  moral  character?  that  rf£KE£r 
he  loves  moral  excellence,  and  dis- 
approves of  moral  evil  ?     This  appears  evidently 


254:  MORAL   SCIENCE. 

from  the  moral  constitution  of  man.  The  law 
interwoven  in  his  constitution  proves  that  his 
Maker  approves  of  moral  excellence.  Again,  it 
would  be  absurd  to  suppose  that  the  creature 
could  possess  an  excellence,  and  one  superior  to 
all  natural  endowments,  of  which  there  was  no 
prototype  in  the  Great  First  Cause.  We  may  lay 
it  down  as  a  maxim,  that  whatever  perfection 
we  can  conceive  of  must  exist  in  the  most  per- 
fect degree  in  the  Creator,  for  all  our  ideas  of 
perfection  are  derived  from  the  contemplation 
of  creation ;  and  whatever  excellence  there  is 
in  the  creation  must  exist  in  the  Creator. 

Besides,  by  the  laws  of  nature,  virtuous  con- 
duct is   generally  productive   of 

Divine  approba-    pleasure   anc|    peace  Qf  m[n&-    and 

hon  of  virtue.  *  * 

immoral  conduct  is  generally  a 
source  of  misery.  These  laws  of  nature  are  the 
laws  of  God,  and  mamfe»t  his  approbation  of 
Y)7*tue  and  digspprop^Loc.  of  vice. 


CHAPTER  XXX. 

DUTIES  OF  MAN  TO  THE  CEEATOK   AS  THUS  MANIFESTED 

Having  given,  in  a  summary,  the  proofs  of  the 

existence  and  character  of  God,  so  far  as  reason 

can  guide  us  in  the  inquiry,  we 

Foundation     of 

law.  are    now   prepared    to    consider 

the  relation  in  which  man  stands 
to  God,  and  the  obligations  which  arise  out 
of  this  relation.  As  man  himself,  in  the  wise 
and  wonderful  constitution  of  his  mind  and 
body,  has  been  supplied  with  the  most  striking 
and  convincing  evidences  of  a  powerful,  wise, 
and  beneficent  Author  of  the  universe  ;  we  are 
led  at  once  to  see,  that  God,  as  being  the  Creator 
of  man,  and  the  Giver  of  all  his  remarkable  en- 
dowments, has  a  perfect  right  to  claim  his  obe- 
dience, to  the  utmost  extent  of  his  powers.  And 
on  taking  an  impartial  survey  of  the  origin  of 
his  being,  of  the  goodness  of  the  Creator  in  his 


256  MORAL   SCIENCK 

various  beneficent  endowments,  and  of  his  con 
tinual  dependence,  not  only  for  the  continuance 
of  his  being,  faculties,  and  susceptibilities,  but 
also  for  all  those  gifts  of  divine  Providence  ne- 
cessary to  his  health  and  comfort,  man  cannot 
but  feel  that  he  is  under  the  strongest  moral 
obligation  to  obey,  honour,  and  glorify  his 
Maker,  with  his  best  affections  and  most  stre- 
nuous exertions.  This  is  the  foundation  of 
what  is  called  the  law ;  that  moral  law  which  is, 
as  it  were,  written  on  the  heart  of  every  man ; 
for  what  man  is  there,  who  has  come  to  the  ex- 
ercise of  reason,  who  does  not  perceive  a  clear 
distinction  between  right  and  wrong?  And 
where  can  be  found  a  human  being,  who,  upon 
having  his  relation  to  God  as  his  Creator  set  be- 
fore him,  does  not  feel  in  his  conscience,  that  he 
is  under  a  moral  obligation  to  be  subservient  to 
his  will  ? 

The  general  obligation  on  all  moral  agents, 
„       ....      to  serve  their  Creator,  is  evident 

Gsneral    obliga-  ' 

enough.  *  It  will  require  some 
time,  and  careful  consideration  of  this  relation 
in  which  man  stands  to  his  Maker,  to  ascertain 


DUTY  TO   CREATOR.  257 

the  particular  duties  which  are  obligatory  on  all 
men. 

This    We  Shall    nOW  attempt,  SO        Particular  obliga- 
tion. 

far  as  reason  can  guide  us  in  this 
matter. 

Here  it  may  be  proper  to  remark,  that  the 
essence  of  all  obedience  is  internal ;  that  is,  con- 
sists in  the  dispositions,  affections, 

Obedience  internal. 

and  purposes  of  the  heart.  Out- 
ward actions  partake  of  a  moral  nature,  only  so 
far  as  they  proceed  from  these  internal  affections. 
Human  laws  must  be  satisfied  with  external  obe- 
dience, because  human  lawgivers  cannot  search 
the  heart,  nor  scrutinize  the  motives  of  those  who 
owe  obedience.  But  even  earthly  judges,  in  ad- 
ministering justice,  endeavour  as  far  as  human 
judgment  can  go,  to  discover  from  what  internal 
motives  any  action  under  examination  was  per- 
formed ;  and  their  decision  of  acquittal  or  con- 
demnation is  grounded  on  the  opinion  which 
they  form  of  the  intention  and  motives  of  the 
person  under  arraignment.  Much  more  then 
does  the  moral  Governor  of  the  World  require 
of  his  creatures  the  obedience  of  the  heart ;  'for 


258  MORAL   SCIENCE. 

he  possesses  a  perfect  knowledge  of  what  is  in 
the  heart  of  every  one ;  and  a  most  perfect  esti- 
mate of  the  nature  of  moral  good  and  evil  as 
those  qualities  exist  in  the  human  heart.  It 
seems  evident,  therefore,  that  the  laws  of  na- 
ture demand  the  highest  degree  of  excellence  of 
which  the  mind  of  man  is  capable.  And  as  God 
possesses  every  moral  attribute  in  the  highest 
perfection,  it  is  reasonable  to  infer,  that  man,  as 
he  came  from  the  hands  of  his  Creator,  was  en- 
dued with  the  seeds  and  principles  of  every 
moral  virtue.  And  if  the  nature  of  man  is  not 
now  found  adorned  with  these  moral  excellen- 
cies, he  must  in  the  exercise  of  his  free  will  have 
departed  from  his  primeval  state.  Our  present 
inquiry,  however,  is  not  whether  man  has  fallen 
from  his  original  integrity,  but  what  are  the  du- 
ties arising  out  of  man's  relation  to  God  as  his 
Creator,  Benefactor,  and  Preserver.  Although 
the  obligation  to  obedience  arises 

Infinite  excellency.  ° 

primarily  from  the  relations  just 

mentioned,  yet  it  is  necessary  to  take  into  view 

the  supreme  excellence  and  majesty  of  the  cha- 

* 
racter  of  God ;  for  if  pious  and  devout  sentiments 
/ 


DOTY   TO   CREATOR.  259 

towards  God  be  required,  it  is  because  there  is 
in  the  character  of  God  as  exhibited  in  his  works, 
something  to  call  forth  such  affections,  from  ra- 
tional and  rightly  disposed  minds.  If  God  wer 
not  supremely  excellent,  it  would  not  be  reason- 
able to  demand  supreme  love  from  his  creatures, 
and  so  of  other  things.  But  as  we  know  that 
God  is  possessed  of  every  excellence  in  an  infi- 
nite degree,  there  exists  an  object  for  every 
affection  and  sentiment  toward  him,  of  which  the 
human  mind  is  capable.  From  what  has  been 
said  it  is  evident,  that  in  order  to  perform  any 
other  duties  to  the  Creator,  some  knowledge 
of  his  true  character  is  requisite.  Without  know- 
ledge the  rational  mind  cannot  exercise  right 
affections. 

Supposing  then  a  rational  mind,  such  as  it  ia 
reasonable  to  think  man  possessed,  when  he  pro- 
ceeded from    the    hands    of   his 

•  Adoration 

Maker,  and  possessing  that  know- 
ledge of  his  attributes  which  may  be  learned 
from  his  works,  what  would  be  the  first  thoughts 
and  feelings  of  the  newly  created  soul?     In  our 
judgment,  the  first  feeling  would  be  an  emotion 


260  HOKAL  SCIENCE. 

of  piofound  veneration,  or  perhaps  the  word 
adoration  would  more  strongly  indicate  the  state 
of  the  mind,  absorbed  in  the  contemplation  of  a 
Being  so  august,  so  powerful,  and  so  immense. 
This  feeling,  then,  is  one  which  ought  to  exist 
in  every  rational  mind  toward  the  Almighty. 
This  is  the  true  foundation  of  divine  worship. 
It  is  the  deep  and  solemn  emotion  which  is  the 
essence  of  the  worship,  which  holy  beings  in  all 
worlds  offer  unto  God. 

And  this  feeling  would  lead  to  a  reverence 

of  every  thing  which  has  any  relation  to  God. 

His  very  name  would  be  sacred. 

Reverence.  ^^ 

We  have  read  of  men  of  great 
eminence  who  never  mentioned  that  name  with- 
out a  solemn  pause,  or  some  external  token  of 
reverence. 

The  duty  Avhich  most  naturally  arises  from 

the    relation   which   man   sustains   to   God,    as 

his   Creator,  Benefactor,  and   Ke- 

Thankfulness.  .  . 

deemer,  is  that  of  gratitude.  This 
is,  when  strong  a  very  lively  and  impulsive 
feeling.  It  draws  men  along  as  taken  captive ; 
and   yet    the    constraint    is    not    painful,    but 


DUTY  TO   CREATOR.  261 

pleasing.  Under  the  influence  of  gratitude, 
men  will  engage  in  the  most  odious  duties,  and 
will  voluntarily  make  the  most  self-denying  sa- 
crifices. Under  the  influence  of  this  affection 
men  have  been  willing  to  lay  down  their  lives. 
Gratitude  is  then  an  important  principle  of  man's 
obedience.  It  is  true,  some  have  attempted  to 
degrade  this  principle  as  one  which  scarcely  can 
be  said  to  partake  of  the  nature  of  virtue,  be- 
cause it  has  respect  to  self,  and  to  our  own  in- 
terest. But  though  gratitude  originates  in  the 
sense  of  benefits  received  by  ourselves,  it  de- 
serves not  to  be  classed  with  mere  selfish  affec- 
tions. Its  object  is  to  make  a  return  to  a  bene- 
factor for  favour  received.  It  is,  therefore,  an 
elevated  species  of  justice ;  for  when  a  suitable 
and  adequate  return  can  be  made  for  favours 
received,  gratitude  will  not  be  satisfied  until  this 
s  done.  And  in  regard  to  the  benefits  received 
from  our  Creator,  as  an  adequate  compensation 
is  utterly  beyond  our  power,  gratitude  manifests 
itself  '^  -.cknowledgment  of  obligation  in  thanks- 
giving and  in  unceasing  praises.  There  is,  how- 
ever, no  necessity  to  argue  this  matter  ;  the  ap 


262  MORAL   SCIENCE. 

peal  may  safely  be  made  to  the  feelings  of  every 
rightly  constituted  mind.  All  men  who  ac- 
knowledge the  existence  and  Providence  of  God, 
feel  that  a  debt  of  gratitude  is  due  to  their  great 
Benefactor. 

As  the  mind,  when  uncorrupted,  is  so  consti- 
tuted as  to  love  and  esteem  whatever  is  excel- 
lent, and  as  moral  excellence  is 

Love. 

superior  to  all  other  amiable  ob- 
jects ;  and  as  God  possesses  this  excellence 
in  an  infinite  degree,  it  is  reasonable  that  he 
should  be  esteemed  above  every  other  object. 
Finite  minds,  it  is  true,  can  never  exercise 
love  proportionate  to  the  excellence  of  this 
Glorious  Being ;  but  as  far  as  they  possess  the 
capacity  of  apprehending  it,  and  the  susceptibil- 
ity of  affection,  they  are  under  moral  obligation 
to  love  God  with  all  their  powers.  And  this 
cannot  be  considered  as  demanding  too  much  of 
the  rational  creature,  for  no  other  measure  of 
affection  can  be  fixed  without  supposing  a  wrong 
estimate  of  the  object,  or  a  defect  of  right  feel- 
ing ;  for  what  is  more  reasonable  than  to  pro- 
portion the  intensity  of  our  affection  to  the  ex- 


DUTY   TO   CREATOR.  263 

cellence  of  the  object  ?  But  in  this  also,  the  ex- 
cellency of  the  object  infinitely  surpasses  our 
capacity  of  love,  so  that  if  the  mind  should  be 
enlarged  a  thousand-fold,  so  as  to  possess  a  thou- 
sand  times  as  great  a  power  of  love  and  esteem 
as  at  present,  the  obligation  to  love  God  with 
this  increasing  capacity  would  be  complete ;  and 
any  less  degree  of  esteem  and  care  would  be 
casting  dishonour  on  God.  And  again,  this  ob- 
ligation would  exist,  even  if  it  were  painful  to 
come  up  in  our  affections  to  this  high  demand ; 
but  this  is  so  far  from  being  the  fact,  that  man's 
happiness  is  perfect  in  the  same  proportion  as  his 
obedience  is  perfect.  From  every  consideration, 
therefore,  it  is  evident  that  man  is  bound  by  the 
law  of  his  nature,  and  the  relation  which  he  sus- 
tains to  God,  to  love  him  with  his  whole  soul. 

As  the  will  of  God  is  always  guided  by  wis- 
dom and  goodness,  whenever  and 

Submission. 

however  this  will  is  manifested,  it 
should  be  implicitly  and  cheerfully  submitted  to, 
even  though  contrary  to  our  wishes,  and  even 
what  seems  best  to  our  reason  ;  which  is  submis- 
sion to  the  Providence  of  God. 


264  MORAL   SCIENCE. 

Another  duty  clearly  incumbent  on  the  ra- 
tional creature  of  God,  is  trust  or  confidence. 
As  man  is  dependent,  and  as  the 

Trust.  .  .  .  .. 

supply  oi  his  necessities  can  be 
derived  from  no  other  source  than  from  God,  it 
is  evidently  his  duty  to  place  his  confidence  in 
God  for  every  thing,  believing  in  his  goodness, 
faithfulness  and  power. 

This  trust  in   God,   however,   involves  the 

duty  of  prayer.     It  is  as  natural  and  reasonable 

for  a  dependent  creature  to  apply 

Pru  vcr. 

to  its  Creator  for  what  it  needs,  as 
for  a  child  thus  to  solicit  the  aid  of  a  parent 
who  is  believed  to  have  the  disposition  and 
ability  to  bestow  what  it  needs.  Plausible 
objections  have  been  raised  against  the  duty 
of  prayer,  derived  from  the  omniscience  01 
God,  and  from  his  immutable  purposes.  But 
these  objections  possess  no  real  validity.  For 
although  God  knows  perfectly  beforehand  wha., 
his  creatures  need,  yet  the  acknowledgment  of 
their  dependence  is  manifestly  proper,  and  the 
offering  of  petitions  for  such  things  as  they 
need,  has  a  tendency  to  keep  up  a  proper  sense 


DUTY    TO    CREATOR  2G5 

of   dependence.      And  as  God  deals  with  his 
creatures  according  to  the  nature  which  he  has 
given  them,  it  is  proper  that  lie  should  require 
of  them  such  dispositions  and  acts  as  are  becom 
ing  ^dependent  creatures.  This,  too,  is  in  accord- 
ance with  the  conduct  of  men  on  whom  others 
are  dependent.     The  object  of  prayer,  including 
praise,  is  to  preserve  in  the  mind  a  right  state 
of  feeling   towards  a  Being  to  whom  it  owes 
every   thing,   and  from  whom   alone  blessings 
can  be  expected.     The  highest  privilege  of  the 
most  exalted  creature  is  to  enjoy  communion 
and    intercourse   Avith   the   Infinite   Source    of 
all    good.      Prayer   is   the   only   means   which 
man  enjoys  of  holding  immediate  intercourse 
with    his    Maker.     And    this   privilege    is   the 
highest  honour  which  he  can  enjoy  in  the  pre- 
sent state.     So  also,  it  is  a  means  of  the  most 
sublime  happiness.     By  this  exercise  he  draws 
near  to  God,  and  when   such   approaches   are 
made  sincerely  and  affectionately  on  his  part,  it 
cannot  be  doubted  that  Divine  communications 
will  be  vouchsafed,  and  the  light  of  the  Divine 
favour  be  lifted  upon  him,  and  the  answer  to  his 
12 


266  MORAL   SCIENCE. 

prayers  be  granted  by  the  dispensations  of  di« 
vine  Providence  toward  him. 

As  to  the  'objection   derived  from  the  im 

mutability   of  the    Divine    purposes,    it    arises 

from  a  narrow  view  of  thisvsub- 

Not  inconsistent    •      ,        j^    j  t  import. 

with  Divine  plan.       J        '  I 

ant  part  of  the  Divine  plan.  The 
purposes  of  God,  though  immutable,  are  not  in- 
consistent with  the  freedom  of  the  creatures,  nor 
with  the  use  and  efficacy  of  appropriate  means. 
The  truth  is,  all  these  acts  and  means  are  in- 
cluded in  the  Divine  plan.  If  God  has  decreed 
that  a  certain  field  shall  produce  a  plentiful  crop ; 
he  has  also  decreed  that  all  the  influences  of 
sun,  rain,  and  the  necessary  labour  shall  take 
place.  And  if  he  has  purposed  to  bestow  cer- 
tain favours  on  his  rational  creatures,  he  may  in 
the  same  manner  purpose  that  these  benefits  shall 
be  given  in  answer  to  prayer ;  so  that  prayer  may 
be  considered  as  the  means  by  which  these  bless- 
ings are  obtained  is  truly  as  a  plentiful  crop  is 
the  effect  of  a  skilful  and  laborious  tillage  of  the 
ground. 

As  to  external  acts  of  devotion,  reason  and 


DUTY   TO    CltEATOR.  207 

nature   teach   that   humility   and   reverence  in 

our  words,  attitudes,  and  gestures 

are  highly  proper  when  we   ad-     , 0utward  acts  of 

o     ./     ±       i.  religion. 

dress  our  praises  unto  God.  When 
we  are  filled  with  devotional  feelings,  nature 
prompts  to  give  utterance  to  our  emotions  ;  and 
the  use  of  appropriate  sounds  and  gestures  seems 
also  to  keep  up  and  increase  the  feelings  of  the 
mind.  These  outward  expressions,  however,  are 
not  essential  to  acceptable  prayer.  The  silent 
breathings  of  desire  are  known  to  God,  and  will 
be  acceptable  to  him.  It  is  reasonable  to  believe 
that  God  never  takes  more  complacency  in  his 
creatures,  than  when  they  come  before  him  in 
the  humble,  reverential  posture  of  adoration, 
prayer,  and  praise. 

Nothing  can  be  more  evident,  than  that  the 
creature  should  exercise  benevo- 
lence or  good  will  towards  the  gloJ^JS£to  tb' 
Author  of  his  being.  Not  that  we 
can  desire  Him  to  be  more  excellent,  more  wise, 
more  powerful,  or  more  independent  than  he  is ; 
but  we  may  rejoice  in  all  his  attributes  and  glory 
in  his  greatness,  and  be  delighted  with  the  idea 


268  MOliAL   SCIENCE. 

of  his  unbounded  and  uninterrupted  happiness  ; 
and  in  these  elevated  emotions  of  joy,  and  act3 
of  gbrying  and  glorifying  God,  it  is  believed 
that  the  purest,  sublimest,  and  most  constant 
happiness  of  all  holy  beings  consists.  Nothing 
is  more  evident  to  impartial  reason,  than  that  the 
glory  of  God  should  be  the  supreme  object  oi 
the  rational  creature's  rjursuit.  It  is,  in  fact,  the 
noblest  object  which  can  be  considered.  We  are 
unable  to  imagine  any  thing  more  glorious  foi 
God  himself  to  seek,  than  his  own  glory.  Cer- 
tainly, then,  it  is  the  highest  end  at  which  anv 
creature  can  aim ;  and  it  is  a  sentiment  entirely 
accordant  with  reason,  that  all  the  creation  was 
produced  for  the  purpose  of  exhibiting  the 
glory  of  God.  And  man  was  endowed  with  a 
capacity  of  knowing  and  loving  God,  for  the 
very  purpose  of  glorifying  his  Maker.  Not  that 
any  addition  can  be  made  to  the  essential  per- 
fection and  felicity  of  the  Eternal  One  :  but  the 
manifestation  of  these  perfections  is  what  is  pro- 
perly called  the  glory  of  God. 

All   the  duties  which   have  been  specified, 


DUT1     TO    OEEATOK.  269 

coil  mend  themselves,  as  obligatory    Ml  the  ra 
tionil  creature,  to  every  impartial 

Summary: 

mind;  all  that  seems  further  ne- 
cessary is  to  give  a  brief  summary  of  what  has 
been  said  on  this  subject. 

The  order  in  which  these  devotional  exercises 
are  set  down  is  not  very  important ;  for  though 
there  is   an   order   of  precedence 

,  '11  ,i  Ail  included  In 

and  sequence  m  all  our  mental  ex-  iove. 
ercises,  yet  while  it  is  unnecessary 
to  speak  of  these  affections  which  have  God  for 
their  object,  seriatim,  they  are  commonly 
combined  ,  and  mingled  in  the  conscious  ex- 
perience of  the  mind ;  so  that  in  the  same 
moment  various  acts  and  exercises  appear  to 
be  simultaneous.  They  may,  however,  be  all 
comprehended  under  the  single  term,  Love,  if 
we  give  a  genuine  meaning  to  that  term. 

The  summation  which  seems  as  proper  as 
any  other  which  occurs,  is  the  following : 

1.  Adoration,  having   for    its 

Dntles  to  Goi 

object  the  greatness,   majesty,  ho- 
liness, and  incomprehensibility  of  God. 

2.  Admiration,  or  holy  wonder  of  the  wis* 


270  MORAL    SCIENCE. 

dom  of  God  in  the  multiplied  contrivances  and 
organizations  in  the  created  universe. 

3.  Esteem  for  and  complacency  in  GooVs  moral 
excellence. 

4.  Desire  of  Union  and  Communion  with  God, 
and  of  conformity  to  his  character. 

5.  Gratitude  for  his  goodness  manifested  in 
all  creation  ;  but  particularly  to  man,  in  the  con- 
stitution of  his  soul  and  body,  and  in  the  provi- 
sion made  by  the  providence  of  God  for  the  sub- 
sistence and  comfort  of  the  human  family,  and 
of  all  living  creatures. 

6.  Trust,  or  Confidence  in  God,  as  a  benignant 
and  kind  Father  and  Protector,  who  will  not 
abandon  the  work  of  his  own  hands,  nor  be 
wanting  in  contributing  to  their  happiness  in 
future,  as  long  as  they  are  obedient  to  his  will. 

7.  Acquiescence .  in  the  will  of  God,  and  sub- 
rmission  to  those  dispensations  which  even  cross 
the  natural  feelings,  is  an  evident  moral  duty, 
Indeed,  the  surrender  of  soul  and  body  to  God, 
to  be  used  and  disposed  of  by  him  for  his  own 
glory,  is  the  state  of  mind  of  which  the  moral 
faculty  approves. 


DUTY   TO    CREATOR.  271 

8.  Prayer  to  God  for  such  things  us  we  need, 
is  a  duty  dictated  by  the  law  of  nature,  includ- 
ing suitable  expressions  of  our  devotional  feel- 
ings in  words  and  gestures.  But  no  creature 
nas  a  right  to  institute  or  adopt  any  ceremonies 
of  worship  which  God  has  not  appointed. 

9.  Making  the  Glory  of  God-the  supreme  end 
cf  all  his  actions,  the  object  of  his  constant  and 
untiring  pursuit ;  and  rejoicing  and  triumphing 
in  the  infinite  glory,  independence,  immutability, 
and  blessedness  of  God. 

The  above  enumeration,  it  is  believed,  com- 
prehends the  internal  acts  and  exercises  in  which 
the  duty  of  man  to  God  consists, 

What  leason    sf 

which  duties  plainly  arise  out  of  firms  of  man's  ran 

ftn  state. 

the  attributes  of  God  and  man's 
relation  to  him,  as  his  Creator,  Preserver,  and 
Benefactor.  And  if  man  had  never  failed  in  the 
nerformance  of  these  duties — if  he  had  continued 
o  exercise  those  affections  which  spontaneously 
spring  up  in  his  soul,  when  he  came  from  the 
nands  of  his  Creator,  this  world,  instead  of  being 
a  land  of  misery,  would  now  have  been  a  bloom- 
ing paradise  of  joy.     And  we  may  be  sure  that 


272  MORAL   SCIENCE. 

a  good  God  who  loves  all  his  creatures  acczird 
ing  to  their  actions,  would  never  have  permitted 
the  natural  evils  which  now  oppress  the  human 
soul,  to  have  entered  into  the  world.  Sickness, 
famine,  and  death  in  its  thousand  different  forms, 
would  have  been  unknown. 

It  is  evident  from  the  slightest  view  of  the 

character  of  man  in  all  ages  and  countries,  tnat 

he  has  lost  his  primeval  integrity. 

Conclusion.  ,  . 

that  the  whole  race  nave  by  some 
means  fallen  into  the  dark  gulf  of  sin  and  misery. 
This,  reason  teaches;  but  how  to  escape  from 
ihis  wretched  condition,  she  teaches  not. 


VI SIZ. 


